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Abstract
Modern software systems are increasingly characterized by uncertain-
ties in the operating context and user requirements. These uncertainties
are difficult to predict at design time. Achieving the quality goals of
such systems depends on the ability of the software to deal with these
uncertainties at runtime. A self-adaptive system employs a feedback
loop to continuously monitor and adapt itself to achieve particular qual-
ity goals (i.e., adaptation goals) regardless of uncertainties. Current re-
search applies formal techniques to provide guarantees for adaptation
goals, typically using exhaustive verification techniques. Although these
techniques offer strong guarantees for the goals, they suffer from well-
known state explosion problem. In this thesis, we take a broader per-
spective and focus on two types of guarantees: (1) functional correct-
ness of the feedback loop, and (2) guaranteeing the adaptation goals
in an efficient manner. To that end, we present ActivFORMS (Active
FORmal Models for Self-adaptation), a formally founded model-driven
approach for engineering self-adaptive systems with guarantees. Ac-
tivFORMS achieves functional correctness by direct execution of for-
mally verified models of the feedback loop using a reusable virtual ma-
chine. To efficiently provide guarantees for the adaptation goals with
a required level of confidence, ActivFORMS applies statistical model
checking at runtime. ActivFORMS supports on the fly changes of adap-
tation goals and updates of the verified feedback loop models that meet
the changed goals. To demonstrate the applicability and effectiveness of
the approach, we applied ActivFORMS in several domains: warehouse
transportation, oceanic surveillance, tele assistance, and IoT building se-
curity monitoring.
Keywords: Self-adaptive software systems, MAPE-K feedback loop,
Statistical model checking, Analytical methods
v

Acknowledgments
With this dissertation, I accomplish a significant milestone in my
life, but it was not possible without the help of my family, teachers, and
friends. I like to thank all the people who helped me during my studies.
My sincerest thanks to my supervisor and mentor, Professor Danny
Weyns, for providing me a chance to pursue my dream. Without his
encouragement and guidance, I wouldn’t have been able to realise this
dream.
I also want to thank my co-supervisor Jesper Andersson and exam-
iner Prof. Welf Lo¨we, for providing me all the support to accomplish
this milestone.
Special thanks to Jonas Lundberg, who has always believed in me
and provided support whenever I needed any guidance and help.
Sincere thanks to all my colleagues and friends Nadeem Abbas,
Sharafat Ali, Stepan Shevtsov, Didac Gil de la Iglesia, and Asim Raza,
who supported me always during my study.
Special thanks to all my teachers, especially, Onaiza Maqbool, who
not only learned me a lot on software engineering, but also guided me to
become a better person.
My research collaborators, Prof. Radu Calinescu and Simos Gerasi-
mou, Prof. Danny Hughes and Gowri R. Sankar, special thanks for pro-
viding support in my research.
Special thanks to all the jury members, especially, Prof. Flavio
Oquendo, Romina Spalazzese, Patrizio Pelloccione, and Maruo Capor-
uscio, for providing me valuable comments.
Special thanks to all the faculty member of Linnaeus University and
KU Leuven University, for supporting me with all the hard work.
I want to thank my mother Farzana Shamim who always believed in
me. Without her prayers, I wouldn’t be able to accomplish this achieve-
ment. After that, I want to thank my grandfather Muhammad Shafi, who
always supported me in pursuing my studies and for every other aspect
of my life. I want to thank my wife Adeela Usman for providing me
moral support and well taken care of me and my son Muhammad Arsh
Usman who was always supportive when I was studying. I am also grate-
ful to my other family members, my sister Summaira Shamail and her
family, my cousins and friends who have supported me along the way.
Last but not least, I want to thank Almighty Allah, who guided me
all my life, providing me with countless blessings.
Va¨xjo¨, Sweden
November 24, 2017

Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Problem Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Scope of the Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Scientific Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Overview of ActivFORMS Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.6 Overview of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Research Background 11
2.1 Self-Adaptation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Related Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Analytical Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Systematic Empirical Inquiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3 ActivFORMS: Active Formal Models for Self-Adaptation 21
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2 State of the Art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3 Robotic System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.4 Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.6 Conclusions & Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4 Engineering Trustworthy Self-Adaptive Software with Dynamic Assur-
ance Cases 45
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.3 Self-adaptive Systems Used in the Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.4 The ENTRUST Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.5 Tool-Supported Instance of ENTRUST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.6 Applying the ENTRUST Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.7 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.8 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5 Model-based Simulation at Runtime for Self-adaptive Systems 107
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.3 Tele Assistance System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.4 Modular Decision Making Approach for Self-Adaptation . . . . . 112
5.5 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.6 Conclusion and future work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6 ActivFORMS: An Efficient Approach to Engineer Self-Adaptive Systems
with Guarantees 127
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.3 Self-Adaptive Internet of Things Application . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.4 ActivFORMS Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.5 Evaluation of ActivFORMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
ix
6.6 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
6.7 Conclusions and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
7 Conclusion and Future Work 175
7.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
7.2 Lessons learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
7.3 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
7.4 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Appendix 181
A A Model Interpreter for Timed Automata 181
A.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
A.2 Timed Automata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
A.3 Executable Model Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
A.4 Model Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
A.5 Additional Features and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
A.6 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
A.7 Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
B DeltaIoT: A Self-Adaptive Internet of Things Exemplar 197
B.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
B.2 DeltaIoT Exemplar and Adaptation Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . 198
B.3 Architecture of DeltaIoT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
B.4 Experimentation with DeltaIoT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
B.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
C List of Publications 213
x
List of Figures
1.1 Overview of the scientific approaches used to conduct the study . . . 5
1.2 Overview of ActivFORMS approach [205] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Overview of the thesis with research questions and their answers . . . 9
2.1 Overview of the 3-layer reference model [122] . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 An overview of a self-adaptive system with MAPE-K reference model
[57] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Overview of the systematic empirical inquiry used in our research . . 19
3.1 Overview of the addressed research goals and used scientific ap-
proaches in the initial version of ActivFORMS . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2 MAPE-K realization in [37] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3 Left: User interface to the robot simulator. Right: Two Turtlebots in
action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.4 ActivFORMS approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.5 Plan automaton of a robot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.6 Excerpt of internal model representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.7 Input triggered execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.8 Time triggered execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.9 Interaction between an effector and the engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.10 Change of the formal model at runtime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.11 Goal model example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.12 Execute behaviors for a robot in two operation modes . . . . . . . . . 38
3.13 Deadlock scenario in robot system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.14 ActivFORMS User Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.15 Illustration of an executing active model of a robot (red locations are
current active locations) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.16 User interface for adding new goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.1 Overview of contribution of ActivFORMS to ENTRUST approach . . 45
4.2 Closed-loop control is used to automate software adaptation . . . . . 48
4.3 Core GSN elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.4 Example of a GSN assurance argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.5 Example of a GSN assurance argument pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.6 Foreign exchange trading (FX) workflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.7 Stages and key artefacts of the ENTRUST methodology. In line
with the two principles underpinning the methodology, its first
stage involves the development of verifiable models for the con-
troller, controlled system and environment of the self-adaptive sys-
tem used throughout the remaining stages, and multiple stages reuse
application-independent software and assurance artefacts. . . . . . . 57
4.8 Architecture of an ENTRUST self-adaptive system . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.9 Event-triggered MAPE model templates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.10 ENTRUST assurance argument pattern. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
xi
4.11 Away goal NoErroneousBehaviour, which justifies the absence of
errors due to reconfiguration and is based on the existing GSN pattern
Hazardous Contribution Software Safety Argument from the existing
GSN catalogue [101] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.12 UUV MAPE automata that instantiate the event-triggered ENTRUST
model templates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.13 CTMC modelMi of the i-th UUV sensor, adopted from [87] . . . . . 76
4.14 FX MAPE automata that instantiate the event-triggered ENTRUST
model templates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.15 Parametric DTMC model of the FX system; pMW, pTA, . . . , timeMW,
timeTA, . . . , and priceMW, priceTA, . . . , represent the reliability (i.e.
success probability), the response time and the price, respectively, of
the implementations used for theMW, TA, . . . system services. . . . . 79
4.16 Partially-instantiated assurance argument for the UUV system . . . . 81
4.17 Partially-instantiated assurance argument for the FX system; the ele-
ments (partially) instantiated in Stage 3 of ENTRUST are shaded. . . 82
4.18 Verification results for requirement (a) R1, (b) R2, and (c) cost of
the feasible configurations; 21 speed values between 1m/s and 5m/s
are considered for each of the seven combinations of active sensors,
corresponding to 21 ⇥ 7 = 147 alternative configurations. The best
configuration (circled) corresponds to x1 = x2 = 1, x3 = 0 (i.e.
UUV using only its first two sensors) and sp = 3.2m/s, and the shaded
regions correspond to requirement violations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.19 Runtime verification results for FX requirement (a) R1, (b) R2, and (c)
R3—cost of the feasible configurations, where the configuration index
i1i2i3i4i5i6 in number base 2 corresponds to the FX configuration
that uses services MWi1 , TAi2 , FAi3 , Ali4 , Ori5 and Noi6 . The best
configuration (circled) has index 5(10) = 000101(2), corresponding to
MW0, TA0, FA0, Al1, Or0 and No1. Shaded regions correspond to
requirement violations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.20 Fully-instantiated assurance argument for the UUV system; the sub-
goals for R2Achieved and R3Achieved (not included due to space
constraints) are similar to those for R1Achieved, and shading is used
to show the elements instantiated at runtime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.21 Fully-instantiated assurance argument for the FX system; the subgoals
for R2Achieved and R3Achieved (not included due to space con-
straints) are similar to those for R1achieved, and shading is used to
show the elements instantiated at runtime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.22 Change scenarios for the self-adaptive UUV system over 2100 sec-
onds of simulated time. Extended shaded regions indicate the sensors
switched on at each point in time, and narrow shaded areas show the
periodical testing of sensors switched off due to degradation (to detect
their recovery). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.23 Change scenarios for the self-adaptive FX system, with the initial ser-
vices characteristics shown in Table 4.5. The thick continuous lines
depict the services selected at each point in time. . . . . . . . . . . . 94
xii
4.24 CPU time for the UPPAAL verification of the generic controller prop-
erties in Table 4.4 (box plots of 10 independent measurements) . . . . 96
4.25 CPU time for the runtime probabilistic model checking of the QoS
requirements after changes (box plots based on 10 system runs com-
prising seven changes each—70 measurements in total) . . . . . . . . 97
5.1 Overview of the goals and scientific methods used in this chapter . . . 107
5.2 TAS workflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.3 High-level model for self-adaptation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.4 Change Management of the modular approach for decision making in
self-adaptive systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.5 Environment model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.6 Managed System model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.7 Quality model: Failure rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.8 Quality model: Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.9 Adaptation options with the selected configuration . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.10 Differences between two configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.11 Results over 10000 runs for the first experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.12 Quality model: Service time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.13 Adaptation options with selected configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.14 Results over 10000 runs for the first experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.15 Comparison of scalability with RQV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.1 Overview of the addressed research goals and used scientific ap-
proaches in this chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.2 DeltaIoT system with network topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.3 Profiles of uncertainties for one of the motes in Figure 6.2. . . . . . . 136
6.4 Overview of ActivFORMS approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.5 Reusable templates for specifying MAPE models . . . . . . . . . . . 143
6.6 MAPE feedback loop model for DeltaIoT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.7 SNR to Power for one of the links of the DeltaIoT network (↵ = 7.29
and   = 0.83) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.8 Reusable templates for probe and effector stubs . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.9 Template for the verifier stub . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.10 Effector stub for DeltaIoT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.11 Verification times for properties that check the correctness of the
MAPE feedback loop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6.12 ActivFORMS runtime architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.13 Quality model to estimate packet loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.14 Decision making at a particular point in time with two adaptation goals 159
6.15 GUI of ActivFORMS in action for DeltaIoT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
6.16 Latency model for DeltaIoT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
6.17 Updated analyzer model for DeltaIoT to deal with latency . . . . . . . 162
6.18 Live updates of the MAPE models for DeltaIoT (user interface to per-
form on-the-fly updates left hand side; the updated models ready for
execution after the update right hand side). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
6.19 Selection of the best adaptation option with three adaptation goals. . . 164
xiii
6.20 Tradeoff between accuracy and adaptation time with ActivFORMS . . 166
6.21 Impact on quality properties for different verification settings . . . . . 167
6.22 Results for a DeltaIoT setting with 15 motes and two adaptation goals 167
6.23 Results of the scalability tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
6.24 Impact of dynamically adding a latency goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
A.1 The simple lamp example. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
A.2 Excerpt of the XML based DSML for the Lamp example. . . . . . . . 185
A.3 Overview of the executable model generation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
A.4 AST for transition Low to TurningBright. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
A.5 Task graph for guard y < 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
A.6 Overview of the Lamp example interpretation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
B.1 DeltaIoT network topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
B.2 Architecture of DeltaIoT Deployed at KU Leuven . . . . . . . . . . . 203
B.3 Excerpt topology with a network setting and result . . . . . . . . . . 205
B.4 Transmission power to SNR relation (for Link between Mote11 and
Mote1 with a spreading factor of 11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
B.5 Architecture of DeltaIoT Simulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
B.6 Profiles of uncertainties for two motes in Figure B.1 (mote 10 left,
mote 13 right) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
B.7 Simulation results of the simple self-adaptation solution . . . . . . . . 209
B.8 Test results of the physical IoT system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
xiv
List of Tables
4.1 Comparison of systems used to assess the generality of ENTRUST . . 54
4.2 Stages of the tool-supported instance of the ENTRUST methodology 65
4.3 Stochastic models supported by the ENTRUST instance, with cita-
tions of representative research that uses them in self-adaptive systems 68
4.4 Generic properties that should be satisfied by an ENTRUST controller 70
4.5 Initial characteristics of the service instances used by the FX system . 84
4.6 Overview of related research on assurances for self-adaptive systems
- part I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.7 Overview of related research on assurances for self-adaptive systems
- part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.8 Comparison of ENTRUST to related research on assurances for self-
adaptive systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.1 Third party service profiles for TAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.2 Average queue lengths and response times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.1 Summary of selection of related work and comparison with Activ-
FORMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
B.1 Generic adaptation scenarios for DeltaIoT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
B.2 Quality attributes and metrics for the evaluation and comparison of
self-adaptation solutions to DeltaIoT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
xv

Listings
6.1 DeltaIoT probe and effector methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.2 Template to define configurations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.3 Specification of DeltaIoT configurations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.4 Definition of Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.5 Knowledge definition for DeltaIoT feedback loop. . . . . . . . . . 141
6.6 Instantiate ActivFORMS with feedback loop of DeltaIoT. . . . . . 151
6.7 Connecting DeltaIoT probe with the monitor model. . . . . . . . . 152
6.8 Connecting the executor model with the DeltaIoT effector. . . . . 152
6.9 Connecting the analyzer model of DeltaIoT with statistical model
checker. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.10 Start the virtual machine for the DeltaIoT network. . . . . . . . . 153
6.11 Verification query for packet loss model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.12 Definition of adaptation goal for latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
6.13 Verification query for latency model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
B.1 DeltaIoT probing methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
B.2 DeltaIoT effecting methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
B.3 DeltaIoT effecting methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
xvii

Chapter 1
Introduction
With the advance of technology, software has become an essential and integrated
part of everyone’s life. Modern computing systems consist of many hardware
and software components working together to achieve particular goals. Examples
are multi-robot systems that support rescue workers with difficult tasks in disaster
areas, unmanned underwater vehicles that monitor pollution levels of maritime
areas, and smart homes that exploit Internet of Things (IoT) technology to monitor
the environment and control appliances for lighting, heating, doors, etc.
The increasing pervasiveness and mobility of modern software systems pose
several challenges to software engineers. One of the critical challenges is the abil-
ity of the software system to handle a highly uncertain environment, with mini-
mum human intervention. Software systems have to deal with many uncertainties
during operation, such as dynamics in the availability of resources and services,
changing operating conditions, and evolving user needs. Developing these systems
is particularly challenging, since software engineers often do not have complete
knowledge about the uncertainties at development time. Without any mitigation
mechanism, the uncertainties can lead to undesired behavior of the software sys-
tem, for example, the performance can degrade or the functionality can be com-
promised due to reliability issues [93, 109].
For a modern software system, it is almost indispensable to continuously con-
figure and optimize itself at runtime when knowledge becomes available that is
required to resolve the uncertainties. Self-adaptation is widely considered as an
effective approach that enables a software system to deal autonomously with un-
certainties and dynamics of the environment [48, 65, 133]. A self-adaptive system
tracks uncertainties in its environment, reasons about the uncertainties, and adapts
itself to maintain the system goals, or degrade gracefully when required [205].
Over the years, many adaptation techniques have been purposed to realize the
adaptation behavior [84, 122, 215]. One of the principled techniques is called
architecture-based self-adaptation [117]. In architecture-based self-adaptation, a
self-adaptive system consists of two parts: a managed system and a managing
system. The managed system provides the domain functionality to the user and
is the subject of adaptation. The managing system adapts the managed system
when required, providing the adaptation behavior. The managed system needs
to be instrumented with probes and effectors that enable the managing system to
monitor the managed system and its environment and adapt the managed system
as needed.
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A common approach to realize the managing system is using one or more
MAPE-K feedback loops. A MAPE-K feedback loop consists of five distinct com-
ponents: Monitor tracks uncertainties in the managed system and environment
using probes, Analyzer performs an analysis of the monitored data and estimates
available adaptation options and determines whether adaptation is required, Plan-
ner picks an adaptation option that realises a set of adaptation goals (adaptation
goals are typically quality goals [208, 212]) and creates a plan, i.e., a set of actions
that are required to adapt the managed system, and Executor executes the plan
using the effectors provided by the managed system. Knowledge provides a repos-
itory that enables the MAPE components to share data. The shared repository is
used to store data about the managed system, the environment, adaptation goals,
and the MAPE components themselves.
The notion of uncertainty has been studied extensively in a variety of fields,
see for example [25, 29, 146]. In the context of self-adaptation, uncertainty has
only been subject of research recently [69, 141, 154]. In our research, we limit
our scope to parametric uncertainty. Parametric uncertainty is characterised by a
lack of knowledge at design time about values of parameters of the system and its
environment. Parametric uncertainty is a form of epistemic uncertainty [154, 184].
The exact values of the uncertainty parameters will only be available at runtime
when the software system operates in the environment. It is important to note that
the parameter values are subject to change over time. An example of a parametric
uncertainty in the case of an IoT application is the interference in the links of the
wireless network that connects motes. The concrete levels of interference will only
be known at runtime when the motes send messages to each other. Note that the
rate of interference for different links can change over time, due to many reasons
such as the presence of users, changing weather conditions, etc. Hence a self-
adaptation solution is required that monitors the uncertainty parameters at runtime
and adapts the system accordingly to deal with changing conditions. Other types
of uncertainty, such as structural uncertainty are out of scope of our research.
Although self-adaptive systems can deal with uncertainties autonomously, pro-
viding guarantees that the system goals are achieved is still a challenging prob-
lem [40, 135]. Especially, providing guarantees for systems with strict goals is
crucial since these systems rely on the correct operation of the software to meet
their goals.
1.1 Problem Definition
Despite the advances of research on self-adaptation, one of the critical aspects that
remains to be tackled is the provision of the guarantees that the self-adaptive sys-
tem achieves its goals [7]. Providing such guarantees is challenging since software
systems are exposed to various types of uncertainty that can appear at anytime.
An important objective of our research is to provide guarantees for the goals of
self-adaptive systems in an efficient way. The following research questions are
investigated in the scope of this thesis:
RQ1 How to provide functional correctness of the feedback loop?
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RQ2 How to efficiently provide guarantees for the adaptation goals of the sys-
tem?
RQ3 How to support on-the-fly changes of adaptation goals?
With RQ1, we aim to achieve functional correctness of the feedback loop com-
ponents, i.e., MAPE-K components. With RQ2, we aim to guarantee the adap-
tation goals of a software system in an efficient way, such that the approach is
applicable in practice. With RQ3, we aim to enable adaptation goals to change
on-the-fly, which typically requires updates of the feedback loop components at
runtime to support the changing goals.
Recent research in self-adaptation suggests using formal methods for providing
guarantees for the goals of self-adaptive systems [38, 214]. Formal methods pro-
vide the means to rigorously specify mathematical models of a software system
and verify its behavior with respect to required properties [104].
Existing approaches mainly focus on using formal methods for two types of
guarantees: 1) guarantees for correct behavior of adaptive systems, and 2) guaran-
tees for the adaptation goals of the system. A pioneering approach that focusses on
guarantees for the correct behavior of adaptive systems is described in [112]. This
approach uses formal models (Petri nets) to specify and verify the adaptive and
non-adaptive behavior of a system. After that, the formal models are automati-
cally translated into executable programs. In this approach, model-based testing
techniques are applied to check the conformance between the models and the exe-
cutable programs.
A prominent approach that mainly focuses on ensuring adaptation goals is Run-
time Quantitative Verification (RQV) [37]. RQV typically uses a parameterized
Markov model of the system and its environment. There are two types of parame-
ters in the model: first, variabilities of the system that determine the adaptation op-
tions, and second uncertainties typically in the environment. The parameters that
represent uncertainties are updated at runtime via monitoring. A model-checking
tool then verifies the updated model to evaluate the quality properties for each
adaptation option that needs to be checked. After that, an adaptation option is se-
lected that fulfils the required adaptation goals of the system. A detailed overview
of the state of the art is provided in sections 4.8 and 6.6.
In general, the primary focus of state of the art is on ensuring the required adap-
tation goals that are subject of adaptation. Guaranteeing the functional correctness
of the feedback loop is often ignored. For example, if the Monitor component uses
a learning function to track changes in uncertainty, then does that function work
correctly? Is the Analyzer able to perform the analysis correctly? Will the plan
created by the Planner fulfill system goals? Is the plan executed in the correct or-
der by the Executor? Guaranteeing such properties is crucial for the feedback loop
to work correctly, which is the goal of RQ1.
Existing approaches that focus on ensuring the required adaptation goals typi-
cally rely on the exhaustive verification, which suffers from the well-known state
explosion problem [53]. Exhaustive verification is known to be computationally
very demanding and may not be applicable in resource-constrained systems, for
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example, embedded systems that have low memory and processing power. There-
fore, with RQ2, we study how to provide guarantees for the adaptation goals in an
efficient way.
Furthermore, existing approaches do not pay much attention on change adapta-
tion goals on-the-fly. However, changing adaptation goals on-the-fly is considered
a fundamental feature of a self-adaptive system [122, 165, 175]. With RQ3, we
study how to enable on-the-fly changes of adaptation goals.
1.2 Scope of the Research
Any research endeavour has a particular scope. We divided the scope of the re-
search presented in this dissertation in three categories: 1) the class of problems
that our research can solve by applying self-adaptation, 2) the type of adaptation
that our research targets, and 3) the assumptions that are made that put restrictions
on the scope of this research.
1.2.1 Class of problems
Our research targets adaptation problems for different types of quality properties
of systems. Quality properties are non-functional properties of the system that
indicate how well the system is able to deliver its intended functionality. We focus
in particular on performance, reliability, and efficiency requirements. We consider
in particular requirements to keep a value above or below a given threshold, or
requirements that optimize a particular value. In addition, we also support the
evolution of quality properties to deal with changed requirements or adding a new
quality property at runtime to deal with new user requirements. Other types of
qualities, such as security or interoperability, are out of the scope of this research.
1.2.2 Types of adaptation
We limit our research to the systems where a central feedback loop can monitor
and adapt the system. In the case, the software system is distributed, we focus
on systems where the Analyzer and Planner components of the feedback loop are
running on the same node. Other types of adaptation, where multiple feedback
loops are required (e.g. [44]), such as in systems-of-systems (e.g. [148]), are out of
the scope of this research. This also includes adaptation solutions that are based
on the principles of self-organisation [86].
1.2.3 Assumptions
Our research relies on the following assumptions:
• We assume that the managed system already exists. We also assume that
the managed system provides the necessary infrastructure to support self-
adaptation, including probes and effectors.
• We consider systems for which adaptation is event- or time-triggered. Fur-
thermore, we target systems in which dynamics of the environment is slower
than the time required by the feedback loop to adapt the system.
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• We consider systems with a finite set of adaptation options among which the
adaptation logic makes a selection to be executed. Discretising continuous
domains or applying heuristics to select adaptation options in a large space
can complement our work, but are out of scope of this research.
Finally, in this research, we follow the paradigm of architecture-based self-
adaptation that uses MAPE-K components to realize the feedback loop.
1.3 Scientific Approach
To conduct our research and evaluate the research results, we used analytical meth-
ods and empirical methods respectively. Analytical methods are used to model and
verify the behavior of software systems rigorously. We used three specific analyt-
ical methods in our research: model checking, runtime simulation, and statistical
model checking. A detailed description of these analytical methods is provided
in chapter 2. Empirical methods are used to collect evidence for the proposed
solutions. We used systematic empirical inquiry as an empirical method in our re-
search [81]. A systematic empirical inquiry follows a rigorous approach to evalu-
ate a particular solution by defining objectives, setting up an experiment, collecting
and analyzing data to presenting findings in a systematic manner.
We conducted our research in three phases in which both analytical methods
and systematic empirical inquiry are used to answer the research questions. Figure
1.1 presents an overview of research phases with the research goals and applied
methods.
Model Checking
Networks of timed automata (NTA)
Timed computation tree logic (TCTL)
Runtime Simulation
Stochastic timed automata (STA)
Empirical Method: Systematic Empirical Inquiry
Analytical Methods
Warehouse robotics
Unmanned underwater vehicle
Exchange trading
Tele assistance
Model Checking
Runtime Simulation
Statistical Model Checking
NTA, TCTL, STA
IoT security monitoring
Research Progress
Efficient adaptation
guarantees RQ1, RQ2, RQ3
Functional correctness of 
the feedback loop
Changing adaptation goals
on the fly
Research Goals
Phase 3Phase 2Phase 1
RQ1:
RQ3:
RQ2:
Figure 1.1: Overview of the scientific approaches used to conduct the study
In the first phase, we focused on RQ1 (functional correctness of the feedback
loop) and RQ3 (changing adaptation goals on the fly). We applied model checking
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as the analytical method to provide functional correctness of the feedback loop.
Concretely, we used networks of timed automata (NTA) to specify feedback loop
models and timed computation tree logic (TCTL) to specify correctness properties
and verify them. We evaluated the research results using a systematic empirical
inquiry in three domains: a simple warehouse robotic system, an unmanned un-
derwater vehicle application, and a exchange trading system.
In the second phase, we focused on research question RQ2 (efficiently pro-
viding guarantees about adaptation goals). We applied runtime simulation as the
analytical method using stochastic timed automata to provide guarantees for the
adaptation goals. We evaluated the research results using a systematic empirical
inquiry for a tele assistance system.
The first and second phase result in an initial version of ActivFORMS. In the
third and final phase our research, we developed a mature and integrated version of
ActivFORMS that deals with the three research questions. We combined different
analytical methods, including model checking, runtime simulation, and statistical
model checking. We evaluated the integrated solution using a systematic empirical
inquiry for a real-world IoT security monitoring application deployed at KU Leu-
ven. We compared our solution with a state of the art approach that uses runtime
quantitative verification (RQV).
1.4 Overview of ActivFORMS Approach
This thesis contributes ActivFORMS (Active Formal Model for Self-Adaptation),
a model-based integrated approach for engineering self-adaptive systems. Activ-
FORMS provides guarantees for: 1) functional correctness of the feedback loop,
2) efficient guarantees about the adaptation goals, and 3) support for on-the-fly
changing adaptation goals.
Figure 1.2 shows a high-level overview of ActivFORMS approach that consists
of four main stages of the software lifecycle of an adaptive system: 1) design, 2)
deployment, 3) runtime adaptation, and 4) evolution of the feedback loop [205].
We discuss each stage briefly.
Stage 1: model and verify feedback loop. In stage 1, formal models for the
feedback loop are specified and verified. ActivFORMS provides a set of reusable
MAPE templates that support the design of feedback loops. For modeling and
verification, we use Uppaal tool suite.
Stage 2: deploy feedback loop model with virtual machine. In stage 2, the
verified formal model of the feedback loop are deployed together with the Ac-
tivFORMS virtual machine. This virtual machine executes the formal model of
the feedback loop to realise self-adaptation. Stages 1 and 2 realise the functional
correctness of the feedback loop.
Stage 3, verify adaptation goals and adapt. In stage 3, the feedback loop
monitors the managed system and its environment, uses runtime simulation and
statistical model checking to realise the adaptation goals by adapting the managed
system. Stage 3 realises the adaptation goals in an efficient manner.
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Figure 1.2: Overview of ActivFORMS approach [205]
Stage 4, evolve adaptation goals and feedback loop model. Stage 4 supports
for on-the-fly change of adaptation goals and the feedback loop model. Stage 4
enables ActivFORMS to deal with new or changing adaptation goals, or to improve
the functions of the MAPE components.
It is important to note that on-the-fly updates supported by ActivFORMS are
restricted as follows:
1. Updates of the feedback loop model that require an update of the managed
system, the probes or effectors, is out of scope of our research.
2. Support for state updates after the new model is loaded is limited to restoring
the state of the same variables (in the old and the new model) or initialising
new variables (in the new model).
3. The execution of input messages of the monitor that are buffered during an
update of the feedback loop model do not generate any effects others as their
intended purpose.
1.5 Contributions
This thesis contributes a novel approach for engineering self-adaptive systems
called ActivFORMS. ActivFORMS adds the following contributions to the state-
of-the-art:
1. An innovative approach to provide functional correctness of the feedback
loop. Functional correctness is achieved using a reusable virtual machine that
directly executes the formally verified model of the feedback loop. Hence, the
approach ensures the design time guarantees at runtime. ActivFORMS comes
with a set of reusable templates that help designers to create MAPE-K com-
ponents [40, 107, 109, 205].
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2. An efficient approach to provide guarantees for the adaptation goals. In par-
ticular, the approach employs statistical model checking at runtime to effi-
ciently estimate quality properties of the system. Compared to exhaustive
model checking, statistical model checking provides verification results with
a require level of accuracy and confidence. However, the engineer can set
the level of accuracy and confidence in terms of the available resources [205,
209].
3. A novel approach for changing adaptation goals on-the-fly, together with
changing models of the feedback loop to support the changing goals. The
approach applies the principles of quiescence [123] to runtime models to en-
able updating the goals and models of the feedback loop safely during opera-
tion [109, 205].
1.6 Overview of the Thesis
We conclude this introduction with an overview of the thesis. Figure 1.3 gives
a schematic overview of the chapters with technical contributions that are linked
to the research questions. Chapters 3 to 6 and Appendix A and B are copies of
published papers.
In chapter 2, we provide an introduction of the basics of self-adaptive systems,
we briefly discuss related approaches, and we introduce the analytical and empiri-
cal methods we use in our research.
In chapter 3, we introduce the initial version of ActivFORMS approach that
uses a virtual machine to execute formal models during operation. The focus of
this chapter is on functional correctness of the feedback loop (RQ1) and chang-
ing adaptation goals on-the-fly (RQ3). We evaluated ActivFORMS with a simple
robotic warehouse transportation system. This chapter is a copy of [109].
In chapter 4, we integrated ActivFORMS with RQV and a dynamic assurance
case (i.e., an assurance case that is dynamically updated after each adaptation of
the system). The resulting engineering approach, called ENTRUST, helps engi-
neers designing trustworthy self-adaptive software systems. We evaluated EN-
TRUST to an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) system and a foreign exchange
trading (FX) system. This chapter is a copy of [40].
In chapter 5, we use runtime simulation to evaluate the expected qualities of
the different adaptation options in an efficient way (RQ3). This enables the feed-
back loop to select the best adaptation option. We evaluated the simulation-based
approach to a tele assistance system. This chapter is a copy of [209].
In chapter 6, we present the integrated ActivFORMS approach, a formally
founded model-driven approach for engineering self-adaptive systems (RQ1, RQ2,
RQ3). The approach integrates: 1) functional correctness of the feedback loop by
direct execution of formally verified models of the feedback loop using a reusable
virtual machine (RQ1), 2) efficient guarantees for the adaption goals with a re-
quired level of confidence using statistical model checking techniques at runtime
(RQ2), and 3) support for changing adaptation goals on the fly and updating of
verified models of the feedback loop that meet the new goals (RQ3). We evaluated
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the approach to a real-world deployed IoT building security monitoring applica-
tion. This chapter is a copy of [205].
Finally, we draw conclusions in chapter 7. We summarise the contributions of
our research, we report lessons learned, and outline interesting paths for future
research.
The dissertation includes two appendixes. Appendix A provides a technical
description of the virtual machine used in ActivFORMS. Appendix B, presents
DeltaIoT, an exemplar that enables researchers to evaluate and compare new meth-
ods, techniques and tools for self-adaptation in IoT. We used DeltaIoT in chapter
6 to evaluate the ActivFORMS approach. Appendix A and B are a copy of [107]
and [111] respectively.
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Chapter 2
Research Background
In this chapter, we discuss the basic concepts and methods that underlie our re-
search. We start with explaining the principles of self-adaptation and highlight
two references models. Then, we discuss a number of state of the art approaches
that are closely related to our work. After that, we explain the analytical methods
that we used in our research, i.e., model checking, runtime simulation, and statis-
tical model checking. The chapter conclude with a brief discussion of systematic
empirical inquiry, the empirical approach we used to validate the research results.
2.1 Self-Adaptation
Self-adaptation enables a software system to deal with uncertainties by reconfig-
uring its structure or adjust its behavior during operation. Examples of uncer-
tainties are dynamic availability of resources and evolving user requirements. In
this research, we focus on architecture-based self-adaptation. Architecture-based
self-adaptation separates the concerns of the managed system that is subject to
adaptation and the the concerns of the managing system that contains the adapta-
tion logic. The managing system realizes a feedback loop that monitors and adapts
the managed system to achieve the adaptation goals. Hereinafter, we discuss key
reference models that are used in our research to realize the managing system.
2.1.1 3-Layer Architecure Model
In 2007, Kramer and Magee proposed a reference model to realise self-adaptation
[122] that is inspired by the three-layer architecture for robotic systems proposed
by Gat [85]. The three layers of the proposed reference model are: component
control, change management, and goal management.
Figure 2.1 shows an overview of the three layer reference model. The bottom
layer Component Control consists of the software system that is subject of adap-
tation. This software system consists of interconnected components that may be
distributed over a network of computing nodes. The software system is equipped
with sensors that report the current status of components to the upper layer and ac-
tuators that enable modification of the components, such as addition, deletion, and
interconnection. The Change Management layer comprises a set of plans that can
be used to respond to status changes of the bottom layer. An example of a status
change is a failure of a component. Such a status change triggers an appropriate
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Figure 2.1: Overview of the 3-layer reference model [122]
plan of the change management layer, for example to create new component(s)
or change interconnections. Finally, the Goal Management layer deals with sta-
tus changes of the bottom layer that cannot be handled by the plans available at
the change management layer. To that end, the goal management layer create new
plans in response to the requests from the layers below, or alternatively in response
to new or changing goals.
2.1.2 MAPE-K Reference Model
In 2003, IBM introduced the vision of autonomic computing that is inspired by
our autonomic nervous system that governs our heart rate, body temperature, etc.
[57]. Central to this vision is the so called MAPE-K reference model [117].
Figure 2.2 shows a schematic overview of a self-adaptive system with a MAPE-
K feedback loop. A self-adaptive system is composed of a managed system that
is subject of adaptation and a managing system that realises a MAPE-K feedback
loop to adapt the managed system. The environment provides context to the man-
aged system in which this system operates. The managed system and managing
system are connected through sensors and actuators. The sensors provided by the
managed system allow the managing system to sense the managed system, the ac-
tuators allow the managing system to adapt the managed system when necessary.
A MAPE-K feedback loop consists of five distinct components that define the
following basic functions:
Monitor: The monitor component provides mechanisms to collect, aggregate,
and filter runtime data collected from the sensors. This data allow resolving
uncertainties.
Analyze: The analyze component analyses the data collected by the monitor to
determine the need for adaptation; examples of analytical models are queuing
models and Markov models.
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Figure 2.2: An overview of a self-adaptive system with MAPE-K reference model [57]
Plan: The plan component constructs a plan consisting of actions needed to
adapt the managed system to achieve the adaptation goals.
Execute: The execute component executes the actions of the plan adapting the
managed system through the actuators.
Knowledge: Knowledge is maintained in a repository that is shared among the
MAPE components. Examples of knowledge are the current state of the man-
aged system and environment, adaptation goals, analysis results, and plans.
2.2 Related Approaches
We discuss a number of key approaches for self-adaptation that are closely related
to our research. Subsequently, we look at approaches that focus on functional cor-
rectness, quality guarantees, executable models, and on-the-fly updates of goals.
A detailed discussion of the related work is included in the next chapters.
2.2.1 Functional correctness
A pioneer work that provides functional correctness of a self-adaptive system is
presented in [112]. The work follows a model-based approach to the development
of self-adaptive systems. A Petri net of the system is designed that models the
adaptive and non-adaptive behavior of the system. Adaptation is then modeled
as a transition of the system. The approach considers different types of adapta-
tions (one-point adaptation, guided adaptation, and overlap adaptation). The Petri
net model can then be verified. When the system is found correct it can be imple-
mented using automatic model transformations or by implementing the system and
checking conformance of the implementation and the model using model-based
testing.
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Recent work [43] uses model-checking techniques to determine the resilience
of self-adaptive systems that embody the MAPE-K model. The approach injects
malformed inputs from probes to quantify the impact that controller failures have
on the target system. The approach comprises two phases. In the first phase,
controller failures are identified by injecting invalid inputs from probes during
the different operational stages of MAPE-K loop. In the second phase, traces of
controller failures are aggregated into discrete-time Markov models. After that the
resilience of the system is quantified by verifying resilience properties expressed
in probabilistic computation tree logic (PCTL) on the synthesized Markov model.
Compare to existing work, our research focuses on fine-grained functional cor-
rectness of MAPE feedback loops. At design time, we use model checking to
verify the correctness of MAPE feedback loop components and their interactions.
At runtime the formal model of the feedback loop is directly executed using a
reusable virtual machine. The correctness of the virtual machine has been tested
extensively. As such the model execution of the MAPE feedback loop model en-
sures the design-time guarantees at runtime.
2.2.2 Quality guarantees
One of the popular approaches to provide guarantees for quality properties is run-
time quantitative verification. Runtime quantitative verification (RQV) is a tech-
nique based on mathematics to analyze the performance and reliability of software
systems that exhibit stochastic behavior [38].
RQV uses a parameterized model of a system, for example in the form of a
discrete-timeMarkov chain (DTMC) or a continuous-timeMarkov chain (CTMC).
The parameters in the model represent uncertainties that are updated at runtime
with actual values monitored from the system and the environment. The up-to-
date model of the system is analyzed at runtime based on the quality requirements
that are expressed formally in temporal logics. Examples of properties that can be
analyzed include for example probability requirements, e.g., probability of packet
loss within a network over a specific time period, and performance requirements,
e.g., the expected latency of a service for a service-based system under a given
workload.
A recent approach that combines runtime quantitative verification with sensitiv-
ity analysis to realise self-adaptation is presented in [73]. The authors propose a
mathematical framework for run-time efficient probabilistic model checking. The
approach follows a two step process: pre-computation at design time and verifi-
cation at run time. The pre-computation step takes as input: (1) a DTMC model
of the system augmented with rewards, (2) a set of variable labels that are model
parameters whose values are determined at runtime, and (3) the desired system
requirements expressed in reward based PCTL properties. The pre-computation
step produces a partially evaluated set of symbolic expressions that represent veri-
fication conditions that can be efficiently evaluated at run time (as soon as changes
occur in the environment). The verification step evaluates the symbolic expres-
sions at runtime by binding concrete values to the variable labels. The proposed
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approach supports sensitivity analysis, i.e. reasoning about the effects of changes.
The results of such analysis can be used to select effective adaptation strategies.
RQV is an effective approach to provide guarantees for quality properties at
runtime. However, the approach is based on exhaustive verification, which suffers
from the well known state-explosion problem [198]. In contrast, the statistical
approach we use in our research allows making a tradeoff between the available
resources and verification time and the required accuracy.
2.2.3 Executable Models
One of the pioneering approaches that uses executable models to realise self-
adaptation is presented in [200]. EUREMA (ExecUtable RuntimE MegAmod-
els) follows a model-driven approach for engineering self-adaptive systems. EU-
REMA provides a domain-specific modeling language (megamodels) for design-
ing feedback loops, knowledge that is represented as runtime models of the man-
aged system, and their feedback loop interactions. The megamodels are kept alive
at runtime and directly executed by an interpreter. The megamodels can be adapted
on the fly to support evolution. EUREMA supports multiple feedback loops to
handle multiple concerns such as self-repair or self-optimization. Furthermore,
EUREMA supports online monitoring and exporting snapshots of runtime meg-
amodels to support engineers in analyzing the feedback loop.
EUREMA is clearly related to our work; however, the current version of the
approach lacks a formal underpinning. On the other hand, EUREMA offers a
domain specific modeling language to specify the feedback loop components. This
is one of our long term goals as discussed in Chapter 7.
2.2.4 Changing goals
One of the few works that supports changing goals on-the-fly is presented in [147].
The proposed approach presents a generic methodology to dynamically update a
controller of a system. This way, the approach is able to satisfy a new specification
that based on changes of environment assumptions, requirements, and interfaces.
The proposed approach allows specifying correctness criteria for dynamic up-
dates of a controller, including: when an updated controller can take control of
the system, the reconfiguration of the environment while satisfying the old spec-
ification, and when to start satisfying the new specification. Once the criteria are
specified, the approach automatically synthesis a controller that can perform a safe
update, i.e., it guides the system to a state in which the update of the controller can
safely start (while ensuring that the controller update will eventually occur).
Compared to our work, the proposed approach is based on hot-swap of the con-
trollers where a new controller takes control of the system while satisfying the old
specification as well. On the other hand, ActivFORMS first makes sure that the
system is in a quiescence state [123] before an update, i.e., a state where no adap-
tation is active so that the old feedback loop models can be safely replaced with the
new models. If an event happens that triggers the feedback loop while updating
the feedback loop, these actions are queued and executed after the update.
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2.3 Analytical Methods
Analytical methods provide means to model and verify the behavior of software
systems rigorously. In this section, we describe the analytical methods that are
used in our research. These analytical methods are model checking, runtime sim-
ulation, and statistical model checking.
2.3.1 Model Checking
Model checking is an analytical method that uses brute-force techniques to analyze
whether a mathematical model of the system satisfies a given set of properties.
Model checking explores all possible system scenarios in a systematic manner in
order to determine whether the system model truly satisfies the given properties.
There are many mathematical approaches to model software systems. For ex-
ample, Petri nets, Z language, etc. In our research, we used timed automata to
model behaviors of the feedback loop. Concretely, we used networks of timed au-
tomata that allow modeling individual components of the MAPE loop as well as
their interactions.
2.3.1.1 Timed Automata
Timed automata (TA) enable modeling and verifing the behavior of time-
dependent systems. A timed automaton (or behaviour) is a finite state machine that
is equipped with a set of of real-valued clocks. All clocks progress synchronously
at one rate. The clock values can be inspected and reset. After a reset, a clock
starts increasing its value again as time progresses [11].
In our research, we use the Uppaal suite that allows to define a network of timed
automata model where an automaton can synchronize with other automaton(s)
through channels. For example, using a channel x a sender x! can synchronize
with a receiver x?. Uppaal supports two types of channels: binary and broadcast. A
binary channel allows a sending automaton to synchronize with only one receiver;
the sender will be blocked in the absence of a receiver. A broadcast channel sends
the signal to all available receivers; the sender will continue if there is no receiver.
Only one state per automaton can be active at a time, called control or active
state. Uppaal offers a subset of a C-like language to define custom functions and
data types, variables, arrays, and structures. For a network of automate, the state
of the system is defined by the active states of all automata, the clock values, and
the values of all the data variables.
There are two types of transitions between states: 1) action transition, which
is further refined into internal transition and synchronization transition, and 2)
delay transition. An automata may make a state transition separately, called in-
ternal transition, or it may synchronise with another automata through channels,
called synchronization transition. If no action transition can be taken and time can
progress, a delay transition can be taken. If no action transition can be taken and
time cannot progress, then a timelock situation occurs, which means no further
transition can be taken resulting in deadlock.
A timed automaton can be formally defined as a tuple TA = (L, l0, C,A,E, I):
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L is a finite set of locations;
l0 2 L is the initial location in an automaton;
C is a finite set of clocks;
A is a finite set of actions–co-actions (synchronization transition) and the internal
transition action;
E ✓ L⇥A⇥B(C)⇥ 2C ⇥ L is a set of edges connecting locations with an ac-
tion, a guard and a set of clocks to be reset;
I : L! B(C) assigns invariants to the locations;
where B(C) represents clock constraints over edges and locations [16].
An edge can be labeled with: a guard that expresses a condition to take a transi-
tion, an update function that defines an action to be taken when a transition is made
(e.g, reset a clock), and a synchronize label that allows the automaton to synchro-
nize with other automata on a complementary action. A location can be equipped
with an invariant that constrains the time that can be spent in that location. The
location must be left before the invariant becomes invalid.
Uppaal allows to define a location as a committed location, i.e., time cannot
progress (no delay transition enabled) until any automaton is in a committed state.
Committed states have priority and a next transition must use an outgoing edge
from one of the committed locations.
2.3.1.2 Timed Computation Tree Logic (TCTL)
The goal of model checking is to verify the correctness of the system model
against a set of verification properties. For this purpose, Uppaal uses a subset
of timed computation tree logic (TCTL) properties. A verification property can
be expresses as a state formulae or a path formulae. A state formulae is an ex-
pression over variables and automata states. A path formulae quantifies over paths
(or traces) of the model; path formulae include reachability, safety, and liveness
properties [16].
Reachability. A reachability property allows to verify that given a state ex-
pression   is reachable by any path that the system takes. A reachability property
in Uppaal is expressed as E <>  .
Safety. A safety property allows to verify that something bad will never happen.
In other words, a given state expression   should be satisfied along all the paths
that system takes. A safety property is expressed as A[] 
Liveness. A liveness property enables to verify that something will eventually
happen, i.e., if a state expression   is satisfied then eventually state expression  
will also be satisfied. A liveness property is expressed as  !  .
2.3.2 Statistical Model Checking
Statistical model checking (SMC) has been put forward as an efficient alternative
to traditional model checking techniques that are based on exhaustive verification
[129]. SMC uses simulation and statistical techniques to decide whether the sys-
tem model satisfies a given property with some degree of confidence [51, 219].
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In our research, we used Uppaal-SMC, a statistical model checking tool sup-
ported by Uppaal that enhances networks of timed automata with stochastic se-
mantics [59].
We used SMC at runtime for probability estimation of a given quality model. An
example of probability estimation is the probability that packets get loss during a
certain period in an Internet of Things application. For probability estimation,
Uppaal-SMC uses Monte Carlo simulation [144].
A probability estimation query is formulated as:
p = Pr[bound](<>  )
The query produces a probability estimation p for an expression  with an ap-
proximation interval [p  ", p+ "] and confidence (1  ↵) in a given time bound.
The number of simulations required to reach the desired approximation interval
and confidence level are automatically determined during the execution of the es-
timation query. The value of " and ↵ can be dynamically changed to tradeoff the
required accuracy of the estimation with the available resources (e.g., computation
power, memory, and adaptation time, etc).
2.3.3 Runtime Simulation
Statistical model checking provides a solution for checking probabilistic proper-
ties. For reward-based properties, our approach relies on runtime simulation. Run-
time simulation provides an estimation of reward-based properties, such as cost
associated to service invocations under a given work load, energy consumption of
motes for a given time period in an Internet of Things application, etc.
For runtime simulation, we use the Uppaal-SMC tool suite that allows to simu-
late the model of the system specified as network of timed automata with stochastic
semantics. In Uppaal-SMCA, a simulation query is defined as:
simulateN [<= bound]{E1, ..., Ek}
where N is the number of simulation runs to be performed for a given time
bound, and E1, ..., Ek is the list of expressions that will be monitored during
simulation.
Similar to statistical model checking, the number of simulationsN and the time
bound bound can be updated dynamically to adjust the required accuracy of the
results allowing a tradeoff with the available resources to perform the simulation.
A simulation query can only simulate the system for a given number of runs
and time bound. In contrasts to SMC, when a simulation query is executed, the
number of simulations required for the required accuracy of the results needs to be
determined by the designer or operator. In our research, we use relative standard
error of the mean (RSEM) to quantify the precision of a simulation result. RSEM
represents the true mean of a population. For example, an RSEM of 5% for a mean
value of 10 will provides simulation results with an accuracy of ±0.5 units. The
RSEM results are expressed in the same unit as of their data. Thus, smaller RSEM
values provide more accurate results (better estimates) but require more simulation
runs [110].
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To calculate RSEM, first the standard error of the mean (SEM) is calculated
using the following formula:
Standard error of mean (SEM) =  /
p
N
The SEM takes into account the value of the standard deviation   and the sample
size N . Once the SEM is known, the RSEM is computed by dividing the SEM by
the sample mean and multiply by 100 to express as a percentage.
Relative SEM = 100 ⇤ SEM/x¯
In our current research, we use offline experiments to calculate the number of
simulations required for a required RSEM. One of our future research goals is to
automatically determine number of simulations required at runtime based for a
given RSEM.
2.4 Systematic Empirical Inquiry
Empirical methods enable to provide evidence for the effectiveness and efficiency
of proposed solutions. In our research, we use systematic empirical inquiry as an
empirical method to evaluate our research. A systematic empirical inquiry allows
to evaluate particular solutions using a rigorous approach that in a systematic man-
ner define objectives, set up an experiment, collect and analyze data, and present
the findings [81].
1. Define 
Objectives
3. Collect 
Data
4. Analyze 
Data
6. Present 
Results
2. Setup 
Experiment 
5. Evolve
Figure 2.3: Overview of the systematic empirical inquiry used in our research
The stages of a systematic empirical inquiry are shown in Figure 2.3.
In stage 1, define objectives, we collect requirements of the domain for which
self-adaptation is required. Basically, requirements are collected from stakehold-
ers. In case of an exemplar, such as tele assistance and underwater unmanned ve-
hicle, requirements are pre-defined. For other applications such as for Internet of
Things (IoT) security monitoring application, requirements are collected from the
stakeholders who have the domain knowledge. Once requirements are collected,
these requirements are translated to adaptation goals to achieve. An example of an
adaptation goal for the IoT application is the average packet loss over a period of
24 hours should not exceed 10%.
In stage 2, setup experiment, we realize the self-adaptation solution using Ac-
tivFORMS. In this stage, we prepare the system for self-adaptation that includes
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creating probes and effectors (if not available), create formal models of the feed-
back loop that are deployed on top of the system. In the IoT application where
system dynamics are slow, we created first a simulator that helped to perform ex-
periments quicker before deploying the self-adaptation solution on the real system.
For the tele assistance and IoT application we also realized a solution using run-
time quantitative verification solution for comparison with ActivFORMS.
In stage 3, collect data, we run the experiments and collect the data. The data
is collected using a simulator or on the real system (in case of IoT application).
We also collect data for runtime quantitative verification when a comparison is
required.
In stage 4, analyze data, we perform an analysis on the collected data. We use
descriptive analysis techniques to summarize the results. In IoT application, we
performed statistical analysis and determined p-values of the adaptation results
using Wilcoxon and paired t-test to compare our results with reference and RQV
approach.
In stage 5, evolve, we deal with evolution of the setting or requirements. In
some cases, the evaluation is done incrementally, for example, a new goal is in-
troduced by the stakeholders, or an additional experiment is required to test the
scalability. In such a case, the first four steps are repeated, typically by adjusting
the requirements and setting.
Finally, in stage 6, present results, we present the results usually in the form
of a report or a scientific paper. All results are also made available via a website
allowing other researcher to use our results or perform replications.
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Chapter 3
ActivFORMS: Active Formal Models for
Self-Adaptation
In this chapter, we introduce an initial version of the ActivFORMS approach; the
chapter was published at 9th International Symposium on Software Engineering
for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems, 2014. This chapter is a copy of [109].
The initial version of ActivFORMS addresses two research questions, i.e., RQ1
providing functional correctness of the feedback loop and RQ3 providing support
for changing adaptation goals on the fly. Figure 3.1 shows an overview of the
research goals addressed and the scientific methods used.
Model checking
Systematic empirical inquiry
(Warehouse robotics)
Scientific Approaches ActivFORMS(Initial version)
Functional correctness of 
the feedback loop
Changing adaptation goals
on the fly
Research Goals
RQ1:
RQ3:
Figure 3.1: Overview of the addressed research goals and used scientific approaches in the
initial version of ActivFORMS
To address RQ1, we formally specify and verify the correctness of the feed-
back loop model at design time using model checking. Then, the verified model
of the feedback loop is directly executed at runtime using a virtual machine to
realise adaptation. This way, the formal guarantees provided before deployment
are preserved at runtime. The address RQ3 providing, we devised an approach that
supports runtime updates of the adaptation goals and the feedback loop model. We
integrated this approach into the virtual machine. The approach for live updates
follows the classical process of quiescence [123], here applied to models.
My contribution to the research presented in this chapter is as follows: I con-
tributed 70% of the conceptualisation, 100% of the technical realisation, and 50%
of writing the chapter.
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ActivFORMS: Active Formal Models for
Self-Adaptation
Abstract
Self-adaptation enables a software system to deal autonomously
with uncertainties, such as dynamic operating conditions that are dif-
ficult to predict or changing goals. A common approach to realize self-
adaptation is with a MAPE-K feedback loop that consists of four adap-
tation components: Monitor, Analyze, Plan, and Execute. These com-
ponents share Knowledge models of the managed system, its goals and
environment. To provide guarantees of the adaptation goals, state of the
art approaches propose using formal models of the knowledge. How-
ever, less attention is given to the formalization of the adaptation com-
ponents themselves, which is important to provide guarantees of cor-
rectness of the adaptation behavior (e.g., does the execute component
execute the plan correctly?). We propose Active FORmal Models for
Self-adaptation (ActivFORMS) that uses an integrated formal model of
the adaptation components and knowledge models. The formal model
is directly executed by a virtual machine to realize adaptation, hence ac-
tive model. The contributions of ActivFORMS are: (1) the approach
assures that the adaptation goals that are verified offline are guaranteed
at runtime, and (2) it supports dynamic adaptation of the active model to
support changing goals. We show how we have applied ActivFORMS
for a small-scale robotic system.
3.1 Introduction
Engineering the upcoming generation of software systems, such as networked
smart homes and multi-robot systems, and guaranteeing the system goals during
operation is complex due to uncertainties resulting from incomplete knowledge
at design time. Among the uncertainties are changing availability of resources,
dynamic operating conditions that are difficult to predict, and changing goals.
Self-adaptation enables a software system to adapt autonomously to deal with
such uncertainties. A self-adaptive system typically consists of a managed sys-
tem and a feedback loop that adapts the managed system according to some goals.
In this research, we focus on architecture-based self-adaptation [84, 122, 150]
where adaptation is realized with a MAPE-K feedback loop that consists of four
adaptation components:Monitor, Analyze, Plan, and Execute, complemented with
Knowledge models of the managed system, its goals and environment [117, 211].
Monitor monitors the managed system and environment through probes, and up-
dates Knowledge models accordingly. Analyze analyzes the data of the knowledge
models and checks whether an adaptation is required. If so, it will trigger Plan that
will compose a plan with actions that are then executed through effectors by Exe-
cute. Central to architecture-based adaptation is the separation of the domain con-
cerns from the adaptation concerns; a recent controlled experiment [210] provides
empirical evidence for the engineering benefits for this separation of concerns.
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One important challenge in engineering self-adaptive systems is to provide ev-
idence that the system goals are satisfied during operation, regarding the uncer-
tainty of changes that may affect the managed system, its goals or environment [48,
134, 135]. To provide guarantees that the system goals are satisfied, state of the art
in architecture-based self-adaptation advocates the use of formal models at runtime
as one promising approach. In particular, existing approaches equip the feedback
loop with formal models of the managed system and the environment in which
it executes. A popular approach is using probabilistic models to model and han-
dle uncertainties. The models are used to verify properties and support decision
making about adaptation at runtime.
However, from a study of the state of the art we learned that existing approaches
have payed little attention on providing guarantees about the behavior of the adap-
tation components themselves. For example, important properties of a self-healing
system may be: does the analysis component correctly identify errors based on the
monitored data, or does the execute component execute the actions to repair the
managed system in the correct order? Lack of such guarantees may ruin the adap-
tation capabilities. In addition, we notice that little attention has been given on
support for adaptation for changing goals or adding new goals at runtime. Exist-
ing approaches mainly focus on uncertainty with respect to parameters of knowl-
edge models (failure rate of components, availability of a service etc.). Support
for adaptation to deal with changing goals or adding new goals typically requires
updates of the feedback loop.
In this paper, we propose Active FORmal Models for Self-adaptation (Activ-
FORMS). ActivFORMS contributes to the state of the art with an approach that
guarantees the verified adaptation behavior at design time and provides first-class
support for dealing with changing goals at runtime. The approach uses an inte-
grated formal model of the complete MAPE-K loop, i.e., models of the knowledge
and the adaptation components. The integrated formal model is directly executed
by a virtual machine at runtime. We refer to this integrated formal model as ac-
tive model. The active model can be dynamically changed with changing goals.
The contributions of ActivFORMS are twofold. First, ActivFORMS assures that
the goals that are verified offline are guaranteed at runtime. Second, the approach
supports dynamic changes of the active model to support changing goals. This
contrasts to existing approaches that provide guarantees during design, but require
additional efforts to transfer the design into an actual implementation and main-
tain guarantees. In this paper, we focus on adaptation with MAPE-K feedback
loops, but ActivFORMS can be applied to other types of feedback loops that can
be modeled using the formal approach.
We evaluated ActivFORMS for a small scale system in which robots perform
transportation tasks in a warehouse environment. The adaptation goal is to enable
robots to adapt their behavior when a lane in the warehouse is temporally closed,
for example for maintenance. We show that equipping each robot with an active
model guarantees that the robots adapt their behavior correctly. The approach
dynamically adapts the adaptation components to deal with potential deadlock due
to a changing warehouse layout.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sect. 3.2 discusses the state
of the art on the use of formal models for self-adaptation at runtime. In Sect. 3.3,
we briefly introduce the robotic system. Sect. 3.4 presents the ActivFORMS ap-
proach and explains how we applied the approach to the robotic system. We reflect
on the tradeoffs and restrictions of the approach in Sect. 3.5. Finally, we draw con-
clusions and outline possible future research in Section 3.6.
3.2 State of the Art
A recent systematic literature survey [207] covering the main software engineer-
ing venues between 2000 and 2012 identified a total of 75 papers that use formal
methods in architecture-based self-adaptive systems. Among the primary studies,
25 study formal methods at runtime. We discuss a representative set of these pa-
pers and focus in addition on recent research results. We conclude with pointing
out a number of interesting challenges in this area.
Back in 2002, Garlan and Schmerl [83] proposed an approach for model-based
runtime adaptation of self-healing systems. Architecture models specified in Acme
are checked via Armani, which evaluates first order constraints on the fly as prop-
erties of the architecture change. When problems are detected Armani triggers a
repair engine to look for a repair strategy. This work laid the basis for the Rainbow
framework [84].
[112] presents a process to create formal models for adaptive systems, verify
the models and automatically translate the models into executable programs. The
authors use Petri Nets and linear temporal logic to provide assurances for the sys-
tem goals, and model-based testing to guarantee conformance between the models
and programs. In follow up work [222], the authors model a dynamically adap-
tive program as a collection of (non-adaptive) steady-state programs and a set of
adaptations that realize transitions among steady state programs in response to
environmental changes. To handle the state explosion, the authors propose a mod-
ular model checking approach. Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) to specify properties
of the non-adaptive portions of the system is combined with A-LTL (an adapt-
operator extension to LTL) to concisely specify properties that hold during the
adaptation process. This work provides an advanced approach for modular verifi-
cation, however, its application at runtime needs further study.
[68] uses a probabilistic model (discrete time Markov chain) to represent an
abstraction of the possible execution flows of a system at runtime. The probabil-
ities that represent uncertainties are dynamically updated based on observations,
using a Bayesian estimator. The probabilistic model can be used by a feedback
loop to detect requirements violations and optimize the realization of system goals
dynamically.
[72] proposes an approach for efficient runtime verification of reliability re-
quirements. The proposed solution considers two distinct steps: pre-computation
at design time and verification at runtime. The output of the pre-computation step
is a set of symbolic expressions, which represent satisfaction of the requirements.
25
3 ActivFORMS: Active Formal Models for Self-Adaptation
The verification step then evaluates the formula by replacing the variables with the
runtime values gathered by monitoring the system.
[69] presents a quantitative approach for making adaptation decisions under un-
certainty, called POISED. POISED builds on possibility theory (that is grounded
in fuzzy mathematics) to assess both the positive and negative consequences of
uncertainty. POISED makes adaptation decisions (runtime reconfiguration of its
customizable software components) that result in the best range of potential be-
havior, improving a software system’s quality of service.
[37] presents an advanced approach for self-adaptation to achieve QoS for
service-based systems. Formally specified requirements are automatically ana-
lyzed to identify and enforce optimal system configurations by adapting service
selection and resource allocation. The approach realizes a feedback loop based on
MAPE-K, see Fig. 3.2. The Knowledge part of the feedback loop is modeled using
Figure 3.2: MAPE-K realization in [37]
different formal languages. The models are used by different tools to assure opti-
mal reliability and performance requirements. As shown in the figure, the MAPE
loop is realized by a series of tools that are glued together.
[91] introduces adaptive model-driven execution to mitigate uncertainties. In
this approach, a Markov decision model of the system is generated from UML
interaction diagrams. The model specifies the probability distribution of the dif-
ferent execution paths of the system. The model is executed by an interpreter that
drives the execution of the system to guarantee the highest utility for a set of qual-
ity properties. The approach uses an embedded model to realize adaptation, but the
concerns of the domain and adaptation are not clearly separated. The adaptation
logic, which is encoded in the interpreter projects the possible future paths in the
model to select the next action on the path with the highest utility.
Two interesting recently proposed approaches are [142] that focus on dynamic
updates to deal with changing assumptions and requirements at runtime in time-
26
3.3 Robotic System
critical systems and [200] that proposes the EUREMA approach that realizes self-
adaptation based on so called executable runtime mega-models.
Summary. To provide guarantees in self-adaptive systems, the use of formal
models has gained increasing attention. Approaches that provide assurances by
construction underpin the importance of formal methods. However, these ap-
proaches require additional efforts to provide guarantees of the actual implementa-
tion. Such efforts may be substantial to handle changing goals at runtime. For ap-
proaches that employ formal models at runtime, quantitative approaches are dom-
inant and a number of studies support runtime verification. Virtually all studies
focus on modeling the manged system, its environment, and the system goals (or
parts of these). These models are then used by adaptation logic (i.e., the adaptation
components) to reason about the system behavior and support analysis and deci-
sion making of adaptation actions. However, formal modeling of the adaptation
components themselves and guaranteeing the required properties of the adapta-
tion behavior has gained little attention. In a number of approaches, the real-
ization of the adaptation logic includes tools, a prominent example is shown in
Fig. 3.2. However, the behavior of the MAPE components and the integration of
tools is often not formalized or verified. Furthermore, more research is required
on adaptation to handle changing adaptation goals or adding new goals to the sys-
tem at runtime, which represents an important class of uncertainty. Handling such
changes typically requires dynamic updates of the adaptation components (and
probably the managed system), which may require human involvement. Finally,
model checking techniques are known to be computationally expensive, as they
suffer from the state space explosion problem. Any solution based on such tech-
niques, either used at design time or runtime is restricted with respect to providing
guarantees in terms of system size. This also applies to ActivFORMS. To that
end, research is required to realize scalable runtime verification for self-adaptive
systems. However, this challenge is not the focus of the research presented in this
paper.
3.3 Robotic System
Before we present ActivFORMS, we first briefly introduce the case study that
we used in this research. The application consists of a set of robots that have to
perform transportation tasks in a warehouse environment. Fig. 3.3 (left hand side)
shows the user interface of the robotic system in simulation.
The map layout consists of a graph of connected nodes. In the example there
are three source (or pick) locations (on the right hand side of the map marked with
S) and two drop locations (on the left hand side marked with D). There are also
two park locations (the zones at the top and bottom of the layout, see the figure).
The tasks in this setting are performed by two robots. The robots receive tasks
from a task managing system, or tasks can be manually added to the system. A
task consists of picking a load at a pick location, drive to the drop location, and
drop the load there. To avoid collisions and deadlock when they perform tasks, the
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Figure 3.3: Left: User interface to the robot simulator. Right: Two Turtlebots in action.
robots can synchronize with one another to lock the next node they plan to visit.
An idle robot can park at one of the park locations.
The robot system can operate in two modes: standard mode and shipping mode.
In standard mode, the robots perform regular transportation tasks within the ware-
house. In shipping mode, the robots have to perform tasks to load or unload a truck
that can park at the drop location at the top. Mode changes are typically planned
in advance, but an operator can also switch modes manually. In the depicted sit-
uation, the system is in standard mode (indicated by the light gray shade of the
lane connected to the park location for trucks that is currently not accessible for
the robots).
In this paper, we use self-adaptation to deal with lanes that have to be closed
temporally in the warehouse, e.g., to perform maintenance tasks or to solve a prob-
lem with a robot. A lane can only be closed if none of the robots is depending on
the lane for their current tasks. Closing a lane may also create the risk for deadlock,
which needs to be anticipated.
To facilitate self-adaption capabilities, the robot program offers a monitor API
that allows to retrieve the status of the robot (current position, current task, locked
node, etc.) and an effector API that allows to perform adaptions of the robot
(disable and enable a lane in the map of the robot, add and remove an element on
the map, lock a node, etc.).
We are currently testing the scenarios with Turtlebot 2 robots
(http://www.willowgarage.com/), see Fig. 3.3 (right hand side). The robot
program to perform the transportation tasks is written in Java and is deployed on
each robot. This program interacts with a local Python script that sends basic
movement commands to the robot hardware using the Robot Operating System
(ROS) API.
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Figure 3.4: ActivFORMS approach
3.4 Approach
We now present the ActivFORMS approach. Fig. 3.4 shows the primary modules
of ActivFORMS. The approach is in line with the three layered reference model for
self-adaptive system proposed by Kramer and Magee [122]. The managed system
realizes the domain functionality for users. In this research, we assume that the
managed system is prepared to enable monitoring of relevant state and executing
adaptation actions. Preparing the managed system for instrumentation to monitor
and adapt the system is a research subject in its own right and out of scope of this
paper. In the robotic system, the managed system is the robot program that enables
the robot to perform transportation tasks. As explained in the previous section,
the robot program provides monitoring and effector API’s to facilitate extensions
with self-adaptation capabilities. We now present the two central components of
ActivFORMS: the active model engine and goal management.
3.4.1 Active Model Engine
The active model engine consists of two parts: an integrated formal model that
realize a MAPE-K feedback loop, i.e., the active model, and a virtual machine that
can execute the active model.
3.4.1.1 Active Model
In this research, we model feedback loops using networks of timed automata
[19]. A timed automaton is a finite-state machine that models a behavior, extended
with clock variables, which are used to synchronize behaviors. Automata can com-
municate through channels. There are two type of channels, binary channels and
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PlanReady
PlanDisable
Plan
PlanWait
PlanDisableLane
!dependOnLane()
addPlanStepDisable()
planned()
execute[RiD]!
planningDisableLane[RiD]?
initiatePlan()
addPlanStepWait()
dependOnLane()
Figure 3.5: Plan automaton of a robot
broadcast channels. For a binary channel, a sender x! can synchronize with a re-
ceiver x? through a signal. If there are multiple receivers x? then a single receiver
will be chosen non-deterministic. The sender x! will be blocked if there is no
receiver. A broadcast channel sends a signal to all the receivers, and if there is no
receiver, the sender will not be blocked. Behavior specifications can be comple-
mented with expressions specified in a C-like language to define data structures
(struct concept) and functions. Goals can be expressed in timed computation tree
logic expressions (TCTL). TCTL expressions describe state and path formulae that
can be verified, such as reachability (a system should/can/cannot/... reach a par-
ticular state or set of states), liveness (something eventually will hold), etc. We
use Uppaal [16], a model checking tool that supports modeling of behaviors and
verification of properties.
Fig. 3.4 shows an overview of the structure of the active model of a feedback
loop design. The model consists of a network of timed automata (also called be-
haviors). The monitor behavior can receive data from probes that connect with the
managed system. The execution behavior can send adaptation actions to effectors.
The monitor, analyze, plan, and execute automata can interact directly via chan-
nels, or indirectly via reading and writing data in the knowledge. Knowledge can
be represented with automata or with data structures (struct), or a combination of
both. Fig. 3.5 shows a concrete example of an automaton of a robot that deals with
the planning to disable a lane in the warehouse.
Planning starts when the automaton receives a signal from analysis (planning-
DiableLane[RiD]?). Planning first initiates a plan (initiatePlan()) and then checks
whether the robot depends on the lane that has to be disabled, i.e, it may currently
travel on the lane or it may need the lane to perform its current task (condition de-
pendOnLane()). If that is the case, planning adds a step to the plan to let the robot
wait until the condition no longer holds (addPlanStepWait()). Planning then moves
on to PlanDisable. If the robot does not depend on the lane, planning immediately
moves to PlanDisable. Planning then adds a step to the plan to disable the lane
(addPlanStepDisable()), which completes planning. Finally, planning signals the
execute behavior to execute the plan (execute[Rid]!).
30
3.4 Approach
Formal Guarantees. During design of the formal model, the required adaptation
goals can be verified. To that end, the formal model of the MAPE-K feedback
loop has to be connected with a models of the managed system. Evidently, the
guarantees obtained from verification only hold to the extent that the implemen-
tation of the managed system conforms to the model of the system that is used
for verification. Such conformance can be tested, for example with model-based
testing techniques [189]. We illustrate verification with an example for the robotic
system.
Monitoring(1).RequestToDisableLane
&& knowledge[1].disabledLane == Lane_cd
--> Execution(1).DisableLane
&& knowledge[1].disabledLane == Lane_cd
The goal allows verifying that when the monitor behavior of robot with ID 1
receives a request for disabling a particular lane, the execution behavior will even-
tually adapt the managed system accordingly.
3.4.1.2 Virtual Machine
In ActivFORMS, the formally verified model can directly be executed to realize
self-adaptation using a virtual machine. The virtual machine can perform the fol-
lowing functions: initiate model, execute model, interact with the managed system
and the environment, verify goals at runtime, and update running models when re-
quested. We discuss these functions in detail.
Initiate Model. When the virtual machine starts1, it first translates the active
model (network of automata) to an internal graph representation. Concretely, each
node of an automaton becomes a node of a graph for that automaton; links be-
tween the nodes become edges between the corresponding nodes. Operations such
as checking guards, updating state, etc. are translated into task graphs that are
associated with the corresponding nodes and edges. Communication between au-
tomata (signals) are integrated in the task graphs of the edges or nodes that send
and receive signals.
Fig. 3.6 shows an excerpt of the internal representation of the formal model of
a robot. Fig. 3.6(a) shows the analysis automaton of a robot, (b) shows an excerpt
of abstract syntax tree of the transition between the nodes Analyzing and Disable-
LaneRequest, and (c) shows the task graph generated for the guard DiableLane
== matchRequest(request). The task graph shows the subsequent atomic tasks that
need to be executed to check the guard.
When the active model is translated to the internal representation, the state of
each graph and the global state is initiated and the model is then ready for execu-
tion.
Execute the Model. Model execution conforms to the semantics of networked
timed automata. The execution of the active model is triggered either by input
from the managed system or the environment,2 or by time.
1 The virtual machine is implemented in Java and can be started with the ActivFORMSEngine class.
2 The active model interacts with the managed system and the environment via signals that commu-
nicate with probes and effectors. We explain the details of interaction via probes and effectors below.
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Figure 3.6: Excerpt of internal model representation
Figure 3.7: Input triggered execution
Fig. 3.7 shows the execution steps of an input triggered execution. When the
virtual machine receives input, it first identifies the enabled nodes that are inter-
ested for the given input, which will be one or more nodes of the monitor behavior
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Figure 3.8: Time triggered execution
of the feedback loop. Next the virtual machine selects a node for execution.3 If
the transition is valid, the task graph of the selected node is executed, otherwise
another enabled node is selected for execution. The execution of the task graph
may trigger a subsequent behavior, e.g., a monitor may trigger an analysis and so
forth. If there exists no valid node, no transition will be taken. This may point to
an inconsistency between the model of the managed system that was used during
the design of the managing system and the implementation of the managed sys-
tem. An example of an input triggered execution in the robotic system is a monitor
behavior that receives a signal from a probe to disable a lane and starts processing
this request.
Fig. 3.8 shows the execution steps of a time triggered execution. The virtual
machine maintains an internal clock that increments with time steps. The real
time that corresponds with each time step can be configured in the virtual machine
engine. In the following example, each step of the clock corresponds with 100 ms.
engine.setRealTimeUnit(100);
In line with the semantics of timed automata, for each time step, the virtual ma-
chine identifies the enabled node for each automaton and checks whether the time
step would invalidate the time invariants of the enabled nodes. The virtual machine
will then execute the task graphs of these invalidated nodes in non-deterministic
order. If any of the nodes with a time invariant is not able to make a transition (due
to a design flaw), time can no longer progress, which causes a timelock. In that
case, a time lock exception will be thrown and execution of the model terminates.
If no invalidated nodes exist, the clock will be increased and the execution step
ends. An example of a time triggered execution in the robotic case is an execute
behavior that executes the first step of the plan to disable a lane (the robot depends
on the lane, see Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.12) and periodically checks whether the robot
still depends on the lane.
3We limit the explanation to input triggered execution for binary channel semantics, that is, a sig-
nal that is sent from a probe synchronizes non-deterministic with one enabled location of a monitor
automaton. The virtual machine also supports broadcast channels, where a signal can trigger multiple
enabled locations.
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Figure 3.9: Interaction between an effector and the engine
Interaction with Managed System and Environment. The virtual machine in-
teracts with the managed system and the environment through probes and effec-
tors. For example, Fig. 3.9 shows two sequence diagrams that illustrate the in-
teraction between the effector of a robot and the ActivFORMS engine to enable
lanes.
To communicate with the virtual machine, the effector has to implement the
Synchronizer interface and register to the virtual machine for channels of enabling
lanes (Fig. 3.9(a)). When the execute behavior of the virtual machine wants to dis-
able or enable a lane, it will synchronize with the effector using readyToReceive()
(Fig. 3.9(b)). The execute behavior will then send the data of the adaptation action
to the effector using receive(). Once the effector knows which lane’ status has to be
changed, it will execute the adaptation action using performAdaptation(). Probes
work in a similar manner. The following excerpt shows how a probe communicates
the updated position of a robot to the monitor.
engine.send(updatePosition, synch,
"position.x=" + position.x,
"position.y=" + position.y);
The parameter updatePosition represents the channel id, synch is a reference to
return an acknowledgment when the updatePosition message is accepted. The last
two parameters contain the data that the probe wants to send to the managing sys-
tem, i.e., the current robot position. The virtual machine will process this message
and execute the task graph of the enabled node of the monitor.
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Verify Goals at Runtime. As formal verification is costly and exhaustive verifi-
cation is hard to achieve, in particular when conditions are uncertain, verification
at runtime may increase the evidence for assurances. Runtime verification can ex-
ploit the concrete information of the system and its environment that is available.
ActivFORMS can exploit the direct availability of the formal model at runtime
to support runtime verification. However, efficient runtime verification for self-
adaptation remains a complex problem with many challenges. In the current ver-
sion of ActivFORMS, we take a first step towards support for runtime verification.
Concretely, the ActivFORMS engine currently supports the verification goals that
can be specified as boolean expressions. To that end, the user has to specify the
goal and load it into the virtual machine. The virtual machine will verify the goal
in each execution step and notify the user whether the goal is satisfied or violated.
For example, a requirement for the robotic system is that a robot should never
drive on a lane that is disabled:
notOn_disabledLane =
"DISABLED_LANE == true &&
knowledge[1].currentLane !=
knowledge[1].disabledLane";
The virtual machine offers a method addGoal() to register goals:
engine.addGoal(notOn_disabledLane, client);
The client is the component that has an interest in the state of the goal.4 When
a goal is registered the virtual machine convert it into task graphs. After each
transition, the virtual machine executes the task graphs of all registered goals and
notifies the user whether the goals are satisfied or violated.
Changing Active Model at Runtime. There are two important motivations to
provide support for changing the active model of the feedback loop at runtime.
First, it enables efficient verification at runtime. Using specific models for the
adaptation components that are tailored for different goals keeps the models small,
which supports efficient verification. In the next section, we show how the goal
manager automatically changes models of the feedback loop to deal with changing
goals. A second important motivation is to support deployment of new models at
runtime to deal with new goals. This latter typically involves humans in the loop.
While this feature is supported by ActivFORMS, it is not the main focus of the
research presented in this paper.
Fig. 3.10 shows the subsequent steps to change (parts of) a running active model.
To start the change of an active model, the different parts of the model that need to
be changed are loaded into the virtual machine using the method:
engine.changeModel(model);
The virtual machine then translates the model to the internal graph repre-
sentation. The remaining steps to complete the dynamic change of the active
4 In section 3.4.2, we will see how the Goal Manager of ActivFORMS serves as client to support
changing goals.
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Figure 3.10: Change of the formal model at runtime
model essentially follow the classical process of runtime updates based on quies-
cence [123]. First, the virtual machine waits until the model reaches a quiescence
state (i.e., no input or time triggered execution is ongoing). The virtual machine
then suspends the execution. The state of the model is saved and new inputs are
stored in a buffer. Subsequently, the old model is replaced by the new model.
The saved state is restored and new variables are initiated. Finally, execution is
resumed.
3.4.2 Goal Management
Goal management deals with adaption issues that cannot be handled by the current
active model. Goal management consists of four key parts (see Fig. 3.4): goal
model, goal monitor, goal adapter, and goal manager. We discuss each of them in
detail.
Goal Model. The goal model represents the adaptation goals. We use tree-based
models to specify goals. The goals at the bottom level of each subtree have asso-
ciated models to realize adaptations. Fig. 3.11 shows an excerpt of a goal model
for a robot.
The figure shows a goal tree to support adaptation for disabling lanes. The
subtree on the left hand side combines DISABLE LANE == true with two TRANS-
PORT MODE, standard and shipping respectively. With each mode a correspond-
ing formal model is associated. To support disabling of lanes in the standard mode,
the virtual machine needs to execute the Standard model. However, in shipping
mode, the Shipping model needs to be executed. To illustrate the need for different
models, consider Fig. 3.12 that shows the models for the execute behavior for the
two modes.
For standard mode, the execute behavior executes the steps of the plan to disable
a lane (see the plan behavior of Fig. 3.5). However, in shipping mode, the map
layout changes (a new lane and drop location is added, see Fig. 3.3), which creates
new types of deadlock when a lane would be disabled.
Fig. 3.13 shows a schematic scenario for the robots in shipping mode. Assume
the robots would have disabled the lane marked in dotted line. When robot R1
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Figure 3.11: Goal model example
wants to drop a load at E and both robots have locked one node ahead, they end
up in deadlock. To anticipate this problem, the new formal model of the feedback
loop is required before the lane is disabled that avoids such deadlock situations. A
concrete solution is to ensure that each robot locks two nodes before a lane can be
closed. Therefore, the plan and execute behaviors have to be updated. Concretely,
the planner in shipping mode has to add a extra step to the plan to lock an extra
node. Fig. 3.12 shows the extra step that the execute behavior executes to lock
an extra node, i.e., executeLockNode(). Locking an extra node constraints the
mobility of the robots (it constraints path selection to drive), and should therefore
only be applied when there is a request for disabling a lane in shipping mode.
Goal Monitor. The goal monitor monitors the status of the goals. To that end,
the goal monitor adds the goals to the virtual machine and registers as client for
notification of the status of the goals. The virtual machine keeps the goal monitor
updated about the status of the goals. The goal monitor in turn will inform the goal
adapter of any goal state changes and keep the goal manager up to date about the
status of the goals (goal manager is discussed below).
Goal Adapter. The goal adapter is the heart of goal management. When the goal
adapter is signaled by the goal monitor about a change of goals, it consults the
goal model and search for a matching model that satisfies the changing situation.
If the model associated with the changing goal differs from the currently deployed
model, the goal adapter starts updating the current model with the new model at
the virtual machine. If the model does not differ no further action is required.
As an example, consider the Disable Lane goal shown in Fig. 3.11. If the robot
system is running in standard mode and a lane is disabled, the standard model is
running (left subtree of the goal). However, when the system switches to shipping
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(a) Execute automaton of standard mode
(b) Execute automaton of shipping mode
Figure
3.12:
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Figure 3.13: Deadlock scenario in robot system
mode, the running model has to be changed to shipping model. Once the new
model is deployed, the system is ready to deal with deadlock when disabling lanes
in shipping mode.
When the goal adapter finds no matching model that satisfies the changing goals,
it will notify the goal manager. In this case, the adaptation goals cannot be satisfied
and the goal manager will inform the system administrator.
Goal Manager. The goal manager offers support for three primary functions:
inspecting the active model and its ongoing execution, monitoring and updating
goals, and updating the goal model. In our current implementation, the Activ-
FORMS User Interface connects with the goal managers of the different nodes of
the system. The user interface enables the system admin (or engineer) to perform
the functions of the goal managers remotely. Fig. 3.14 shows the ActivFORMS
User Interface.
The user interface allows a system admin to connect with goal managers of
different nodes using the Connect button. In the snapshot, the user interface is
connected with two robots. The main pane shows basic info about the robots and
the status of their goals.
Clicking the glasses symbol for a robot shows the running model of the feedback
loop of that robot, as illustrated in Fig. 3.15. The pane on the right hand side shows
the current state of all data variables. The pane on the right hand side shows the
models in action.
Fig. 3.16 shows the window that opens when the Update Goals button of the
user interface is selected. The system admin can select a goal for any of the con-
nected nodes in the left pane and edit the goal in the right pane. A new model can
be selected and associated with the selected goal (Save button). Furthermore, new
goals can be added or goals can be removed. All goal changes are directly for-
warded to the corresponding goal manager to load the goal model. The model will
be executed once it is selected by the goal adapter. To manually update the running
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Figure 3.14: ActivFORMS User Interface
model, the admin can select the Updates Models button in the user interface. We
do not further discuss this feature here.
3.5 Discussion
By directly executing the active model at runtime, ActivFORMS provides guar-
antees of the self-adaptive behavior and supports dynamic updates of the feed-
back loop. Active models go beyond the notion of model@runtime, which is de-
fined [23] as a causally connected self-representation of the associated system [...]
from a problem-space perspective. An active model is the engine that executes
self-adaptation using a self-representation. Formalizing the distinct behaviors of
a feedback loop supports fine grained verification of the correctness of the adap-
tation behaviors. Furthermore, modeling goals as first class entities and handling
changing goals by dynamically changing the formal models of the adaptation be-
haviors supports small models that can be verified efficiently (at design time and
potentially at runtime).
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Figure 3.15: Illustration of an executing active model of a robot (red locations are current
active locations)
Figure 3.16: User interface for adding new goals
However, the proposed approach has a number of tradeoffs and restrictions.
First, the approach requires expert knowledge to design and change the formal
models, which is a characteristic of every approach where designers have to use
formal methods. ActivFORMS uses timed automata and TCTL, which offer an
accessible notation. To further support designers with modeling MAPE-K feed-
back loops, we have developed a set of templates for designing the behaviors of
the MAPE-K components.1 These templates define abstract automata that can be
1Available at the ActivFORMS website:
https://people.cs.kuleuven.be/danny.weyns/software/ActivFORMS/
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instantiated and extended for the domain at hand. The templates were derived
from experience with modeling MAPE-K feedback loops for different applica-
tions, e.g., [94, 108]. Nevertheless, formal modeling remains a tedious task. In
our future work, we plan to explore how the underlying formalism could be hided
from designers. An inspiring approach is proposed in [91]. Second, in this paper,
we have used ActivFORMS to realize MAPE-K loops, but ActivFORMS can exe-
cute other types of feedback loops [28] as long as the components of the loops can
be modeled correctly with timed automata. Third, the approach relies on models.
However, accurate information to the design the models may not be available at de-
sign time. To support modeling of uncertainty of the environment and the system
in the knowledge part of the feedback loop, we are currently working on extend-
ing ActivFORMS with probabilistic timed automata. Fourth, timed automata may
not be an appropriate language for modeling the behavior of the feedback loop
for particular types of systems; an example is a system that requires continuous
adaptation features. Fifth, ActivFORMS approach is not tested yet for medium or
large-scale systems. One feature of the approach to handle scalability is dynamic
switching of models to handle different goals, which keeps the running models
small. Nevertheless, further study is required to study the scalability of the ap-
proach. Sixth, ActivFORMS introduces some overhead. The memory required to
launch the virtual machine engine and load a active model is approximately 100
MB, depending on the size of the active model that is used. Performance overhead
may be an issue, as the virtual machine has to check the validity of the transitions
of the enabled nodes in each execution step. For the robotic system, the perfor-
mance overhead was minimal, but this might be different for other domains.
3.6 Conclusions & Future Work
In this paper, we presented ActivFORMS, a formal approach for self-adaptation.
ActivFORMS distinguishes itself for existing approaches in two ways. First, the
formally verified model of the complete feedback loop is directly executed, which
guarantees the verified adaptation goals at runtime. This contrasts in particular to
existing approaches that provide guarantees during design, but require additional
efforts to transfer the design into an actual implementation and assure guarantees.
As the active model is directly executed in ActivFORMS, the approach does not
require coding. We recently performed a series of case studies in the context of
a Master course on Adaptive Systems. Initial results show that the total time for
adding a self-adaptation property to a legacy system was up to 3 times lower when
using ActivFORMS comparing to regular coding of the system.
ActivFORMS considers goals as first-class citizens and is designed to support
runtime updates of the feedback loop, which allows to dynamically change mod-
els of the adaptation components handling changing goals. Deploying small mod-
els enables focussed verification, which is important to deal with the state space
problem inherent to verification. Furthermore, supporting dynamic updates is im-
portant to deal with uncertainty, in particular dynamically adding new goals. It is
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noteworthy to mention that runtime updates of the active model is a lightweight
process.
ActivFORMS paves the way for several lines of future research. In our cur-
rent work, we are extending the virtual machine to support probabilistic timed
automata. The current version of ActivFORMS supports online detection of sim-
ple goal violations. We will enhance the support for more advanced goal models
and study how to handle dependencies between goals. In the future, we also plan
to study how we can introduce efficient runtime verification in ActivFORMS. Our
aim is to enhance ActivFORMS with a plugin for incremental verification at run-
time, which would allow verifying goals within a restricted time window. Another
line of research that we plan to explore is supporting coordination between formal
models. Currently, an active model interacts only with the local managed sys-
tem and its environment. Supporting interactions between formal models would
open both a way to handle multiple concerns locally and coordination between
distributed active models in a decentralized setting.
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Chapter 4
Engineering Trustworthy Self-Adaptive
Software with Dynamic Assurance Cases
In this chapter, we introduce ENgineer TRUstworthy Self-adaptive sofTware sys-
tems (ENTRUST), an integrated methodology to engineer self-adaptive systems
with strict requirements. This chapter is accepted for publication in IEEE Transac-
tions on Software Engineering, 2017. This chapter was a joint effort between three
research teams (R. Calinescu and S. Gerasimou, D. Weyns and M. U. Iftikhar, T.
Kelly and I. Habli). This chapter is a copy of [40].
This chapter demonstrates how ActivFORMS can be incorporated with other
approaches. Figure 4.1 provides an overview of contribution of ActivFORMS to
the ENTRUST approach.
Model checking
Systematic empirical inquiry
(UUV & FX)
Scientific Approaches ENTRUST
Functional correctness of 
the feedback loop
Research Goals
RQ1:
Figure 4.1: Overview of contribution of ActivFORMS to ENTRUST approach
The primary contribution of ActivFORMS to ENTRUST is the realisation of
functional correctness of the feedback loop (RQ1). To that end, we contributed
an initial set of formally specified templates that help engineers to design and ver-
ify MAPE feedback loop models (based on [79]). We evaluated ENTRUST with
an Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) System and Foreign Exchange Trading
(FX) System.
My contribution to the research presented in this chapter is as follows: I con-
tributed 35% of the overall technical realisation of ENTRUST, 35% of the evalua-
tion, and 10% of writing the chapter.
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Engineering Trustworthy Self-Adaptive Software
with Dynamic Assurance Cases
Abstract
Building on concepts drawn from control theory, self-adaptive soft-
ware handles environmental and internal uncertainties by dynamically
adjusting its architecture and parameters in response to events such as
workload changes and component failures. Self-adaptive software is in-
creasingly expected to meet strict functional and non-functional require-
ments in applications from areas as diverse as manufacturing, health-
care and finance. To address this need, we introduce a methodology
for the systematic ENgineering of TRUstworthy Self-adaptive sofTware
(ENTRUST). ENTRUST uses a combination of (1) design-time and
runtime modelling and verification, and (2) industry-adopted assurance
processes to develop trustworthy self-adaptive software and assurance
cases arguing the suitability of the software for its intended applica-
tion. To evaluate the effectiveness of our methodology, we present a
tool-supported instance of ENTRUST and its use to develop proof-of-
concept self-adaptive software for embedded and service-based systems
from the oceanic monitoring and e-finance domains, respectively. The
experimental results show that ENTRUST can be used to engineer self-
adaptive software systems in different application domains and to gen-
erate dynamic assurance cases for these systems.
4.1 Introduction
Software systems are regularly used in applications characterised by uncertain en-
vironments, evolving requirements and unexpected failures. The correct operation
of these applications depends on the ability of software to adapt to change, through
the dynamic reconfiguration of its parameters or architecture. When events such
as variations in workload, changes in the required throughput or component fail-
ures are observed, alternative adaptation options are analysed, and a suitable new
software configuration may be selected and applied.
As software adaptation is often too complex or too costly to be performed by
human operators, its automation has been the subject of intense research. Using
concepts borrowed from the control of discrete-event systems [160], this research
proposes the extension of software systems with closed-loop control. As shown
in Fig. 4.2, the paradigm involves using an external software controller to monitor
the system and to adapt its architecture or configuration after environmental and
internal changes. Inspired by the autonomic computing manifesto [105, 117] and
by pioneering work on self-adaptive software [114, 151], this research has been
very successful [203]. Over the past decade, numerous research projects proposed
architectures [84, 122, 215] and frameworks [37, 67, 188, 211] for the engineering
of self-adaptive systems. Extensive surveys of this research and its applications
are available in [106, 157, 164].
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Figure 4.2: Closed-loop control is used to automate software adaptation
In this paper, we are concerned with the use of self-adaptive software in sys-
tems with strict functional and non-functional requirements. A growing number of
systems are expected to fit this description in the near future. Service-based tele-
health systems are envisaged to use self-adaptation to cope with service failures
and workload variations [37, 68, 204], avoiding harm to patients. Autonomous
robots used in applications ranging from manufacturing [63, 90] to oceanic mon-
itoring [34, 87] will need to rely on self-adaptive software for completing their
missions safely and effectively, without damage to, or loss of, expensive equip-
ment. Employing self-adaptive software in these applications is very challenging,
as it requires assurances about the correct operation of the software in scenarios
affected by uncertainty.
Assurance has become a major concern for self-adaptive software only recently
[7, 49, 134, 135, 166]. Accordingly, the research in the area is limited, and often
confined to providing evidence that individual aspects of the self-adaptive software
are correct (e.g. the software platform used to execute the controller, the controller
functions, or the runtime adaptation decisions). However, such evidence is only
one component of the established industry process for the assurance of software-
based systems [24, 137, 192]. In real-world applications, assuring a software sys-
tem requires the provision of an assurance case, which standards such as [193]
define as
“a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence, that provides
a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for a
given application in a given environment”.
Our work addresses this discrepancy between the state of practice and the cur-
rent research on assurances for self-adaptive software. To this end, we introduce a
generic methodology for the joint development of trustworthy self-adaptive soft-
ware systems and their associated assurance cases. Our methodology for the EN-
gineering of TRUstworthy Self-adaptive sofTware (ENTRUST) is underpinned by
a combination of (1) design-time and runtime modelling and verification, and (2)
an industry-adopted standard for the formalisation of assurance arguments [95,
178].
ENTRUST uses design-time modelling, verification and synthesis of assurance
evidence for the control aspects of a self-adaptive system that are engineered be-
fore the system is deployed. These design-time activities support the initial con-
troller enactment and the generation of a partial assurance case for the self-adaptive
system. The dynamic selection of a system configuration (i.e., architecture and
parameters) during the initial deployment and after internal and environmental
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changes involves further modelling and verification, and the synthesis of the addi-
tional assurance evidence required to complete the assurance case. These activities
are fully automated and carried out at runtime.
The ENTRUST methodology is not prescriptive about the modelling, verifica-
tion and assurance evidence generation methods used in its design-time and run-
time stages. This generality exploits the fact that the body of evidence underpin-
ning an assurance case can combine verification evidence from activities including
formal verification, testing and simulation. As such, ENTRUST assurance cases
can use assurance evidence obtained through a combination of testing, simulation
and formal verification, at both design time and runtime.
ENTRUST supports the systematic engineering and assurance of self-adaptive
systems. In line with other research on self-adaptive systems (see e.g. [164, 207]),
we assume that the controlled software system from Fig. 4.2 already exists, and we
focus on its enhancement with self-adaptation capabilities through the addition of
a high-level monitor-analyse-plan-execute (MAPE) control loop. The components
of the controlled software system may already support low-level, real-time adapta-
tion to localised changes. For instance, the self-adaptive embedded system used in
one of our case studies is a controlled unmanned vehicle that employs built-in low-
level control to maintain the speed selected by its high-level ENTRUST controller.
Mature approaches from the areas of robust control of discrete-event systems (e.g.
[127, 160, 183, 220]) and real-time systems (e.g. [124, 138]) already exist for the
engineering of such low-level control. Thus, real-time control is outside the scope
of ENTRUST.
Likewise, established assurance processes are available for the non-self-
adaptive aspects of software systems (e.g. [22, 24, 98, 100, 163]). We do not
duplicate this work. Using these processes to construct assurance arguments for
the correct design, development and operation of the controlled software system,
and for the derivation, validity, completeness and formalisation of the requirements
from Fig. 4.2 is outside the scope of our paper. Thus, ENTRUST focuses on the
correct engineering of the controller and on the correct operation of self-adaptive
system, assuming that the controlled system and its requirements are both correct.
The main contributions of our paper are:
1) The first end-to-end methodology for (a) engineering self-adaptive software
systems with assurance evidence for the controller platform, its functions and
the adaptation decisions; and (b) devising assurance cases whose assurance
arguments bring together this evidence.
2) A novel assurance argument pattern for self-adaptive systems, expressed in the
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) standard [95] that is widely used for assur-
ance case development in industry [178].
3) An instantiation of our methodology whose stages are supported by the estab-
lished modelling and verification tools UPPAAL [17] and PRISM [126].
These contributions include four significant extensions of complementary results
from our previously separate strands of work on developing formally verified con-
trol loops [79, 109], runtime probabilistic model checking [38] and dynamic as-
surance cases [61]. First, the instantiation of the ENTRUST methodology is based
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on a formally verifiable controller architecture where the controller from [109]
was extended to use probabilistic model checking at runtime [38]. Second, build-
ing on [79], we introduce a set of generic properties that ENTRUST controllers
must satisfy. Third, we extend our preliminary work from [61] with a realisation
of the principles of dynamic assurance case continuity, updatability, proactivity,
automation and formality that we suggested in [61]. Fourth, we devise the first
assurance argument pattern for self-adaptive systems. In addition, we integrate
these extended building blocks into a complete methodology for the engineering
of self-adaptive systems.
To ensure the generality of ENTRUST, these contributions are evaluated us-
ing two case studies with different characteristics (e.g. types of system, require-
ments and adaptation actions) and belonging to different application domains (i.e.
oceanic monitoring and exchange trade). We chose for these case studies systems
that have been used to evaluate related software engineering research [34, 87, 88,
171], as these systems are already known to the research community – one of them
as an “exemplar” for the evaluation of new approaches to engineering self-adaptive
systems [89].
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 4.2, we pro-
vide background information on assurance cases, GSN and assurance argument
patterns. Section 4.3 introduces the self-adaptive systems used in our case stud-
ies, and Section 4.4 describes the generic ENTRUST methodology. Sections 4.5
and 4.6 present the tool-supported ENTRUST instance and its use to develop the
self-adaptive systems from the two case studies, respectively. Section 4.7 presents
our evaluation results, which show that the methodology can be used for the effec-
tive engineering of self-adaptive systems from different domains and for the gen-
eration of dynamic assurance cases for these systems. In Section 4.8, we overview
the existing approaches to providing assurances for self-adaptive software systems,
and we compare them to ENTRUST. Finally, Section 4.9 concludes the paper with
a discussion and a summary of future work directions.
4.2 Preliminaries
This section provides background information on assurance cases, introducing the
assurance-related terminology and concepts used in the rest of the paper. We start
by defining assurance cases and their components in Section 4.2.1. Next, we in-
troduce a commonly used notation for the specification of assurance cases in Sec-
tion 4.2.2. Finally, we introduce the concept of an assurance argument pattern in
Section 4.2.3.
4.2.1 Assurance Cases
An assurance case1 is a report that supports a specific claim about the requirements
of a system [22]. As an example, the assurance case in [149] provides documented
1Assurance cases developed for safety-critical systems are also called safety cases. In this work, we
are concerned with any self-adaptive software systems that must meet strict requirements, and therefore
we talk about assurance cases and assurance arguments.
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Figure 4.3: Core GSN elements
assurance that the “implementation and operation of North European Functional
Airspace Block (NEFAB) is acceptably safe according to ICAO, EC and EURO-
CONTROL safety requirements.” The documented assurance within an assurance
case comprises (1) evidence and (2) structured arguments that link the evidence to
the claim [22], possibly through intermediate claims.
Assurance cases are becoming mandatory for software systems used in safety-
critical and mission-critical applications [24, 137, 192]. They are used in domains
ranging from nuclear energy [194] and medical devices [196] to air traffic control
[70] and defence [193]. A growing number of assurance cases from these and
other domains are openly available (e.g., [149, 195]).
The development of assurance cases comprises processes carried out at all
stages of the system life cycle [192]. Requirements analysis evidence and de-
sign evidence demonstrate that system reliability, safety, maintainability, etc. are
considered in the early stages of the life cycle. Implementation, validation and ver-
ification evidence are then generated as the system is developed. Finally, evidence
collected at runtime is used to update assurance cases during system maintenance.
As aptly described in [192], the assurance case must be “a living, cradle-to-
grave document.” This is particularly true for self-adaptive software systems. For
these systems, existing evidence needs to be continuously combined with new
adaptation evidence, i.e., evidence that the system will continue to operate safely
after self-adaptation activities.
4.2.2 Goal Structuring Notation
The assurance cases for self-adaptive systems introduced later in the paper are de-
vised in the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [115], a community standard [95]
widely used for assurance case development in industry [178]. The main GSN
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elements (Fig. 4.3) can be used to construct an argument by showing how an as-
surance claim (represented in GSN by a goal) is broken down into sub-claims (also
represented by GSN goals), until eventually it can be supported by GSN solutions
(i.e., assurance evidence from verification, testing, etc.). Strategies are used to par-
tition the argument and describe the nature of the inference that exists between a
goal and its supporting goal(s). The rationale (assumptions and justifications) for
individual elements of the argument can be captured, along with the context (e.g.
to describe the operational environment) in which the claims are stated.
In a GSN diagram, claims are linked to strategies, sub-claims and ultimately
to solutions using ‘supported by’ connectives, which are rendered as lines with a
solid arrowhead and declare inferential or evidential relationships. ‘Supported by’
connectives may be decorated with their multiplicity or marked as optional. The
‘in context of ’ connective, rendered as a line with a hollow arrowhead, declares a
contextual relationship between a goal or strategy on the one hand and a context,
assumption or justification on the other hand.
Large or complex sections of the assurance argument can be organised into mod-
ules by means of GSN away goals referenced in the main argument and defined
separately. Finally, GSN entities can be marked as uninstantiated to indicate that
they are placeholders that need to be replaced with a concrete instantiation, and
GSN goals can be marked as undeveloped to indicate that they need to be further
developed into sub-goals, strategies and solutions.
As an example, Fig. 4.4 shows a simple GSN assurance argument for the soft-
ware part of a heating system. Its root goal (Goal 1) claims that the system is safe
at all times. This claim is partitioned into sub-claims using a strategy (Strategy 1)
that addresses the safety of the two system functions (i.e. control and monitoring)
separately through sub-claims Goal 2 (for the control system) and Goal 2’ (for
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the monitor system), and includes sub-claim Goal 3 that the two functions are
independent. The three sub-claims are supported by three solutions comprising
assurance evidence from simulation, testing and formal proof, respectively.
4.2.3 Assurance Argument Patterns
To reduce the significant effort required to develop assurance cases, in our previous
work on software assurance [98, 99] we collaborated to the creation of a catalog of
reusable GSN assurance argument patterns [101]. Each pattern considers the con-
tribution made by the software to system hazards for a particular class of systems
and scenarios. The GSN elements of a pattern that are generic to the entire class
are fully developed and instantiated, whereas the entities that are specific to each
system and scenario within the class are left undeveloped and/or uninstantiated.
As an example, Fig. 4.5 depicts an assurance argument pattern that is instanti-
ated by the GSN assurance argument from Fig. 4.4. The elements surrounded by
curly brackets ‘{’ and ‘}’ in the pattern must be instantiated for each assurance ar-
gument based on the pattern, as further indicated by the triangular ‘uninstantiated’
symbol under the GSN entities that contain them. Goal 2 is marked with both
this ‘uninstantiated’ symbol (because it contains elements in curly brackets) and a
diamond-shaped ‘undeveloped’ symbol (because, like for the ‘choice’ sub-claims
Goal 3 andGoal 4, additional GSN entities must be added underneath to complete
the assurance argument); the two symbols are rendered overlapping under Goal 2.
In this paper, we devise a new assurance argument pattern, which is applicable
to self-adaptive software systems.
4.3 Self-adaptive Systems Used in the Case Studies
This section introduces the self-adaptive software systems from the two case stud-
ies used to illustrate and evaluate our methodology. To assess the generality of
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Table 4.1: Comparison of systems used to assess the generality of ENTRUST
UUV FX
Type embedded system service-based system
Domain oceanic monitoring exchange trade
Requirements throughput, resource use,
cost, safety
reliability, response time,
cost, safety
Sensor data UUV sensor measure- service response time
ment rate and reliability
Adaptation switch sensors on/off, change service instance
actions change speed
Uncertainty continuous-time stochas- discrete-time stochastic
modelling tic model of UUV sensors model of system
ENTRUST, we chose different types of systems from different domains. The first
system, introduced in Section 4.3.1, is an embedded unmanned underwater ve-
hicle (UUV) system from the oceanic monitoring domain. The second system,
presented in Section 4.3.2, is a service-based system from the foreign exchange
(FX) trade domain. Table 4.1 lists several additional characteristics that differ
significantly between the two systems. These characteristics include the types of
requirements, sensor data and adaptation actions of the systems, and the types of
models whose verification underpins their self-adaptation decisions.
4.3.1 Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) System
The self-adaptive UUV embedded system is adapted from [87]. UUVs are increas-
ingly used in a wide range of oceanographic and military tasks, including oceanic
surveillance (e.g., to monitor pollution levels and ecosystems), undersea mapping
and mine detection. Limitations due to their operating environment (e.g., impossi-
bility to maintain UUV-operator communication during missions and unexpected
changes) require that UUV systems are self-adaptive. These systems are often
mission critical (e.g., when used for mine detection) or business critical (e.g., they
carry expensive equipment that should not be lost).
The self-adaptive system we use consists of a UUV deployed to carry out a
data gathering mission. The UUV is equipped with n   1 on-board sensors that
can measure the same characteristic of the ocean environment (e.g., water current,
salinity or temperature). When used, the sensors take measurements with different,
variable rates r1, r2, . . . , rn. The probability that each sensor produces measure-
ments that are sufficiently accurate for the purpose of the mission depends on the
UUV speed sp, and is given by p1, p2, . . . , pn. For each measurement taken, a
different amount of energy is consumed, given by e1, e2, . . . , en. Finally, the n
sensors can be switched on and off individually (e.g., to save battery power when
not required), but these operations consume an amount of energy given by eon1 , eon2 ,
. . . , eonn and eo↵1 , eo↵2 , . . . , eo↵n , respectively. The UUV must adapt to changes in
the sensor measurement rates r1, r2, . . . , rn and to sensor failures by dynamically
adjusting:
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(a) the UUV speed sp
(b) the sensor configuration x1, x2, . . . , xn (where xi = 1 if the i-th sensor is on
and xi = 0 otherwise)
in order to meet the quality-of-service requirements below:
R1 (throughput): The UUV should take at least 20 measurements of sufficient
accuracy for every 10 metres of mission distance.
R2 (resource usage): The energy consumption of the sensors should not exceed
120 Joules per 10 surveyed metres.
R3 (cost): If requirements R1 and R2 are satisfied by multiple configurations, the
UUV should use one of these configurations that minimises the cost function
cost = w1E + w2sp
 1, (4.1)
where E is the energy used by the sensors to survey a 10m mission distance,
and w1, w2>0 are weights that reflect the relative importance of carrying out
the mission with reduced battery usage and completing the mission faster.1
R4 (safety): If a configuration that meets requirements R1–R3 is not identified
within 2 seconds after a sensor rate change, the UUV speed must be reduced
to 0m/s. This ensures that the UUV does not advance more than the distance it
can cover at its maximum speed within 2 seconds without taking appropriate
measurements, and waits until the controller identifies a suitable configuration
(e.g., after the UUV sensors recover) or new instructions are provided by a
human operator.
4.3.2 Foreign Exchange Trading System
The service-based system from the area of foreign exchange trading is taken from
our recent work in [88]. This system, which we anonymise as FX for confidential-
ity reasons, is used by an European foreign exchange brokerage company. The FX
system implements the workflow shown in Fig. 4.6 and described below.
An FX customer (called a trader) can use the system in two operation modes.
In the expert mode, FX executes a loop that analyses market activity, identifies
patterns that satisfy the trader’s objectives, and automatically carries out trades.
Thus, the Market watch service extracts real-time exchange rates (bid/ask price)
of selected currency pairs. This data is used by a Technical analysis service that
evaluates the current trading conditions, predicts future price movement, and de-
cides if the trader’s objectives are: (i) “satisfied” (causing the invocation of an
Order service to carry out a trade); (ii) “unsatisfied” (resulting in a new Market
watch invocation); or (iii) “unsatisfied with high variance” (triggering an Alarm
service invocation to notify the trader about discrepancies/opportunities not cov-
ered by the trading objectives). In the normal mode, FX assesses the economic
1Cost (or utility) functions that employ weights to combine several performance, reliability, resource
use and other quality attributes of software—accounting for differences in attribute value ranges and
relative importance—are extensively used in self-adaptive software systems (e.g. [37, 67, 84, 164,
201]).
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Figure 4.6: Foreign exchange trading (FX) workflow
outlook of a country using a Fundamental analysis service that collects, analy-
ses and evaluates information such as news reports, economic data and political
events, and provides an assessment on the country’s currency. If satisfied with
this assessment, the trader can use the Order service to sell or buy currency, in
which case a Notification service confirms the completion of the trade. We assume
that the FX system has to dynamically select third-party implementations for each
service from Fig. 4.6, in order to meet the following system requirements:
R1 (reliability): Workflow executions must complete successfully with probabil-
ity at least 0.9.
R2 (response time): The total service response time per workflow execution must
be at most 5s.
R3 (cost): If requirements R1 and R2 are satisfied by multiple configurations, the
FX system should use one of these configurations that minimises the cost func-
tion:
cost = w1price + w2time, (4.2)
where price and time represent the total price of the services invoked by a
workflow execution and the response time for a workflow execution, respec-
tively, and w1, w2 > 0 are weights that encode the desired trade-off between
price and response time.
R4 (safety): If a configuration that ensures requirements R1–R3 cannot be iden-
tified within 2s after a change in service characteristics is signalled by the sen-
sors of the self-adaptive FX system, the Order service invocation is bypassed,
so that the FX system does not carry out any trade that might be based on
incorrect or stale data.
Note that requirements R1–R3 express two constraints and an optimisation crite-
rion that are qualitatively different from those specified by the requirements from
our first case study (cf. Section 4.3.1). Nevertheless, our tool-supported instance
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Figure 4.7: Stages and key artefacts of the ENTRUST methodology. In line with the two
principles underpinning the methodology, its first stage involves the development of ver-
ifiable models for the controller, controlled system and environment of the self-adaptive
system used throughout the remaining stages, and multiple stages reuse application-inde-
pendent software and assurance artefacts.
of the ENTRUST methodology enabled the development of the self-adaptive FX
system as described in Section 4.6.
4.4 The ENTRUST Methodology
The ENTRUST methodology supports the systematic engineering and assurance
of self-adaptive systems based on monitor-analyse-plan-execute (MAPE) control
loops. This is by far the most common type of control loop used to devise self-
adaptive software systems [28, 67, 106, 125, 134, 135, 139, 164]. The engineering
of self-adaptive systems based on essentially different control techniques, such as
the control theoretical paradigm [172], as for example proposed in [75], is not
supported by our methodology.
ENTRUST comprises the tool-supported design-time stages and the automated
runtime stages shown in Fig. 4.7, and is underpinned by two key principles:
1) Model-driven engineering is essential for developing trustworthy self-adaptive
systems and their assurance cases. As emphasised in the previous section,
model-based analysis, simulation, testing and formal verification—at design
time and during reconfiguration—represent the main sources of assurance ev-
idence for self-adaptive software. As such, both the design-time and the run-
time stages of our methodology are model driven. Models of the structure and
behaviour of the functional components, controller and environment are the
basis for the engineering and assurance of ENTRUST self-adaptive systems.
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2) Reuse of application-independent software and assurance artefacts signifi-
cantly reduces the effort and expertise required to develop trustworthy self-
adaptive systems. Assembling an assurance case for a software system is a
costly process that requires considerable effort and expertise. Therefore, the
reuse of both software and assurance artefacts is essential for ENTRUST. In
particular, the reuse of application-independent controller components and of
templates for developing application-specific controller elements also enables
the reuse of assurance evidence that these software artefacts are trustworthy.
The ENTRUST stages and their exploitation of these two principles are de-
scribed in the remainder of this section.
4.4.1 Design-time ENTRUST Stages
4.4.1.1 Stage 1: Development of Verifiable Models
In ENTRUST, the engineering of a self-adaptive system with the architecture from
Fig. 4.2 starts with the development of models for:
1) The controller of the self-adaptive system;
2) The relevant aspects of the controlled software system and its environment.
A combination of structural and behavioural models may be produced, depending
on the evidence needed to assemble the assurance case for the self-adaptive system
under development. ENTRUST is not prescriptive in this respect. However, we
require that these models are verifiable, i.e., that they can be used in conjunction
with methods such as model checking or simulation, to obtain evidence that the
controller and the self-adaptive system meet their requirements. As an example,
finite state transition models may be produced for the controllers of our UUV and
FX systems from Section 4.3, enabling the use of model checking to verify that
these controllers are deadlock free.
The verifiable models are application-specific. As illustrated in Fig. 4.7, their
development requires domain knowledge,1 is based on a controlled system specifi-
cation, and is informed by the system requirements. As in other areas of software
engineering, we envisage that tool-supported methods will typically be used to
obtain these models. However, their manual development or fully automated syn-
thesis are not precluded by ENTRUST.
In line with the “reuse of artefacts” principle, ENTRUST exploits the fact that
the controllers of self-adaptive systems implement the established MAPE work-
flow, and uses application-independent controller model template(s) to devise the
controller model(s). These templates model the generic aspects of the MAPE
workflow and contain placeholders for the application-specific elements of an EN-
TRUST controller.
Given the environmental and internal uncertainty that characterises self-adaptive
systems, only incomplete system and environment models can be produced in this
ENTRUST stage. These incomplete models may include unknown or estimated
1The ENTRUST software and assurance artefacts that appear in italics in the text are also shown in
Fig. 4.7.
58
4.4 The ENTRUST Methodology
parameters, nondeterminism (i.e., alternative options whose likelihoods are un-
known), parts that are missing, or some combination of all of these. For example,
parametric Markov chains may be devised to enable the runtime analysis of the
requirements for our UVV and FX systems detailed in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2,
respectively, by means of probabilistic model checking or simulation.
4.4.1.2 Stage 2: Verification of Controller Models
The main role of the second ENTRUST stage is to produce controller assur-
ance evidence, i.e., compelling evidence that a controller based on the controller
model(s) from Stage 1 will satisfy a set of generic controller requirements. These
are requirements that must be satisfied in any self-adaptive system (e.g., deadlock
freeness) and are predefined in a format compatible with that of the controller
model templates and with the method that will be used to verify the controller
models. For example, if labelled transition systems are used to model the con-
troller and model checking to establish its correctness as in [63, 64], these generic
controller requirements can be predefined as temporal logic formulae.
The controller assurance evidence must include evidence that the system re-
quirements for application-specific failsafe operating mode(s) are always satisfied.
In this way, a minimal assurance case is always available for the scenario when
the runtime assurance evidence for other system requirements cannot be obtained
and the self-adaptive system needs to switch to a degraded, failsafe mode of opera-
tion. Several fallback levels as proposed in [63] can also be supported in this way,
with only the most degraded fallback level ensured through assurance evidence
obtained in this ENTRUST stage. For example, requirements R4 of our UUV and
FX systems from Section 4.3 specify failsafe operating modes for the two systems,
so we will need to show that these requirements are always met.
The assurance evidence generated in this stage of the methodology may be ob-
tained using a range of methods that include formal verification, theorem proving
and simulation. The methods that can be used depend on the types of models pro-
duced in the previous ENTRUST stage, and on the generic controller requirements
and system requirements for which assurance is sought. The availability of tool
support in the form of model checkers, theorem provers, SMT solvers, domain-
specific simulators, etc. will influence the choice of these methods.
Preparing the design-time models, i.e., developing verifiable models and veri-
fying the controller models, comes with a cost. This cost can be reduced by using
tool-supported methods and by exploiting reusable application-independent soft-
ware, as done by the related approaches described in Section 4.8. Furthermore,
these related approaches that only provide a fraction of the assurances that EN-
TRUST achieves (as detailed when we discuss related work in Section 4.8) oper-
ate with design-time models that require a comparable effort to specify the models
and provide the controller assurance evidence.
4.4.1.3 Stage 3: Partial Instantiation of Assurance Argument Pattern
This ENTRUST stage uses the controller assurance evidence from Stage 2 to sup-
port the partial instantiation of a generic assurance argument pattern for self-
adaptive software. As explained in Section 4.2.3, this pattern is an incomplete
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assurance argument containing placeholders for the system-specific assurance ev-
idence. A subset of the placeholders correspond to the controller assurance evi-
dence obtained in Stage 2, and are therefore instantiated using this evidence. The
result is a partial assurance argument, which still contains placeholders for the
assurance evidence that cannot be obtained until the uncertainties associated with
the self-adaptive system are resolved at runtime.
For example, the partial assurance argument for our UUV and FX systems
should contain evidence that their controllers are deadlock free and that their fail-
safe requirements R4 are always satisfied. These requirements can be verified
at design time. In contrast, requirements R1–R3 for the two systems cannot be
verified until runtime, when the controller acquires information about the mea-
surement rates of the UUV sensors and the third-party services available for the
FX operations, respectively. Assurance evidence that requirements R1–R3 are sat-
isfied can only be obtained at runtime.
In addition to the two types of placeholders, the assurance argument pattern
used as input for this stage includes assurance evidence that is application inde-
pendent. In particular, it includes evidence about the correct operation of the veri-
fied controller platform, i.e. the software that implements application-independent
controller functionality used to execute the ENTRUST controllers. This platform
assurance evidence is reusable across self-adaptive systems.
4.4.1.4 Stage 4: Enactment of the Controller
This ENTRUST stage assembles the controller of the self-adaptive system. The
process involves integrating the verified controller platform with the application-
specific controller elements, and with the sensors and effectors that interface the
controller with the controlled software system from Fig. 4.2.
The application-specific controller elements must be devised from the verified
controller models, by using a trusted model-driven engineering method. This can
be done usingmodel-to-text transformation, a method that employs a trustedmodel
compiler to generate a low-level executable representation of the controller mod-
els. Alternatively, the ENTRUST verified controller platformmay include a trusted
virtual machine2 able to directly interpret and run the controller models. The sec-
ond, model interpretation method [177], has the advantage that it eliminates the
need to generate controller code and to provide additional assurances for it.
4.4.1.5 Stage 5: Deployment of the Self-Adaptive System
In the last design-time stage, the integrated controller and controlled components
of the self-adaptive system are installed, preconfigured and activated by means of
an application-specific process. The pre-configuration is responsible for setting
the deployment-specific parameters and architectural aspects of the system. For
example, the pre-configuration of the UUV system from Section 4.3.1 involves
selecting the initial speed and active sensor set for the UUV, whereas for the FX
system from Section 4.3.2 it involves choosing initial third-party implementations
for each FX service.
2 Throughout the paper, the term “virtual machine” refers to a software component capable to inter-
pret and execute controller models, much like a Java virtual machine executes Java code.
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The deployed self-adaptive systemwill be fully configured and a complete assur-
ance argument will be available only after the first execution of the MAPE control
loop. This execution is typically triggered by the system activation, to ensure that
the newly deployed self-adaptive system takes into account the current state of its
environment as described next.
4.4.2 Runtime ENTRUST Stages
4.4.2.1 Stage 6: Self-adaptation
In this ENTRUST stage, the deployed self-adaptive system is dynamically adjust-
ing its parameters and architecture in line with observed internal and environmen-
tal changes. To this end, the controller executes a typical MAPE loop that mon-
itors the system and its environment, using the information obtained in this way
to resolve the “unknowns” from the incomplete system and environment models.
The resulting up-to-date system and environment models enable the MAPE loop
to analyse the system compliance with its requirements after changes, and to plan
and execute suitable reconfigurations if necessary.
Whenever the MAPE loop produces a reconfigured self-adaptive system, its
analysis and planning steps generate adaptation assurance evidence confirming
the correctness of the analysis results and of the reconfiguration plan devised on
the basis of these results. This assurance evidence is a by-product of analysis and
planning methods that may include runtime verification, simulation and runtime
model checking. Irrespective of the methods that produce it, the adaptation assur-
ance evidence is essential for the development of a complete assurance argument
in the next ENTRUST stage.
4.4.2.2 Stage 7: Synthesis of Dynamic Assurance Argument
The final ENTRUST stage uses the adaptation correctness evidence produced by
the MAPE loop to fill in the placeholders from the partial assurance argument,
and to devise the complete assurance case for the reconfigured self-adaptive sys-
tem. For example, runtime evidence that requirements R1–R3 of the UUV and FX
systems from Section 4.3 are met will be used to complete the remaining place-
holders from their partial assurance arguments. Thus, an ENTRUST assurance
case is underpinned by a dynamic assurance argument that is updated after each
reconfiguration of the system parameters and architecture. This assurance case
captures both the full assurance argument and the evidence that justifies the active
configuration of the self-adaptive system.
The ENTRUST assurance case versions generated for every system reconfigu-
ration have two key uses. First, they allow decision makers and auditors to under-
stand and assess the present and past versions of the assurance case. Second,
they allow human operators to endorse major reconfiguration plans in human-
supervised self-adaptive systems. This type of self-adaptive systems is of par-
ticular interest in domains where human supervision represents an important risk
mitigation factor or may be required by regulations. As an example, UK Civil Avi-
ation Authority regulations [191] permit self-adaptation in certain functions (e.g.,
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power management, flight management and collision avoidance) of unmanned air-
craft of no more than 20 kg provided that the aircraft operates within the visual
line of sight of a human operator.
4.5 Tool-Supported Instance of ENTRUST
This section presents an instance of ENTRUST in which the stages described in
Section 4.4 are supported by the modelling and verification tools UPPAAL [17]
and PRISM [126]. We start with an overview of this tool-supported ENTRUST
instance in Section 4.5.1, followed by a description of each of its stages in Sec-
tion 4.5.2.
4.5.1 Overview
The ENTRUST methodology can be used with different combinations of mod-
elling, verification and controller enactment methods, which may employ different
self-adaptive system architectures and types of assurance evidence. This section
presents a tool-supported instance of ENTRUST that uses one such combination of
methods. We developed this instance of the methodology with the aim to validate
ENTRUST and to ease its adoption.
Our ENTRUST instance supports the engineering of self-adaptive systems with
the architecture shown in Fig. 4.8. The reusable verified controller platform at the
core of this architecture comprises:
1) A Trusted Virtual Machine that directly interprets and executes models of the
four steps from the MAPE control loop1 (i.e., the ENTRUST controller mod-
els).
2) A Probabilistic Verification Engine that is used to verify stochastic models
of the controlled system and its environment during the analysis step of the
MAPE loop.
Using the Trusted Virtual Machine for controller model interpretation eliminates
the need for a model-to-text transformation of the controller models into exe-
cutable code, which is a complex, error-prone operation. Not having to devise
this transformation and to provide assurance evidence for it are major benefits of
our ENTRUST instance. Although we still need assurance evidence for the virtual
machine, this was obtained when we developed and verified the virtual machine,2
and is part of the reusable platform assurance evidence for the ENTRUST instance.
The Probabilistic Verification Engine consists of the verification libraries of the
probabilistic model checker PRISM [126] and is used by the analysis step of the
MAPE control loop. As such, our ENTRUST instance works with:
1) Stochastic finite state transition models of the controlled system and the en-
vironment, defined in the PRISM high-level modelling language. Incomplete
1Hence the controller models are depicted as software components in Fig. 4.8.
2 This assurance evidence is in the form of a comprehensive test suite and a report describing its
successful execution by the virtual machine, both of which are available on our ENTRUST project
website at https://www-users.cs.york.ac.uk/simos/ENTRUST/.
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system&env.
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Figure 4.8: Architecture of an ENTRUST self-adaptive system
versions of these models are devised in Stage 1 of ENTRUST, and have their
unknowns resolved at runtime. All types of models that PRISM can analyse are
supported, including discrete- and continuous-time Markov chains (DTMCs
and CTMCs), Markov decision processes (MDPs) and probabilistic automata
(PAs).
2) Runtime-assured system requirements expressed in the appropriate variant of
probabilistic temporal logic, i.e., probabilistic computation tree logic (PCTL)
for DTMCs, MDPs and PAs, and continuous stochastic logic (CSL) for
CTMCs.
This makes our instantiation of the generic ENTRUST methodology applicable
to self-adaptive systems whose non-functional (e.g., reliability, performance, re-
source usage and cost-related) requirements can be specified in the above logics,
and whose behaviour related to these requirements can be described using stochas-
tic models. As shown by the recent work of multiple research groups (e.g., [37,
38, 39, 41, 68, 71, 76, 158, 180]), this represents a broad and important class of
self-adaptive software that includes a wide range of service-based systems, web
applications, resource management systems, and embedded systems.
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Also developed in Stage 1 of ENTRUST, the four controller models form an
application-specific network of interacting timed automata [4], and are expressed
in the modelling language of the UPPAAL verification tool suite [17].
Accordingly, UPPAAL is used in Stage 2 of ENTRUST to verify the compliance
of the controller models with the generic controller requirements and with any
system requirements that can be assured at design time. These requirements are
defined in computation tree logic (CTL) [52].
In Stage 3 of our ENTRUST instance, a partial assurance argument is devised
starting from an assurance argument pattern represented in goal structuring nota-
tion (GSN) [115].
The controller enactment from Stage 4 involves integrating the timed-automata
controller models with our verified controller platform.
In Stage 5 of ENTRUST, the controlled software system and its enacted con-
troller are deployed, together with a Knowledge Repository that supports the oper-
ation of the controller. Initially, this repository contains: (i) the partial assurance
argument from Stage 3; (ii) the system requirements to be assured at runtime; and
(iii) the (incomplete) stochastic system and environment models from Stage 1.
During the execution of the MAPE loop in Stage 6 of ENTRUST, the Monitor
obtains information about the system and its environment through Sensors. This
information is used to resolve the unknowns from the stochastic models of the
controlled system and its environment. Examples of such unknowns include prob-
abilities of transition to ‘failure’ states for a DTMC, MDP or PA, rates of transition
to ‘success’ states for a CTMC, and sets of states and transitions modelling certain
system behaviours. After each update of the stochastic system and environment
models, the Analyzer reverifies the compliance of the self-adaptive system with
its runtime-assured requirements. When the requirements are no longer met, the
Analyzer uses the verification results to identify a new system configuration that
restores this compliance, or to find out that such a configuration does not exist
and to select a predefined failsafe configuration. The step-by-step actions needed
to achieve the new configuration are then established by the Planner and imple-
mented by the Executor through the Effectors of the controlled system.
Using the Probabilistic Verification Engine enables the Analyzer and Planner
to produce assurance evidence justifying their selection of new configurations and
of plans for transitioning the system to these configurations, respectively. This
adaptation assurance evidence is used to synthesise a fully-fledged, dynamic GSN
assurance argument in Stage 7 of our ENTRUST instance. As indicated in Fig. 4.8,
versions of the adaptation assurance evidence and of the dynamic assurance argu-
ment justifying each reconfiguration of the self-adaptive system are stored in the
Knowledge Repository.
The implementation of the ENTRUST stages in our tool-supported instance of
the methodology is summarised in Table 4.2 and described in further detail in
Section 4.5.2.
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4.5.2 Stage Descriptions
4.5.2.1 Development of Verifiable Models
Controller models. We devised two types of templates for the four controller
models from Fig. 4.8: (i) event triggered, in which the monitor automaton is acti-
vated by a sensor-generated signal indicating a change in the managed system or
the environment; and (ii) time triggered, in which the monitor is activated period-
ically by an internal clock. The event-triggered automaton templates are shown in
Fig. 4.9 using the following font and text style conventions:
• Sans-serif font is used to annotate states with the atomic propositions (i.e.
boolean properties) that hold in those states, e.g. PlanCreated from the Planner
automaton;
• Italics text is used for the guards that annotate state transitions with the condi-
tions which must hold for the transitions to occur, e.g. timeMAX TIME from
the Analyzer automaton;
• State transitions are additionally annotated with the actions executed upon tak-
ing the transitions, and these actions are also shown in sans-serif font, e.g.
time=0 to initialise a timer in the Monitor automaton;
• Bold text is used for the synchronisation channels between two automata—
these channels are specified as pairs comprising a ‘!’-decorated sent signal and
a ‘?’-decorated received signal with the same name, e.g., startAnalysis! and
startAnalysis? from the monitor and analyzer automata, respectively. The
two transitions associated with a synchronisation channel can only be taken at
the same time.
Finally, signals in angle brackets ‘hi’ are placeholders for application-specific
signal names, and guards and actions decorated with brackets ‘()’ represent
application-specific C-style functions.
To specialise these model templates for a particular system and application, soft-
ware engineers need: (a) to replace the signal placeholders with real signal names;
(b) to define the guard and action functions; and (c) to devise the automaton re-
gions shaded in Fig. 4.9. For example, for the monitor automaton the engineers
first need to replace the placeholders hsensorSignal1?i, . . . , hsensorSignaln?i
with sensor signals announcing relevant changes in the managed system. They
must then implement the functions process(), analysisRequired() and monitor-
Cleanup(), whose roles are to process the sensor data, to decide if the change
specified by this data requires the “invocation” of the analyzer through the start-
Analysis! signal, and to carry out any cleanup that may be required, respectively.
Details about the other automata from Fig. 4.9 are available on our project web-
site, which also provides implementations of these MAPE model templates in the
modelling language of the UPPAAL verification tool suite [17].
Parametric stochastic models. These models used by the ENTRUST control loop
at runtime are application specific, and need to be developed from scratch. Their
parameters correspond to probabilities or rates of transition between model states,
and are continually estimated at runtime, based on change information provided
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Table 4.3: Stochastic models supported by the ENTRUST instance, with citations of rep-
resentative research that uses them in self-adaptive systems
Type of stochastic model Non-functional require-
ment specification logic
Discrete-time Markov chains [36,
37, 68, 71, 72, 92]
PCTLa, LTLb, PCTL*c
Markov decision processes [76] PCTLa, LTLb, PCTL*c
Probabilistic automata [38, 113] PCTLa, LTLb, PCTL*c
Continuous-time Markov chains
[34, 35, 87]
CSLd
Stochastic games [41, 42] rPATLe
aProbabilistic Computation Tree Logic [21, 96]
bLinear Temporal Logic [155]
cPCTL* is a superset of PCTL and LTL
dContinuous Stochastic Logic [10, 12]
ereward-extended Probabilistic Alternating-time Temporal Logic [46]
by the sensors of the controlled system. As such, the verification of these models
at runtime enables the ENTRUST analyzer to identify configurations it can use to
meet the system requirements after unexpected changes, as described in detail in
[35, 37, 38, 68, 72]. The types of stochastic models supported by our ENTRUST
instance are shown in Table 4.3. As illustrated by the research work cited in the
table, the temporal logics used to express the properties of these models support
the specification of numerous performance, reliability, safety, resource usage and
other non-functional requirements that recent surveys propose for self-adaptive
systems [49, 199].
To ensure the accuracy of the stochastic models described above, ENTRUST
can rely on recent advances in devising these models from logs [92, 153] and UML
activity diagrams [31, 80], and in dynamically and accurately updating their pa-
rameters based on sensor-provided runtime observations of the controlled system
[32, 36, 68, 74].
4.5.2.2 Verification of Controller Models
During this ENTRUST stage, a trusted model checker is used to verify the network
of MAPE automata devised in the previous section. This verification yields evi-
dence that the MAPE models satisfies a set of key safety and liveness properties
that include both generic and application-specific properties. Table 4.4 shows a
non-exhaustive list of generic properties that we assembled for the current version
of ENTRUST. Although these properties are application-independent, verifying
that an ENTRUST controller satisfies them is possible only after its application-
specific MAPE models were devised. This involves completing the application-
specific parts of the planner and executor automata, and implementing the func-
tions for the guards and actions from all the model templates.
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Additionally, automata that simulate the controller sensors, runtime probabilis-
tic verification engine and effectors from Fig. 4.8 need to be defined to enable
this verification. The sensors, verification engine and effectors automata have to
synchronise with the relevant monitor, analyzer and executor signals, respectively.
The sensors automaton and verification automaton also have to exercise the pos-
sible paths through the monitor, analyzer and planner automata (and indirectly
the executor automaton). To this end, they can nondeterministically populate the
knowledge repository with data that satisfies all the different guard combinations.
Alternatively, a finite collection of the two automata can be used to verify subsets
of all possible MAPE paths, as long as the union of all such subsets covers the
entire behaviour space of the MAPE network of automata.
Note that these application-specific elements of the MAPE automata are much
larger than the application-independent elements from the MAPE model tem-
plates. Therefore, we do not use compositional model checking [54, 113] to verify
the two parts of the MAPE automata separately, with the application-independent
elements verified once and for all. Such an approach would increase the complex-
ity of the verification task (e.g. by requiring the identification and verification of
less intuitive “assumptions” [55] that the application-specific parts of the automata
need to “guarantee”) without any noticeable reduction in the verification time, al-
most all of which would be required to verify the application-specific automata
elements.
4.5.2.3 Partial Instantiation of Assurance Argument Pattern
We used the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) introduced in Section 4.2.2 to de-
vise a reusable assurance argument pattern (cf. Section 4.2.3) for self-adaptive
software. Unlike all existing assurance argument patterns [101], our new pat-
tern captures the fact that for self-adaptive software the assurance process cannot
be completed at design time. Instead, it is a continual process where some de-
sign features and code elements are dynamically reconfigured and executed during
self-adaptation. As such, the detailed claims and evidence for meeting the system
requirements must vary with self-adaption, and thus ENTRUST assurance cases
must evolve dynamically at runtime.
The ENTRUST assurance argument pattern is shown in Fig. 4.10. Its root goal,
ReqsSatisfied, states that the system requirements are satisfied at all times. These
requirements are typically allocated to the software from the higher-level system
analysis process, so the justifications of their derivation, validity and completeness
are addressed as part of the overall system assurance case (which is outside the
scope of the software assurance case). ReqsSatisfied is supported by a sub-claim
based on (i.e. in the context of) the current configuration (ReqsConfiguration)
and by a reconfiguration sub-claim (Reconfig). That is, the pattern shows that we
are guaranteeing that the current configuration satisfies the requirements (in the
absence of changes) and that the ENTRUST controller will plan and execute a
reconfiguration that will satisfy these requirements (should a change occur).
The pattern justifies how the system requirements are achieved for each con-
figuration by using a sub-goal RxAchieved for each requirement Rx. Further, a
new configuration has the potential to introduce erroneous behaviours (e.g., dead-
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Figure 4.10: ENTRUST assurance argument pattern.
locks). The justification for the absence of these errors is provided via the away
goal NoErroneousBehaviour (described below). The pattern concludes with the
goals RxVerified and ReqsPreservedByPlatform, which justify the verification
and the implementation of the formalised requirements, respectively. The away
goal ReqsPreservedByPlatform confirms that the controlled system handles cor-
rectly the reconfiguration commands received through effectors. This away goal
is obtained using standard assurance processes, which are outside the scope of this
paper.
As shown Fig. 4.11, the NoErroneousBehaviour away goal is supported by
two sub-claims. The FMsManaged sub-claim uses the goals FMsIdentified and
ReqsDerived to state that the relevant “failure modes” for the self-adaptive system
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have been identified and that the system requirements fully address these failure
modes. We leave the two goals undeveloped, as they are achieved using standard
requirements engineering and assurance practices. The EngErrorsAbsent sub-
claim states that the engineering of the self-adaptive system does not introduce
errors in the context of the ENTRUST reusable artefacts (i.e., of our trusted virtual
machine and probabilistic verification engine) and of the generic properties that
an ENTRUST controller has to satisfy. EngErrorsAbsent is in turn supported by
two sub-goals, NoProcessError and NoController&SystemError. The former
sub-goal is obtained through using suitable software engineering processes (via
the away goal SuitableSoftEngProcess, which also covers the use of the methods
mentioned in Section 4.5.2.1 to ensure the accuracy of the ENTRUST stochas-
tic models) and through avoiding methodological errors by using the ENTRUST
methodology. The latter sub-goal, NoController&SystemError, is achieved by
claims about:
1) The absence of controller errors. This is supported by (i) the controller ver-
ification evidence from Stage 2 of ENTRUST; and (ii) the reusable platform
assurance evidence, which includes (testing) evidence about the correct oper-
ation of the model checkers UPPAAL and PRISM, based on their long track
record of successful adoption across multiple domains and on our own experi-
ence of using them to develop self-adaptive systems.
2) The absence of controlled system errors, covered by the ControlledSystem
away goal.
The away goals SuitableSoftEngProcess andControlledSystem are obtained fol-
lowing existing software assurances processes, and thus we do not describe them
here.
The partial instantiation of the assurance argument pattern in the last design-
time stage of ENTRUST produces a partially-developed and partially-instantiated
assurance argument [61]. This includes placeholders for items of evidence that
can only be instantiated and developed based on operational data, i.e., the runtime
verification evidence that is generated by the analysis and planning steps of the
ENTRUST controller.
4.5.2.4 Enactment of the Controller
In this stage, the controller from Fig. 4.8 is assembled by integrating the MAPE
controller models discussed in Section 4.5.2.1, the ENTRUST verified controller
platform and application-specific sensor, effector and stochastic model manage-
ment components. The application-specific components include generic function-
ality such as the signals through which these components synchronise with the
MAPE automata (e.g., verify? and planExecuted?). Accordingly, our current
version of ENTRUST includes abstract Java classes that provide this common
functionality. These abstract classes, which we made available on the project web-
site, need to be specialised for each application. Thus, the specialised sensors and
effectors must use the APIs of the managed software system to observe its state and
environment, and to modify its configuration, respectively. The stochastic model
management component must specialise the probabilistic verification engine so
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that it instantiates the parametric stochastic models using the actual values of the
managed system and environment parameters (provided by sensors) and analyses
the application-specific requirements.
4.5.2.5 Deployment of the Self-Adaptive System
As explained in Section 4.4.1.5, the role of this stage is to integrate the ENTRUST
controller and the controlled software system into a self-adaptive software sys-
tem that is then installed, preconfigured and set running. In particular, the pre-
configuration must select initial values for all the parameters of the controlled sys-
tem. Immediately after it starts running and until the first execution of the MAPE
control loop, the system functions as a traditional, non-adaptive software system.
As such, a separate assurance argument (which is outside the scope of this paper)
must be developed using traditional assurance methods, to confirm that the initial
system configuration is suitable.
The newly running software starts to behave like a self-adaptive system with the
first execution of the MAPE control loop, as described in the next two sections.
4.5.2.6 Self-Adaptation
In this ENTRUST stage, the deployed self-adaptive system is dynamically adjust-
ing its configuration in line with the observed internal and environmental changes.
The use of continual verification within the ENTRUST control loop produces as-
surance evidence that underpins the dynamic generation of assurance cases in the
next stage of our ENTRUST instance.
4.5.2.7 Synthesis of Dynamic Assurance Argument
The ENTRUST assurance case evolves in response to the results of the MAPE
process, e.g., time-triggered and event-triggered outputs of the monitor, the out-
comes of the analyzer, the mitigation actions developed by the planner and their
realisation by the executor. This offers a dynamic approach to assurance because
the full instantiation of the ENTRUST assurance argument pattern is left to run-
time, i.e. the only stage when the evidence required to complete the argument
becomes available. As such, the assurance case resulting from this stage captures
the full argument and evidence for the justification of the current configuration of
the self-adaptive system.
4.6 Applying the ENTRUST Methodology
4.6.1 Development of Verifiable Models
4.6.1.1 UUV System
Controller models. We instantiated the ENTRUST model templates for the UUV
system from Section 4.3.1, obtaining the automata shown in Fig. 4.12. The sig-
nal newRate? is the only sensor signal that the monitor automaton needs to deal
with, by reading a new UUV-sensor measurement rate (in process()) and check-
ing whether this rate has changed to such extent that a new analysis is required (in
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s0 s1 s2 s3 s5
s4s6
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1 xi
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1 pi1
1
1
1
eo↵i
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{starti} {oni}
{o↵i}
{accuratei}
{donei}
{inaccuratei}
{readi}eoni
Figure 4.13: CTMC modelMi of the i-th UUV sensor, adopted from [87]
analysisRequired()). If analysis is required, the analyzer automaton sends a ver-
ify! signal to invoke the runtime verification engine, and thus verifies which UUV
configurations satisfy requirements R1 and R2 and with what cost . The function
analyse() uses the verification results to select a configuration that satisfies R1
and R2 with minimum cost (cf. requirement R3). If no such configuration exists
or the verification does not complete within 2 seconds and the guard ‘time>2’ is
triggered, a zero-speed configuration is selected (cf. requirement R4). If the se-
lected configuration is not the one in use, adaptationRequired() returns true and
the startPlanning! signal is sent to initiate the execution of the planner automa-
ton. The planner assembles a stepwise plan for changing to the new configuration
by first switching on any UUV sensors that require activation, then switching off
those that are no longer needed, and finally adjusting the UUV speed. These recon-
figuration steps are carried out by the executor automaton by means of sensorON!,
sensorOFF! and changeSpeed! signals handled by the effectors from Fig. 4.8, as
described in Section 4.5.2.4.
Parametric stochastic models. Fig. 4.13 shows the CTMC modelMi of the i-th
UUV sensor. From the initial state s0, the system transitions to state s1 or s6 if
the sensor is switched on (xi = 1) or off (xi = 0), respectively. The sensor takes
measurements with rate ri, as indicated by the transition s1 ! s2. A measure-
ment is accurate with probability pi as shown by the transition s2 ! s3; when
inaccurate, the transition s2 ! s4 is taken. While the sensor is active this opera-
tion is repeated, as modelled by the transition s5 ! s1. The model is augmented
with two reward structures. A “measure” structure, shown in a dashed rectangular
box, associates a reward of 1 to each accurate measurement taken. An “energy”
structure, shown in solid rectangular boxes, associates the energy used to switch
the sensor on (eoni ) and off (eo↵i ) and to perform a measurement (ei) with the tran-
sitions modelling these events. The model M of the n-sensor UUV is given by
the parallel composition of the n sensor models: M = M1||...||Mn; and the QoS
system requirements are specified using CSL as follows:
R1: R measure 20 [C10/sp ]
R2: R energy120 [C10/sp ]
R3: minimise(w1E+w2sp 1), where E=R energy=? [C10/sp ]
where 10/sp is the time taken to travel 10m at speed sp. As requirement R4 is a
failsafe requirement, we verify it at design time as explained in Section 4.6.2.1, so
it is not encoded into CSL.
76
4.6 Applying the ENTRUST Methodology
(a
) M
on
ito
r
(d
) E
xe
cu
to
r
(c
) P
lan
ne
r
FX
 p
lan
ne
r
W
ait
P
pla
nn
erC
lea
nu
p()
Pl
an
Pl
an
Cr
ea
te
d
sta
rt
Pl
an
ni
ng
?
sta
rt
Ex
ec
ut
in
g!
!"
#$
%&'
&(
)*
+"
,-
.
sT
yp
e=
=M
AX
_T
YP
E
ste
p=
=D
O
_N
O
TH
IN
G
ad
dS
tep
(N
OT
IF
IC
AT
IO
N,
 se
rvi
ce
ID
)
ste
p=
=C
H
AN
G
E_
NO
TI
FI
CA
TI
O
N
ad
dS
tep
(A
LA
RM
, s
er
vic
eID
)
ste
p=
=C
H
AN
G
E_
AL
AR
M
ad
dS
tep
(F
UN
DA
ME
NT
AL
_A
NA
LY
SI
S,
 se
rvi
ce
ID
)
ste
p=
=C
H
AN
G
E_
FU
ND
AM
EN
TA
L_
AN
AL
YS
IS
ad
dS
tep
(O
RD
ER
, s
er
vic
eID
)
ste
p=
=C
H
AN
G
E_
O
RD
ER
ad
dS
tep
(T
EC
HN
IC
AL
_A
NA
LY
SI
S,
 se
rvi
ce
ID
)
ste
p=
=C
H
AN
G
E_
TE
CH
NI
CA
L_
AN
AL
YS
IS
ad
dS
te
p(
M
AR
KE
T_
W
AT
CH
, s
er
vic
eI
D)
st
ep
=
=
C
H
AN
G
E_
M
AR
K
ET
_W
AT
C
H
ste
p 
= 
ch
ec
kC
on
ﬁg
()
sT
yp
e+
+
FX
 E
xe
cu
to
r
W
ait
E
Pl
an
Ex
ec
ut
ed
Ex
ec
ut
e
ex
ec
ut
eP
lan
()
st
ar
tE
xe
cu
tin
g?
ex
ec
uto
rC
lea
nu
p()
pl
an
E
xe
cu
te
d!
al
lP
la
nS
te
ps
Ex
ec
ut
ed
()
/
al
lP
la
nS
te
ps
Ex
ec
ut
ed
() Ch
an
ge
No
tiﬁ
ca
tio
n
Se
rv
ice
Ch
an
ge
Al
ar
m
Se
rv
ice
Ch
an
ge
Or
de
r
Se
rv
ice
Ch
an
ge
Te
ch
nic
al
An
aly
sis
Se
rv
ice
Ch
an
ge
Fu
nd
am
en
ta
l
An
aly
sis
Se
rv
ice
Ch
an
ge
M
ar
ke
t
W
at
ch
Se
rv
ice
ch
an
ge
Se
rv
ic
e!
pla
nS
te
p=
ne
xtP
lan
St
ep
()
se
rv
ice
Ty
pe
=n
ex
tP
lan
Se
rv
ice
Ty
pe
()
se
rv
ice
ID
=n
ex
tP
lan
Se
rv
ice
ID
()
pl
an
St
ep
=
=
 
O
RD
ER
pl
an
St
ep
==
 
FU
ND
AM
EN
TA
L_
AN
AL
YS
IS
pl
an
St
ep
==
TE
CH
NI
CA
L_
AN
AL
SY
SI
S
pl
an
St
ep
==
 
M
AR
KE
T_
W
AT
CH
pl
an
St
ep
=
=
 
AL
AR
M
pl
an
St
ep
=
=
 
N
O
TI
FI
C
AT
IO
N
st
ar
tA
na
ly
si
s!
W
ait
M
Pr
oc
es
sS
en
so
rD
at
a
Ch
ec
kM
pr
oc
es
s(
)
/
an
al
ys
is
Re
qu
ir
ed
()
m
on
ito
rC
lea
nu
p(
)
ne
w
Se
rv
ic
es
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s?
M
on
ito
rF
ini
sh
ed
an
al
ys
is
Re
qu
ir
ed
()
St
ar
tA
na
lys
is
tim
e=
0
st
ar
tP
la
nn
in
g!
st
ar
tA
na
ly
si
s?
W
ait
A
Ch
ec
kA
An
aly
se
St
ar
tV
er
if
an
aly
se
()
ad
ap
ta
tio
nR
eq
ui
re
d(
)
E
nd
V
er
if
ve
ri
fy
!
ve
ri
fD
on
e?
/
ad
ap
ta
tio
nR
eq
ui
re
d(
)
Ad
ap
t
an
aly
se
rC
lea
nu
p(
)
An
aly
sis
Fi
nis
he
d
(b
) A
na
lyz
erW
ai
tV
er
if
tim
e !
 2
tim
e >
 2
us
eF
ail
sa
fe
Co
nﬁ
g(
)
Fi
gu
re
4.
14
:F
X
M
A
PE
au
to
m
at
a
th
at
in
st
an
tia
te
th
e
ev
en
t-t
rig
ge
re
d
EN
TR
U
ST
m
od
el
te
m
pl
at
es
77
4 Engineering Trustworthy Self-Adaptive Software with Dynamic Assurance Cases
4.6.1.2 FX System
Controller models. We specialised our event-triggered MAPE model templates
for the FX system. The resulting MAPE models are shown in Fig. 4.14, where
the shaded areas in Planner and Executor automata indicate the FX-specific steps
for assembling a plan and executing the adaptation, respectively. The implemen-
tations of all guards and actions decorated with brackets ‘()’ (which represent
application-specific C-style functions, as explained in Section 4.5.2.1) are avail-
able on our project website.
Parametric stochastic models. Tomodel the runtime behaviour of the FX system,
we used the parametric discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC) depicted in Fig. 4.15.
In this DTMC, constant transition probabilities derived from system logs are as-
sociated with the branches of the FX workflow from Fig. 4.6. In contrast, state
transitions that model the success or failure of service invocations are associated
with parameterised probabilities, which are unknown until the runtime selection
of the FX services. Likewise, the “price” and (response) “time” reward structures
(shown in solid and dashed boxes, respectively) are parametric and depend on the
combination of FX services dynamically selected by the ENTRUST controller.
Finally, we formalised requirements R1–R3 in rewards-augmented probabilistic
computational tree logic (PCTL):
R1: P 0.9[F done]
R2: R time5 [F done]
R3: minimise(w1price + w2time), where
price = R price=? [F done] and time = R
time
=? [F done]
4.6.1.3 Discussion
The ENTRUST controller model templates supported the development of the UUV
and FX controller models with structural changes confined to the Planner and Ex-
ecutor automata. Despite the differences between the sensor data used by the two
systems (cf. Table 4.1), the Monitor and Analyzer automata could be instanti-
ated with all application-specific functionality provided by the guard and action
functions associated with the automata transitions. Different types of stochastic
models were required for the two systems (continuous time for the UUV system,
and discrete time for the FX system) as the differences in their requirements and
uncertainties needed the modelling of different aspects of their behaviour.
4.6.2 Verification of Controller Models
4.6.2.1 UUV System
We used the UPPAAL model checker [17] to verify that the network of MAPE
automata from Fig. 4.12 (which we made available on our project website) satisfies
all the generic correctness properties from Table 4.4, as well as the application-
specific property
R4: A2 (Analyzer.Analyse ^ Analyzer.time>2!
A3 Planner.Plan ^ newConfig.speed==0),
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Figure 4.15: Parametric DTMC model of the FX system; pMW, pTA, . . . , timeMW, timeTA,
. . . , and priceMW, priceTA, . . . , represent the reliability (i.e. success probability), the re-
sponse time and the price, respectively, of the implementations used for the MW, TA,
. . . system services.
which represents the CTL encoding of requirement R4. To carry out this verifi-
cation, we defined simple sensors, verification engine and effectors automata as
described above. We used a simple one-state effectors automaton with transitions
returning to its single state for each of the received signals sensorON?, senso-
rOFF? changeSpeed? and planExecuted?; and a finite collection of sensor–
verification engine automata pairs that together exercised all possible paths of the
MAPE automata from Fig. 4.12. These auxiliary UPPAAL automata are available
on the project website.
4.6.2.2 FX System
We used the model checker UPPAAL to verify that the MAPE automata network
from Fig. 4.14 satisfies the generic controller correctness properties in Table 4.4,
and a FX-specific CSL property corresponding to the failsafe requirement R4 of
the FX system:
R4: A2 (Analyzer.Analyse ^ Analyzer.time>2!
A3 Planner.Plan ^ newConfig.Order==NoSvc),
where ‘newConfig.Order==NoSvc’ signifies that no service is used to implement
the Order operation (i.e., the operation is skipped).
4.6.2.3 Discussion
The availability of a set of generic properties that must be satisfied by all EN-
TRUST controllers (cf. Table 4.4) meant that an additional CSL property was only
needed for the application-specific failsafe requirement. For both systems, this
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additional property corresponds to the scenario where a suitable new configura-
tion cannot be obtained timely, suggesting that using a property template may be
feasible for this and potentially for other types of failsafe requirements.
4.6.3 Partial Instantiation of Assurance Argument Pattern
4.6.3.1 UUV System
Fig. 4.16 shows the partially-instantiated assurance argument pattern for the self-
adaptive UUV system, in which we shaded the (partially) instantiated GSN ele-
ments. To keep the diagram clear, we only show the expansion for requirements
R1 and R4, leaving R2 and R3 undeveloped. The goal R1Achieved (which needs
to be further instantiated when the system configuration is dynamically selected)
is supported by: (a) sub-claim R1Verified, whose associated solution placeholder
R1Result remains uninstantiated and should constantly be updated by the EN-
TRUST controller at runtime; and (b) the away goal ReqsPreservedByPlatform
described earlier in this section. The undeveloped and partially instantiated goals
R2Achieved and R3Achieved have the same structure as R1Achieved. In con-
trast, the (failsafe) goal R4Achieved is fully instantiated because the solution
R4Result, comprising UPPAAL verification evidence that R4 is achieved irrespec-
tive of the configuration of the self-adaptive system, was obtained in the second
ENTRUST stage (verification of controller models), cf. Section 4.6.2.1.
4.6.3.2 FX System
We partially instantiated the ENTRUST assurance argument pattern for our self-
adaptive FX system, as shown in Fig. 4.17.
4.6.3.3 Discussion
As shown in Figs. 4.16 and 4.17, roughly the top half of the partially instantiated
assurance argument pattern comes from ENTRUST assurance pattern in Fig. 4.10.
This part of the assurance argument captures assurance elements generic to all
self-adaptive systems, allowing the developers of a self-adaptive system to focus
on the application-specific elements, which they are often more familiar with.
4.6.4 Enactment of the Controller
4.6.4.1 UUV System
To assemble an ENTRUST controller for the UUV system, we implemented Java
classes that extend the functionality of the abstract Sensors, Effectors and Verifi-
cationEngine classes from the ENTRUST distribution. In addition to synchronis-
ing with the relevant application-specific signals from the MAPE automata (e.g.,
newRate?), the specialised sensors and effectors invoke the relevant API methods
of our UUV simulator. The specialised verification engine instantiates the para-
metric sensor modelsMi from Fig. 4.13, 1 in, and verifies the CSL-encoded
requirements from Section 4.6.1.1.
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Figure 4.16: Partially-instantiated assurance argument for the UUV system
4.6.4.2 FX System
To assemble the ENTRUST controller for the FX system, we combined the con-
troller and stochastic models from Stage 1 with our generic controller platform,
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Figure 4.17: Partially-instantiated assurance argument for the FX system; the elements
(partially) instantiated in Stage 3 of ENTRUST are shaded.
and with FX-specific Java classes that we implemented to specialise the abstract
Sensors, Effectors and VerificationEngine abstract classes of ENTRUST. The
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Sensors class synchronises with the Monitor automaton from Fig. 4.14 through
the newServicesCharacteristics! signal (issued after changes in the properties of
the FX services are detected). In addition, the Sensors and Effectors classes use
the relevant API methods of an FX implementation that we developed as explained
in Section 4.6.5.2. The specialised VerificationEngine instantiates the parametric
DTMC model from Fig. 4.15 at runtime, and verifies the PCTL formulae devised
for requirements R1–R3 from Section 4.6.1.2.
4.6.4.3 Discussion
The controller enactment comprises typical software development (i.e. speciali-
sation of Java classes) and integration tasks. A considerable part of the required
functionality is application-independent, and already provided by the reusable ab-
stract Java classes available with ENTRUST.
4.6.5 Deployment of the Self-Adaptive System
4.6.5.1 UUV System
We used the open-source MOOS-IvP1 platform (oceanai.mit.edu/
moos-ivp) for the implementation of autonomous applications on unmanned
marine vehicles [20] to develop a fully-fledged three-sensor UUV simulator that
is available on the ENTRUST website. We then exploited the publish-subscribe
architecture of MOOS-IvP to interface the ENTRUST sensors and effectors (and
thus the controller from Section 4.6.4.1) with the UUV simulator, we installed the
controller and the controlled system on a computer with a similar spec to that of
the payload computer of a mid-range UUV, and we preconfigured the system to
start with zero speed and all its sensors switched off. We chose this configuration,
corresponding to initial UUV parameter values (x1, x2, x3, sp) = (0, 0, 0, 0), to
ensure that the system started with a configuration satisfying its failsafe require-
ment R4 (cf. Section 4.3.1).2
4.6.5.2 FX System
We implemented a prototype version of the FX system using Java web services
deployed in Tomcat/Axis, and a Java FX workflow that we integrated with the
ENTRUST controller from Stage 4. Our self-adaptive FX system (whose code
is available on our project website) could select from two functionally equiva-
lent web service implementations for each of the six FX services from Fig. 4.6,
i.e. from 12 web services with the initial characteristics shown in Table 4.5. For
simplicity and without loss of generality, we installed the components of the self-
adaptive FX system on a single computer with the characteristics detailed in Sec-
tion 4.7.1, and we preconfigured the system to start by using the first web service
implementation available for each service (i.e. MW0, TA0, etc.), except for the
Order service. For Order, NoSvc was selected initially, to ensure that the failsafe
1Mission-Oriented Operating Suite – Interval Programming
2 The use of a failsafe initial configuration is our recommended approach for ENTRUST self-adaptive
systems. When this is not possible, an execution of the MAPE loop must be initiated as part of the
system start-up, to ensure that an initial configuration meeting the system requirements is selected.
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Table
4.5:
Initialcharacteristics
ofthe
service
instances
used
by
the
FX
system
O
peration:
M
arketW
atch
TechnicalAnalysis
Fundam
.Analysis
Alarm
O
rder
N
otification
Service
ID
:
M
W
0
M
W
1
TA
0
TA
1
FA
0
FA
1
A
l0
A
l1
O
r0
O
r1
N
o
0
N
o
1
response
tim
e
[s]
.5
.5
.6
1.0
1.6
.7
.6
.9
.6
1.3
1.8
.5
reliability
.976
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Figure 4.18: Verification results for requirement (a) R1, (b) R2, and (c) cost of the feasible
configurations; 21 speed values between 1m/s and 5m/s are considered for each of the seven
combinations of active sensors, corresponding to 21 ⇥ 7 = 147 alternative configurations.
The best configuration (circled) corresponds to x1 = x2 = 1, x3 = 0 (i.e. UUV using only
its first two sensors) and sp = 3.2m/s, and the shaded regions correspond to requirement
violations.
requirement R4 was satisfied until a configuration meeting requirements R1–R3
was automatically selected by the first execution of the MAPE loop, shortly after
the system started.
4.6.5.3 Discussion
This stage involved a typical deployment of the managed systems and of their
controllers, except that both self-adaptive systems were preconfigured to start with
a configuration satisfying their failsafe requirement. Note that such a configu-
ration always exists because the compliance of the two systems with their fail-
safe requirements was formally verified in the second ENTRUST stage (cf. Sec-
tion 4.6.2).
4.6.6 Self-Adaptation
4.6.6.1 UUV System
The dynamic reconfiguration of the self-adaptive UUV system is described in de-
tail in Section 4.7.1.1. Here we illustrate the process by considering a scenario in
which the UUV system comprises n= 3 sensors with: initial measurement rates
r1 = 5s 1, r2 = 4s 1, r3 = 4s 1; energy consumed per measurement e1 = 3J,
e2=2.4J, e3=2.1J; and energy used for switching a sensor on and off eon1 =10J,
eon2 =8J, eon3 =5J and eo↵1 =2J, eo↵2 =1.5J, eo↵3 =1J, respectively. Also, suppose
that the current UUV configuration is (x1, x2, x3, sp)=(0, 1, 1, 2.8), and that sen-
sor 3 experiences a degradation such that rnew3 =1s 1. The ENTRUST controller
gets this new measurement rate through the monitor. As the sensor rates differ
from those in the knowledge repository, the guard analysisRequired() returns true
and the startAnalysis! signal is sent. Upon receiving the signal, the analyser
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Figure 4.19: Runtime verification results for FX requirement (a) R1, (b) R2, and (c)
R3—cost of the feasible configurations, where the configuration index i1i2i3i4i5i6 in num-
ber base 2 corresponds to the FX configuration that uses services MWi1 , TAi2 , FAi3 , Ali4 ,
Ori5 and Noi6 . The best configuration (circled) has index 5(10) = 000101(2), correspond-
ing to MW0, TA0, FA0, Al1, Or0 and No1. Shaded regions correspond to requirement
violations.
model invokes the probabilistic verification engine, whose analysis results for re-
quirementsR1–R3 are depicted in Fig. 4.18. The analyse() action filters the results
as follows: configurations that violate requirementsR1 orR2, i.e., the shaded areas
from Fig. 4.18a and Fig. 4.18b, respectively, are discarded.3 The remaining con-
figurations are feasible, so their cost (4.1) is computed for w1 = 1 and w2 = 200.
The configuration minimising the cost (i.e., (x1, x2, x3, sp) = (1, 1, 0, 3.2) – cir-
cled in Fig. 4.18a-c) is selected as the best configuration. Since the best and the
current configurations differ, the analyzer invokes the planner to assemble a step-
wise reconfiguration plan with which i) sensor 1 is switched on; ii) next, sensor
3 is switched off; and iii) finally the speed is adjusted to 3.2m/s. Once the plan
is assembled, the executor is enforcing this plan to the UUV system. The adapta-
tion results from Fig. 4.18 provide the evidence required for the generation of the
assurance case as described in Section 4.6.7.1.
4.6.6.2 FX System
In this stage, the self-adaptive FX system dynamically reconfigures in response
to observed changes in the characteristics of the web services it uses. Several
such reconfigurations are described later in the paper, in Section 4.7.1.2 and in
Fig. 4.23. To illustrate this process in detail, consider the system configuration
3Note that R1 and R2 are “conflicting” requirements, in the sense that the configurations that satisfy
R1 by the widest margin violate R2, and the other way around. In such scenarios, ENTRUST supports
the selection of configurations based on trade-offs between the conflicting requirements, as specified
by a cost (or utility) function. If either requirement became much stricter (e.g. if R1 required over 50
measurements per every 10m), no configuration would satisfy both R1 and R2. In this case, ENTRUST
would choose the configuration specified by the failsafe requirement R4, i.e. would reduce the UUV
speed to 0m/s, and would record the probabilistic model checking evidence showing the lack of a
suitable non-failsafe configuration.
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immediately after change C from Fig. 4.23, where the FX workflow uses the ser-
vices MW1, TA0, FA0, Al0, Or0 and No1. This configuration is reached after the
FX services, initially operating with the characteristics from Table 4.5, experience
degradations in the reliability of MW0 (pnewMW0 = 0.9, change B in Fig. 4.23) and
in the response time of FA1 (timenewFA1 = 1.2s, change C in Fig. 4.23). With the
FX system in this configuration, suppose that the Market Watch service MW0 re-
covers, i.e., pnewMW0 = 0.976 as in Table 4.5. Under these circumstances, which
correspond to change D from Fig. 4.23, the ENTRUST controller receives the up-
dated characteristics of MW0 via its monitor. As the new service characteristics
differ from those in the knowledge repository, the guard analysisRequired() holds
and the startAnalysis! signal is sent. The analyser model receives the signal and
invokes the runtime probabilistic verification engine, whose analysis of the FX re-
quirements R1–R3 over the 26=64 possible system configurations (corresponding
to six services each provided by two implementations) is shown in Fig. 4.19. As
part of this analysis, configurations that violate requirements R1 or R2 (i.e., those
from the shaded areas in Fig. 4.19a and Fig. 4.19b, respectively) are discarded.
The remaining configurations are feasible, so their cost is calculated (for w1 = 1
and w2 = 2) as shown in Fig. 4.19c. The feasible configuration using services
MW0, TA0, FA0, Al1, Or0 and No1 has the lowest cost and is thus selected as the
best system configuration. Since the best and the current configurations differ, the
guard adaptationRequired() holds and the analyser invokes the planner through
the startPlanning! signal to assemble a stepwise reconfiguration plan through
which: (i) MW0 replaces MW1; and (ii) Al1 replaces Al0. Once the plan is ready,
the executor automaton receives the startExecuting? signal and is ensuring the
implementation of this plan by sending the signal changeService! to the system
effectors.
4.6.6.3 Discussion
Both self-adaptive systems reconfigured in response to application-specific
changes (more of which are described in Section 4.7). Selecting the new con-
figurations involved the runtime probabilistic model checking of different types of
stochastic models, to generate assurance evidence that system requirements were
satisfied after each change.
4.6.7 Synthesis of Dynamic Assurance Argument
4.6.7.1 UUV System
In this stage, the partially-instantiated assurance argument pattern for the UUV
system (Fig. 4.16) is fully instantiated after every selection of a new UUV config-
uration by the ENTRUST controller. For instance, after the ENTRUST controller
activities described in Section 4.6.6.1 conclude with the selection of the UUV
configuration (x1, x2, x3, sp)= (1, 1, 0, 3.2) and the generation of runtime verifi-
cation evidence that this configuration satisfies requirements R1–R3, this partially-
instantiated assurance argument pattern is fully instantiated as shown in Fig. 4.20.
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Figure 4.20: Fully-instantiated assurance argument for the UUV system; the subgoals for
R2Achieved and R3Achieved (not included due to space constraints) are similar to those
for R1Achieved, and shading is used to show the elements instantiated at runtime
4.6.7.2 FX System
The partially instantiated FX assurance pattern from Fig. 4.17 is updated into a
full assurance argument after each selection of a new configuration by the EN-
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Figure 4.21: Fully-instantiated assurance argument for the FX system; the subgoals for
R2Achieved and R3Achieved (not included due to space constraints) are similar to those
for R1achieved, and shading is used to show the elements instantiated at runtime
TRUST controller. This involves using the new evidence generated by the runtime
probabilistic verification engine to complete the instantiation of the assurance pat-
tern. As an example, Fig. 4.21 shows the complete assurance pattern synthesised
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as part of the configuration change that we used to illustrate the previous stage of
ENTRUST in Section 4.6.6.2.
4.6.7.3 Discussion
For both the UUV system and the FX system, integrating the dynamically gener-
ated assurance evidence required the updating of only a few uninstantiated GSN
‘solutions’ from the partially instantiated assurance arguments. In contrast, instan-
tiating the current system configurations in the two assurance arguments involved
multiple but small updates of ‘context’, ‘strategy’ and ‘goal’ GSN elements. The
rightmost branches of the assurance arguments ensure the goals associated with
the failsafe requirements of the two systems, and therefore remained unchanged in
this ENTRUST stage.
4.7 Evaluation
To evaluate the effectiveness and generality of ENTRUST, we used our methodol-
ogy to engineer the self-adaptive software systems from Section 4.3. The two sys-
tems were developed as described in Section 4.6, and were deployed in a realistic
environment seeded with simulated changes specific to their application domains.
Finally, we examined the correctness and efficiency of the adaptation and of the
assurance cases produced by ENTRUST in response to each of these unexpected
environmental changes. The aim of our evaluation was to answer the following
research questions.
RQ1 (Correctness): Are ENTRUST self-adaptive systems making the right adap-
tation decisions and generating valid assurance cases?
RQ2 (Efficiency): Does ENTRUST provide design-time and runtime assurance
evidence with acceptable overheads for realistic system sizes?
RQ3 (Generality): Does ENTRUST support the development of self-adaptive
software systems and dynamic assurance cases across application domains?
As the focus of our evaluation was the ENTRUST methodology and its tool-
supported instance, we necessarily made a number of assumptions. In particular,
we assumed that established assurance processes could be used to construct as-
surance arguments for all aspects of the controlled systems from our case studies,
including their correct design, development, operation, ability to respond to effec-
tor requests, and any real-time considerations associated with achieving the new
configurations decided by the ENTRUST controller. As such, these aspects are
outside the scope of ENTRUST and are not covered in our evaluation. We fur-
ther assumed that the derivation, validity, completeness and formalisation of the
self-adaptive system requirements are addressed as part of the overall system as-
surance cases for the two case studies, and therefore also outside the scope of our
evaluation of ENTRUST.
The experiments carried out to address the three research questions are de-
scribed in Sections 4.7.1–4.7.3, and the main threats to validity are discussed in
Section 4.7.4.
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Figure 4.22: Change scenarios for the self-adaptive UUV system over 2100 seconds of
simulated time. Extended shaded regions indicate the sensors switched on at each point in
time, and narrow shaded areas show the periodical testing of sensors switched off due to
degradation (to detect their recovery).
4.7.1 RQ1 (Correctness)
To answer the first research question, we carried out experiments that involved run-
ning the UUV and FX systems in realistic environments comprising (simulated)
unexpected changes specific to their domains. For the UUV system, the experi-
ments were seeded with failures including sudden degradation in the measurement
rates of sensors and complete failures of sensors, and with recoveries from these
problems. For the FX system, we considered variations in the response time and
the probability of successful completion of third-party service invocation. All the
experiments were run on a MacBook Pro with 2.5 GHz Intel Core i7 processor,
and 16 GB 1600 MHz DDR3 RAM.
4.7.1.1 UUV System
For the UUV system, we described a concrete change scenario and the resulting
self-adaptation process and generation of an assurance case in Sections 4.6.6.1
and 4.6.7.1. The complete set of change scenarios we used in this experiment is
summarised in Fig. 4.22, which depicts the changes in the sensor rates and the new
UUV configurations selected by the ENTRUST controller. The labels A–H from
Fig. 4.22 correspond to following key events:
A) The UUV starts with the initial state and configuration from Section 4.6.6.1;
B) Sensor 3 experiences the degradation described in Section 4.6.6.1 (rnew3 = 1),
so the higher-rate but less energy efficient sensor 1 is switched on (allowing a
slight increase in speed to sp=3.2m/s) and sensor 3 is switched off;
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C) Sensor 3 recovers and the initial configuration is resumed;
D) Sensor 2 experiences a degradation, and is replaced by sensor 1, with the speed
increased to sp=3.1m/s;
E) Sensor 2 recovers and the initial configuration is resumed;
F) Both sensor 2 and sensor 3 experience degradations, so sensor 1 alone is used,
with the UUV travelling at a lower speed sp=2.1m/s;
G) Periodic tests (which involve switching sensors 2 and 3 on for short periods of
time) are carried out to detect a potential recovery of the degraded sensors;
H) Sensors 2 and 3 resume operation at nominal rates and the initial UUV config-
uration is reinstated.
If the UUV system was not self-adaptive, it would have to operate with a fixed
configuration, which would lead to requirement violations for extended periods
of time. To understand this drawback of a non-adaptive UUV, consider that its
fixed configuration is chosen to coincide with the initial UUV configuration from
Fig. 4.22 (i.e. (x1, x2, x3, sp) = (0, 1, 1, 2.8)) – a natural choice because manual
analysis can be used to find that this configuration satisfies the UUV requirements
at deployment time. However, with this fixed configuration, the UUV will violate
its throughput requirement R1 whenever one or both of UUV sensors 1 and 2 ex-
perience a non-trivial degradation, i.e. in the time intervals B–C (only 13 measure-
ments per 10m instead of the required 20 measurements, according to additional
analysis we carried out), D–E (only 15 measurements per 10m) and F–H (only 7
measurements per 10m) from Fig. 4.22. Although a different fixed configuration
may always meet requirement R1, such a configuration would violate other re-
quirement(s), e.g. having all three UUV sensors switched on meets R1 but violates
the resource usage requirement R2 at all times.
Finally, we performed experiments to assess how the adaptation decisions may
be affected by changes in the weights w1, w2 from the UUV cost (4.1) and the
energy usage of the n UUV sensors. We considered UUVs with n 2 {3, 4, 5, 6}
sensors, and for each value of n we carried out 30 independent experiments with
the weights w1, w2 randomly drawn from the interval [1, 500], and the energy con-
sumption for taking a measurement and switching on and off a sensor (i.e., ei, eoni
and eo↵i , 1  i  n) randomly drawn from the interval [0.1J, 10J ]. The experi-
mental results (available, together with the PRISM-generated assurance evidence,
on the project website) show that ENTRUST successfully reconfigured the system
irrespective of the weight and energy usage values. In particular, if a configu-
ration satisfying requirements R1–R3 existed for a specific change and system
characteristics combination, ENTRUST reconfigured the UUV system to use this
configuration. As expected, the configuration minimising the cost (4.1) depended
both on the values of the weights w1, w2 and on the sensor energy usage. When no
configuration satisfying requirements R1–R3 was available, ENTRUST employed
the zero-speed failsafe configuration from requirement R4 until configurations sat-
isfying requirements R1–R3 were again possible after a sensor recovery.
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4.7.1.2 FX System
For the FX system, a concrete change scenario is detailed in Section 4.3.2, and
the complete set of change scenarios used in our experiments is summarised in
Fig. 4.23, where labels A–G correspond to the following events:
A) The FX starts with the initial services characteristics from Table 4.5 and uses
a configuration comprising the services MW0, TA0, FA0, Al1, Or0 and No1,
which satisfies requirements R1 and R2 and optimises R3;
B) The Market Watch service MW0 experiences a significant reliability degrada-
tion (pnewMW0 = 0.9), so FX starts using the significantly more reliableMW1, and
thus “affords” to also switch to the slightly less reliable but faster Fundamental
Analysis service FA1 in order to minimise the cost defined in requirement R3;
C) Due to an increase in response time of Fundamental Analysis service FA1
(timenewFA1 = 1.2s), the FX switches to using FA0 and also replaces the Alarm
service Al1 with the faster but more expensive service Al0 (to meet the timing
requirement R2);
D) TheMarket Watch serviceMW0 recovers, so FX switches back to this services
and also resumes using the less reliable Alarm service Al1;
E) The Technical Analysis service TA0 and the Notification service No1 exhibit
unexpected degradations in reliability (pnewTA0 = 0.98) and in response time
(timenewNo1 = 1s), respectively, so the FX system self reconfigures to use MW0,
TA1, FA1, Al0, Or0 and No0;
F) As a result of a reliability degradation in the Order service Or0 (pnewOr0 = 0.91)
and recovery of the Technical Analysis service TA0, the FX system replaces
servicesMW0, TA1, FA1 and Or0 withMW1, TA0, FA0 and Or1, respectively;
G) All the degraded services recover, so the initial configurationMW0, TA0, FA0,
Al1, Or0 and No1 is reinstated.
As in the case of the UUV system, a non-adaptive FX version will fail to meet
the system requirements for extended periods of time. For example, choosing to
always use the initial FX configuration from Fig. 4.23 would lead to a violation of
the reliability requirement R1 while service MW0 experiences a significant relia-
bility degradation in the time interval B–D. While using service MW1 instead of
MW0 would avoid this violation, MW1 is more expensive but no faster thanMW0
(cf. Table 4.5) so its choice would increase the cost (4.2), thus violating the cost
requirement R3 in the time interval A–B.
4.7.1.3 Discussion
For each change scenario from our experiments within the two case studies (cf.
Figs. 4.22 and 4.23), we performed two checks. For the former check, we con-
firmed that the ENTRUST controller operated correctly. To this end, we estab-
lished that the change was accurately reported by the sensors and correctly pro-
cessed by the monitor, leading the analyzer to select the right new configuration,
for which a correct plan was built by the planner and implemented by the executor.
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Figure 4.23: Change scenarios for the self-adaptive FX system, with the initial services
characteristics shown in Table 4.5. The thick continuous lines depict the services selected
at each point in time.
For the latter check, we determined the suitability of the ENTRUST assurance
cases. We started from the guidelines set by safety and assurance standards, which
highlight the importance of demonstrating, using available evidence, that an as-
surance argument is compelling, structured and valid [56, 137, 193]. Also, we
considered the fact that ENTRUST has been examined experimentally but has not
been tested in real-world scenarios to generate the industrial evidence necessary
before approaching the relevant regulator. However, our preliminary results show,
based on formal design-time and runtime evidence, that the primary claim of EN-
TRUST assurance cases is supported by a direct and robust argument. Firstly, the
argument assures the achievement of the requirements either based on a partic-
ular active configuration or through reconfiguration, while maintaining a failsafe
mechanism. Secondly, the argument and patterns are well-structured and conform
to the GSN community standard [95]. Thirdly, ENTRUST provides rigorous as-
sessments of validity not only at design time but also through-life, by means of
monitoring and continuous verification that assess and challenge the validity of
the assurance case based on actual operational data. This continuous assessment
of validity is a core requirement for safety standards, as highlighted recently for
medical devices [162]. As such, our approach satisfies five key principles of dy-
namic assurance cases [61]:
• continuity and updatability, as evidence is generated and updated at runtime
to ensure the continuous validity of the assurance argument (e.g. the formal
evidence for solution R1Result from the UUV argument in Fig. 4.20, which
satisfies a system requirement given the current configuration);
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• proactivity, since the assurance factors that provide the basis for the evidence in
the assurance argument are proactively identified (e.g. the ConfigDef context
from the UUV argument in Fig. 4.20, which captures the parameters of the
current configuration);
• automation, because the runtime evidence is dynamically synthesised by the
MAPE controller;
• formality, as the assurance arguments are formalised using the GSN standard.
In conclusion, subject to the limitations described above, our experiments pro-
vide strong empirical evidence that ENTRUST self-adaptive systems make the
right adaptation decisions and generate valid assurance cases.
4.7.2 RQ2 (Efficiency)
To assess the efficiency of the ENTRUST generation of assurance evidence, we
measured the CPU time taken by (i) the design-time UPPAAL model checking of
the generic controller properties from Table 4.4; and (ii) the runtime probabilistic
model checking performed by the ENTRUST analyzer. Fig. 4.24 shows the time
taken to verify the generic controller properties from Table 4.4 for a three-sensor
UUV system, and for an FX system comprising two third-party implementations
for each workflow service. With typical CPU times of several minutes per property
and a maximum below 12 minutes, the overheads for this design-time, once-only
verification of all controller properties are entirely acceptable.
The CPU times required for the runtime probabilistic model checking of the
QoS requirements for alternative configurations of the two systems (Fig. 4.25)
have values below 1.5s and 2s, respectively. These runtime overheads, which cor-
respond to under 10ms for the verification of a UUV configuration and under 30ms
for the verification of an FX configuration, are acceptable because ENTRUST is
intended for scenarios where:
1) failures and other changes requiring system reconfigurations are, on average,
much less frequent than the frequency with which the runtime verification can
be executed (i.e. every 1.5–2s for our two systems);
2) failsafe configurations can be temporarily assumed if needed during the infre-
quent reverifications of the ENTRUST stochastic models.
These assumptions ensure that, most of the time, ENTRUST adaptation decisions
are reached before new changes occur and can be applied. They also ensure that
any time spent in failsafe configurations is small compared to the time when the
system employs “useful” configurations.
As shown in Fig. 4.25, we also ran experiments to assess the increase in run-
time overhead with the system size and number of alternative configurations, by
considering UUVs with up to six sensors, and FX system variants with up to five
implementations per service. Typical for model checking, the CPU time increases
exponentially with these system characteristics. This makes the current imple-
mentation of our ENTRUST instance suitable for self-adaptive systems with up to
hundreds of configurations to analyse and select from at runtime. However, our re-
cent work on compositional [38], incremental [113], caching-lookahead [87] and
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Figure 4.24: CPU time for the UPPAAL verification of the generic controller properties in
Table 4.4 (box plots of 10 independent measurements)
distributed [34] approaches to probabilistic model checking and on metaheuris-
tics for probabilistic model synthesis [88] suggests that these more efficient model
checking approaches could be used to extend the applicability of our ENTRUST
instance to much larger configuration space sizes. As an example, in [87] we
used caching of recent runtime probabilistic model checking results and antici-
patory verification of likely future configurations (i.e. lookahead) to significantly
reduce the mean time required to select new configurations for a variant of our
self-adaptive UUV system (by over one order of magnitude in many scenarios).
Integrating ENTRUST with these approaches is complementary to the purpose of
this paper and represents future work.
4.7.3 RQ3 (Generality)
We used ENTRUST to develop an embedded system from the oceanic monitoring
domain, and a service-based system from the exchange trade domain. As pre-
viously mentioned in Section 4.3 and summarised in Table 4.1, self-adaptation
within these systems was underpinned by the verification of continuous- and
discrete-time Markov chains, respectively; and the requirements and types of
changes for the two systems differed. Finally, the ENTRUST assurance arguments
for the two systems were based on assurance evidence obtained using multiple
verification techniques:
1) testing evidence for the correct operation of trusted virtual machine;
2) model checking evidence for the correctness of the MAPE controller and the
failsafe system requirements;
3) probabilistic model checking evidence for the remaining system requirements.
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Figure 4.25: CPU time for the runtime probabilistic model checking of the QoS require-
ments after changes (box plots based on 10 system runs comprising seven changes each—70
measurements in total)
Although evaluation in additional areas is needed, these results indicate that our
ENTRUST instance can be used across application domains.
To assess the overall generality of ENTRUST, we note that probabilistic model
checking can effortlessly be replaced with simulation in our experiments, because
the probabilistic model checker PRISM can be configured to use discrete-event
simulation instead of model checking techniques. Using this PRISM configuration
requires no change to the Markov models or probabilistic temporal logic properties
we analysed at runtime. As for any simulation, the analysis results would be ap-
proximate, but would be obtained with lower overheads than those from Fig. 4.25.
The uncertainties that affect self-adaptive systems are often of a stochastic na-
ture, and thus the use of stochastic models and probabilistic model checking to
analyse the behaviour of these systems is very common (e.g. [37, 38, 41, 68, 71,
76, 158, 180]). As such, our ENTRUST instance is applicable to a broad class of
self-adaptive systems.
Nevertheless, other methods have been used to synthesise MAPE controllers
and to support their operation. Many such methods (e.g. based on formal proof,
traditional model checking, other simulation techniques and testing) are described
in Section 4.8. Given the generality of ENTRUST, these methods could poten-
tially be employed at design time and/or at runtime by alternative instantiations of
ENTRUST, supported by different modelling paradigms, requirement specifica-
tion formalisms, and tools. For example, the use of the (non-probabilistic) graph
transformation models or dynamic tests proposed in [15] and [78], respectively, in
the self-adaptation ENTRUST stage is not precluded by any of our assumptions
(cf. Section 4.4.2.1), although the method chosen for this stage will clearly con-
strain the types of requirements for which assurance evidence can be provided at
runtime.
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4.7.4 Threats to Validity
Construct validity threats may be due to the assumptions made when implement-
ing our simple versions of the UUV and FX systems, and in the development
of the stochastic models and requirements for these systems. To mitigate these
threats, we implemented the two systems using the well-established UUV soft-
ware platform MOOS-IvP and (for FX) standard Java web services deployed in
Tomcat/Axis. The model and requirements for the UUV system are based on a
validated case study that we are familiar with from previous work [87], and those
for the FX system were developed in close collaboration with a foreign exchange
expert.
Internal validity threats can originate from how the experiments were per-
formed, and from bias in the interpretation of the results due to researcher sub-
jectivity. To address these threats, we reported results over multiple independent
runs; we worked with a team comprising experts in all the key areas of ENTRUST
(self-adaptation, formal verification and assurance cases); and we made all exper-
imental data and results publicly available to enable replication.
External validity threats may be due to the use of only two systems in our
evaluation, and to the experimental evaluation having been done by only the au-
thors’ three research groups. To reduce the first threat, we selected systems from
different domains with different requirements. The evaluation results show that
ENTRUST supports the development of trustworthy self-adaptive solutions with
assurance cases for the two different settings. To reduce the second threat, we
based ENTRUST on input from, and needs identified by, the research community
[7, 49, 134, 135]. In addition, we fine tuned ENTRUST based on feedback from
industrial partners involved in the development of mission-critical self-adaptive
systems, and these partners are now using our methodology in planning future
engineering activities. Nevertheless, additional evaluation is required to confirm
generality for domains with characteristics that differ from those in our evaluation
(e.g., different timing patterns and types of requirements and disturbances) and
usability by a larger number of users.
4.8 Related Work
Given the uncertain operating conditions of self-adaptive systems, a central aspect
of providing assurances for such systems is to collect and integrate evidence that
the requirements are satisfied during the entire lifetime. To this end, researchers
from the area of self-adaptive systems have actively studied a wide variety of as-
surance methods and techniques applicable at design time and/or at runtime[49,
135, 140, 186, 207, 213, 224]. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 summarise the state of the art,
partitioned into categories based on the main method used to provide assurances,
e.g. formal proof, model checking or simulation. We consider as the main method
of a study from our analysis the method that the study primarily focuses on; the
approaches from these studies may implicitly use additional methods, such as test-
ing of their platforms and tools, but this is not emphasised by their authors. We
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summarise the representative approaches included in each category according to
their:
1) Assurances evidence, comprising separate parts for the methods used to pro-
vide assurance evidence for: (i) the correctness of the platform used to execute
the controller, (ii) the correctness of the controller functions, and (iii) the cor-
rectness of the runtime adaptation decisions;
2) Methodology, comprising three parts: the engineering process (i.e. a method-
ical series of steps to provide the assurances), tool support (i.e., tools used by
engineers to provide evidence at design time and tools used at runtime by the
controller, e.g. during analysis or planning), and other reusable components
(i.e. third-party libraries and purpose-built software components used as part
of the controller, and other artefacts that can be used at design time or at run-
time, including models, templates, patterns, algorithms).
Providing assurances for self-adaptive systems with strict requirements requires
covering all these aspects, as well as an assurance argument that integrates the
assurance evidence into a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that the sys-
tem requirements are satisfied. Unlike ENTRUST (Table 4.8), the current research
disregards this need for an assurance argument. We discuss below the different
approaches and point out limitations that we overcome with ENTRUST.
Formal proof establishes theorems to prove properties of the controller or the
system under adaptation. Proof was used to provide evidence for safety and live-
ness properties of self-adaptive systems with different semantics (one-point adap-
tation, overlap adaptation, and guided adaptation) [221]. Formal proof was also
used to provide evidence for properties of automatically synthesised controllers,
e.g. the completeness and soundness of synthesised behavioral models that sat-
isfy an expressive subset of liveness properties [62] and correctness and deadlock
free adaptations performed by automatically synthesised controllers [118]. Fi-
nally, formal proof was used to demonstrate the correctness of adaptation effects,
e.g. proofs for safety, no deadlock, and no starvation of system processes as a
result of adaptation [27], and guarantees for the required qualities of adaptations,
e.g. proofs for optimised resource allocation, while satisfying quality of service
constraints [3]. The focus of all these approaches is on providing assurance evi-
dence for particular aspects of adaptation. All of them offer reusable components,
however, these solutions require complete specifications of the system and its envi-
ronment, and—unlike ENTRUST—cannot handle aspects of the managed system
and its environment that are unknown until runtime.
Model checking enables verifying that a property holds for all reachable states
of a system, either offline by engineers and/or online by the controller software.
Model checking was used to ensure correctness of the adaptation functions that
are modeled as interacting automata, with the verified models directly interpreted
during execution by a thoroughly tested virtual machine [109]. Model checking
was also used to provide guarantees for automatic controller synthesis and enact-
ment, e.g. to assure that a synthesised controller and reusable model interpreter
have no anomalies [26]. Model checking has extensively been used to provide
guarantees for the effects of adaptation actions on the managed system, e.g. for
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safety properties of the transitions of a managed system that is modeled as a graph
transformation system [15], to ensure non-functional requirements by runtime ver-
ification of continually updated stochastic models of the controlled system and the
environment [33], and to provide evidence for resilience properties of synthesized
Markov models of the managed system [43]. Again, the focus of all the approaches
is on providing assurance evidence for particular aspects of adaptation. The EN-
TRUST instance presented in Section 4.5 uses two of these techniques (i.e., [109]
and [33]) to verify the correctness of the MAPE logic at design time and to obtain
evidence that adaptation decisions are correct at runtime, respectively. In addition,
ENTRUST offers a process for the systematic engineering of all components of
the self-adaptive system, which includes employing an industry-adopted standard
for the formalization of assurance arguments.
Simulation approaches provide evidence by analysing the output of the exe-
cution of a model of the system. Simulation was used to evaluate novel self-
adaptation approaches, e.g. to ensure the scalability and robustness to node failures
and message loss of a self-assembly algorithm [182], and to support the design of
self-adaptive systems, e.g., to check if the performance of a latency-aware adap-
tation algorithm falls within predicted bounds [41]. Recently some efforts have
been made to let the controller exploit simulation at runtime to support analysis,
e.g. runtime simulation of stochastic models of managed system and environment
has been used to ensure non-functional requirements with certain level of confi-
dence [209]. The primary focus of simulation approaches has been on providing
assurance evidence for the adaptation actions (either as a means to check the con-
troller effects or to make a prediction of the expected effects of different adaptation
options). The approaches typically rely on established simulators.
Testing is a standard method for assessing if a software system performs as ex-
pected in a finite number of scenarios. Testing was used to test the effectiveness
of adaptation frameworks, e.g. checking whether a self-repair framework applied
to a client-server system keeps the latencies of clients within certain bounds when
the network is overloaded [84]. Testing was used to provide evidence for the ro-
bustness of controllers by injecting invalid inputs at the controller’s interface and
use the responses to classify robustness [43]. Several studies have applied testing
at runtime, e.g. to validate safe and correct adaptations of the managed system
based on adapt test cases generated in response to changes in the system and en-
vironment [78]. While simulation and testing approaches can be employed within
the generic ENTRUST methodology to obtain assurance evidence for particular
aspects of self-adaptive systems, they need to be complemented by assurances for
other components of a self-adaptive system and integrated in a systematic process
as provided by ENTRUST.
Other approaches. We highlight some other related approaches that have been
used to provide assurances for self-adaptive systems. Recently, there has been
a growing interest in applying control theory to build “correct by construction”
controllers [172]. The approach was used to automatically synthesise controllers
at runtime, providing control-theoretic guarantees for stability, overshoot, set-
ting time and robustness of system operating under disturbances [75]. Although
promising, this research is at an early stage, and its potential to deliver solutions for
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real-world systems and scenarios has yet to be confirmed. In contrast, ENTRUST
relies on proven software engineering techniques for modelling and analysing soft-
ware systems and assuring their required properties. Runtime verification is a well-
studied lightweight verification technique based on extracting information from a
running system to detect whether certain properties are violated. For example, se-
quences of events can be modeled as observation sequences of a Hidden Markov
Model allowing to verify the probability that a temporal property is satisfied by a
run of a system given a sampled execution trace [179]. Sanity checks are another
approach to check the conformance of requirements of adaptive systems. Sanity
checks have been used to evaluate the correctness of resource sharing decisions
made by a reasoning engine [197]. Approaches such as runtime verification and
sanity checks are often supported by established tools. However, these approaches
provide only one piece of evidence. Such approaches can also be used by our
generic ENTRUST methodology, which supports the integration of assurance evi-
dence from multiple sources in order to continuously generate an assurance case.
Another line of related research (not specifically targetting self-adaptation and
thus not included in Table 4.7) is runtime certification, proposed in [163] and fur-
ther developed in [121, 168]. Runtime certification involves the proactive runtime
monitoring of the assumptions made in the assurance case, thereby providing early
warnings for potential failures. ENTRUST goes beyond the mere monitoring of
assumptions, to evolving the arguments and evidence dynamically based on the
runtime verification data, particularly for self-adaptive software assurance. EN-
TRUST also extends existing work on assurance argument patterns [60] by en-
abling runtime instantiation.
The ENTRUST methodology and the other research summarised in this section
also build on results from the areas of configurable software, configuration optimi-
sation, and performance tuning. For instance, symbolic evaluation has been used to
understand the behaviour of configurable software systems [161], dedicated sup-
port to automatically verify the correctness of dynamic updates of client-server
systems has been proposed [102], and specification languages have been devised to
help program library developers expose multiple variations of the same API using
different algorithms [187]. Research in this area has been applied to realise self-
adaptive software systems. For example, it has been used to deal with the prob-
lem of configurability of multi-tenant cloud settings by using a game theoretic ap-
proach that maximises tenants’ preferences satisfaction [82], to find workarounds
and add configuration guards to prevent particular failures [181], and to model the
variability of cloud systems and identify reconfigurations that meet given crite-
ria using temporal constraints and reconfiguration operations [174]. While these
approaches address adaptation of highly configurable systems at runtime, they
provide only specific pieces of evidence. Runtime testing as mentioned above
(e.g. [78]) is one interesting approach to ensure that such systems continue to exe-
cute in a safe and correct manner when adapting to handle changing environmen-
tal conditions. Such an approach could be integrated in the generic ENTRUST
methodology as part of the analysis phase to provide guarantees about the runtime
decision making process of self-adaptation.
104
4.9 Conclusion
Finally, assurance cases and GSN in particular are related to goal modeling.
Several approaches exist that provide alternative means to specify goal models
for self-adaptive systems; we discuss a representative selection. RELAX offers a
textual language that allows requirements to be temporarily relaxed to deal with
uncertainty in adaptation [217]. RELAX has been integrated with traditional goal
modeling using KAOS [50]. FLAGS provides both crisp goals specified in linear
temporal logic and fuzzy goals specified in fuzzy temporal language [13]. Adap-
tations are triggered by violated goals and the goal model is modified accord-
ingly to maintain a coherent view of the system and enforce adaptation on the run-
ning system. Other researchers specify requirements for adaptive systems as two
complementary types: awareness requirements and evolution requirements [175].
Awareness requirements indicate the situations that require adaptation and evolu-
tion requirements prescribe what to do in these situations. The development of
GSN was influenced by the research on goal modeling. Similar to the approaches
discussed above, the notation is used to represent and decompose system goals,
but in addition to that explicitly incorporate rationale arguments for the decompo-
sition.
The sparsity of Tables 4.6 and 4.7 makes clear that existing approaches are con-
fined to providing correctness evidence for specific aspects of the self-adaptive
software. In contrast to existing work on assurances for self-adaptive systems,
Table 4.8 shows that ENTRUST offers an end-to-end methodology for the devel-
opment of trustworthy self-adaptive software systems. Unique to our approach,
this includes the development of assurance arguments. The upper part of Table 4.8
shows how the generic ENTRUST methodology covers the whole spectrum of as-
pects that are required to provide assurances for self-adaptive systems with strict
requirements. The lower part of Table 4.8 shows a concrete tool-supported in-
stantiation of ENTRUST and summarises how the various assurances aspects are
covered for this instance. Details about the information summarised in the table
are provided in Sections 4.4 and 4.5.
4.9 Conclusion
We introduced ENTRUST, the first end-to-end methodology for the engineering
of trustworthy self-adaptive software systems and the dynamic generation of their
assurance cases. ENTRUST and its tool-supported instance presented in the paper
include methods for the development of verifiable controllers for self-adaptive sys-
tems, for the generation of design-time and runtime assurance evidence, and for
the runtime instantiation of an assurance argument pattern that we devised specif-
ically for these systems.
The future research directions for our project include evaluating the usability of
ENTRUST in a controlled experiment, extending the runtime model checking of
system requirements to functional requirements, and reducing the runtime over-
heads by exploiting recent advances in probabilistic model checking at runtime
[34, 38, 72, 87, 113]. In addition, we are planning to explore the applicability of
ENTRUST to other systems and application domains.
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Chapter 5
Model-based Simulation at Runtime for
Self-adaptive Systems
In this chapter, we introduce a novel modular approach for decision making in self-
adaptive systems that uses runtime simulation to efficiently provide guarantees for
the adaptation goals. This chapter is published at Models at Runtime, International
Conference on Autonomic Computing, 2016, and copied from [209].
This chapter provides an initial solution to provide guarantees for adaptation
goals in an efficient manner. Figure 4.1 shows an overview of the context of the
contribution.
Runtime simulation
Systematic empirical inquiry
(tele assistance)
Scientific Approaches Simulation-based approach
Efficient guarantees of the 
adaptation goals
Research Goals
RQ2:
Figure 5.1: Overview of the goals and scientific methods used in this chapter
To address RQ2 (efficiently providing guarantees for the adaptations goals), we
propose a novel modular approach that uses simulation and statistical methods to
efficiently provide adaptation guarantees for self-adaptive systems. The approach
uses distinct quality models for each relevant quality requirement with runtime
simulation of the quality models to provide efficient guarantees for the adaptation
goals. The approach is evaluated using a simulated tele assistance system.
My contribution to the research presented in this chapter is as follows: I con-
tributed 50% of the conceptualisation, 100% of the technical realisation, and 30%
of writing the chapter.
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Model-based Simulation at Runtime for
Self-adaptive Systems
Abstract
Modern software systems are subject to uncertainties, such as dy-
namics in the availability of resources or changes of system goals. Self-
adaptation enables a system to reason about runtime models to adapt
itself and realises its goals under uncertainties. Our focus is on pro-
viding guarantees for adaption goals. A prominent approach to provide
such guarantees is automated verification of a stochastic model that en-
codes up-to-date knowledge of the system and relevant qualities. The
verification results allow selecting an adaption option that satisfies the
goals. There are two issues with this state of the art approach: i) chang-
ing goals at runtime (a challenging type of uncertainty) is difficult, and
ii) exhaustive verification suffers from the state space explosion prob-
lem. In this paper, we propose a novel modular approach for decision
making in self-adaptive systems that combines distinct models for each
relevant quality with runtime simulation of the models. Distinct models
support on the fly changes of goals. Simulation enables efficient deci-
sion making to select an adaptation option that satisfies the system goals.
The tradeoff is that simulation results can only provide guarantees with
a certain level of accuracy. We demonstrate the benefits and tradeoffs of
the approach for a service-based telecare system.
5.1 Introduction
Over the past years, various self-adaptation approaches have been proposed to deal
with the dynamics and uncertainties of software systems (e.g., the availability of
resources or changes of system goals may be difficult to predict at design time).
Central to these approaches are feedback loops equipped with models that are up-
dated at runtime, when new knowledge becomes available. The system uses these
models to reflect upon itself and achieve its goals by adapting itself in response
to changing conditions [48, 133]. With the increasing demand for self-adaptation
in applications with critical goals, providing guarantees for the system goals has
become an important subject of research [49, 186, 213].
One prominent approach to provide such guarantees is runtime automated veri-
fication that allows checking whether certain properties hold for the system model
during operation. There is a particular interest in using stochastic models that en-
code system behaviour and knowledge of relevant qualities. The probabilities of
the transitions can be based on value estimates provided by domain experts, but
as these values may change over time they need to be updated online [68]. Ver-
ification of a stochastic model through exhaustive analysis of the state-transition
graph of the system model enables to calculate expected quality properties (e.g.,
likelihood of failures, expected response times) for different adaptation options,
allowing the system to select an option that satisfies the system goals and adapt
accordingly [37, 38].
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There are two issues with this state of the art approach. Encoding the system
behavior and knowledge of different quality properties in a single model lacks
flexibility to change goals at runtime, which is an important, but challenging type
of uncertainty [133]. Furthermore, exhaustive verification suffers from the state-
space explosion problem, which puts constraints on the time and resources re-
quired to perform verification, and the size of the models that can be verified.
This problem becomes particular relevant for verification at runtime, when time
and resources are often constrained. Optimisation techniques have been proposed,
for example caching and lookahead [87], but new approaches will be required to
provide guarantees for self-adaptation at runtime in an efficient way.
In this paper, we propose a novel modular approach for decision making in
self-adaptive systems that is based on distinct models for each relevant quality
combined with runtime simulation of the models. Distinct models support on the
fly changes of goals. Simulation enables efficient decision making to select an
adaptation option that satisfies the system goals. By using statistical techniques,
simulation allows to provide results with a required level of accuracy. Simulation
is less time and resource consuming compared exhaustive verification approaches.
However, the tradeoff is that the guarantees are bounded to a certain level of accu-
racy.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 5.2 discusses se-
lected related work. In Section 5.3, we introduce a telecare system that we use for
illustration and evaluation. Section 5.4 introduces the novel modular approach for
decision making in self-adaptive systems. In Section 5.5, we evaluate the approach
using the telecare system. Section 5.6 wraps up and outlines directions for future
work.
5.2 Related Work
We have divided related work in three parts: i) runtime automated verification,
ii) simulation in self-adaptive systems, and iii) adaptation goals. We limit the
discussion to a selection of representative approaches from the huge body of work
that has been developed over the past years.
There is an increasing trend in the use of formal methods at runtime in self-
adaptive systems [214]. [68] represents the possible execution flows of a system
at runtime with a discrete time Markov chain. The probabilities that represent
uncertainties are dynamically updated with a Bayesian estimator. [72] proposes
a two-step verification approach: a pre-computation step computes a set of sym-
bolic expressions, which represent satisfaction of the requirements, a verification
step then evaluates the formula by replacing the variables with values gathered
at runtime. In [37], formally specified requirements are automatically analyzed
using runtime model checking techniques to identify and enforce optimal con-
figurations and resource allocations of service systems that are modeled using a
Markov model. [91] uses a Markov decision model of the system that enables an
interpreter to drive the execution of the system and guarantee the highest utility for
a set of quality properties. [74] propose a effective lightweight filtering approach
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that learns and continuously updates the transition probabilities of discrete time
Markov models of the system. In summary, state of the art proposes to equip the
feedback loop with a stochastic model that maintains up-to-date knowledge about
the relevant qualities and uncertainties of the system. This model is kept alive and
used by automated verification to identify system configurations that comply with
the required goals and adapt the system as required.
Simulation allows to explore many different states of the system without being
prevented by an infinite (or at least very large) state space. Simulation runs can
provide guarantees at different levels of fidelity, based on the level of abstraction
of the model used and number of simulation runs applied. Simulation is a com-
monly used for evaluating novel approaches for self-adaptation [214]. Evaluation
can also be used during the engineering process, e.g., to iteratively improve the
design of self-adaptive systems, as in [41]. Simulation is rarely used to support
decision making at runtime in self-adaptive systems. One example is [173], that
presents an approach that automatically builds a dynamic model of a business pro-
cess to realise service level agreements, while optimizing system resources. The
prediction is based on a simulation model whose parameters are tuned at runtime.
As recently pointed out [213], simulation offers interesting opportunities to pro-
vide guarantees for self-adaptive systems at runtime. However, the approach has
not been well studied yet.
A variety of goal models have been proposed to deal with adaptation. We high-
light a few representative examples. The RELAX language [216] allows temporal
relaxation of requirements to capture uncertainty. FLAGS [13] proposes “crisp
goals” specified in linear temporal logic and “fuzzy goals” specified in fuzzy tem-
poral language. [175] distinguishes “awareness requirements” that refer to situa-
tions that require adaptation and “evolution requirements” that prescribe what to
do in these situations. While several approaches support the operationalisation of
adaptation based on goal models, further research is required to support solutions
that allow changing adaptation goals on the fly [49, 133].
5.3 Tele Assistance System
The Tele Assistance System (TAS) provides health support to users in their
home [37, 204]. Users wear a device that uses third-party remote services from
health care, pharmacy, and emergency service providers. Fig. 5.2 shows the TAS
workflow that comprises different services. The workflow can be triggered period-
ically to measure the user’s vital parameters and invoke a medical analysis service.
Depending upon the analysis result a pharmacy service can be invoked to deliver
new medication to the user or change his/her dose of medication, or the alarm
service can be invoked, dispatching an ambulance to the user. The user can also
invoke the alarm service directly via a panic button.
Multiple service providers provide concrete services for Alarm service, Medi-
cal analysis service, and Drug service, abbr. by AS, MAS, and DS respectively.
Concrete services have a failure rate F rate and an invocation Cost. Table 5.1
shows the initial values declared by the service providers.
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Patient
Medical Analysis 
Service
Alarm Service
Drug Service
 0.25 
 0.75 
 0.66 
 0.34 
Emergency
Change 
dose/drug
Emergency
Check vital 
parameters
Figure 5.2: TAS workflow
As a default behavior we assume that TAS selects a particular configuration of
services, e.g. {AS3, MAS4, DS1}. We consider two types of uncertainties in
TAS. The first one is related to the actions performed to the system. As shown
in Fig. 5.2, we assume that on average 75% of the requests are (automatically
triggered) checks of vital parameters and 25% are emergency calls invoked by
the user. After checking vital parameters, depending upon the result 66% of the
requests invoke the drug service, and 34% of the requests invoke the alarm service.
However, these probabilities can change over time. The second uncertainty is
related to the concrete services of the system. These uncertainties include the
availability of services and quality parameters of running services. Depending
upon load on the system, the network and other conditions the initial values of the
failure rates and response times of the services are subject to change.
We apply self-adaptation to TAS to deal with uncertainty related to failures,
cost, and service time. An offline analysis may find a configuration which supports
the set of requirements. But as there are many uncertainties associated with TAS,
there is a need for adapting the current configuration at runtime based on the actual
values of these uncertainties.
5.4 Modular Decision Making Approach for Self-
Adaptation
We introduce the novel modular decision making approach for self-adaptation in
two steps. We start with a high level overview of the model for self-adaptation we
use in this research. Then we zoom in on change management, the central part of
decision making for self-adaptation.
5.4.1 Model for Self-adaptation
In this research, we study architecture-based self-adaptation, where a self-adaptive
system consists of a managed system that provides the domain functionality and a
managing system that monitors and adapt the managed system [84, 122, 150, 208].
Furthermore, we look at managing systems that are realised with a MAPE-K based
feedback loop that is divided in four components: Monitor, Analyze, Plan, and
Execute [117, 210], that share common Knowledge (hence, MAPE-K). Knowl-
edge comprises models that provide a causally connected self-representation of
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Table 5.1: Third party service profiles for TAS
S.No AS MAS DS
F rate Cost F rate Cost F rate Cost
1 0.11 4.0 0.12 4.0 0.01 5.0
2 0.04 12.0 0.07 14.0 0.03 3.0
3 0.18 2.0 0.18 2.0 0.05 2.0
4 0.08 3.0 0.10 6.0 0.07 1.0
5 0.14 5.0 0.15 3.0 0.02 4.0
the managed system referring to the structure, behavior, goals, and other relevant
aspects of the system [23].
Fig. 5.3 shows the high-level overview of the model for self-adaptation that we
use in our research. The model conforms to the three-layer model of Kramer and
Magee [122].
The Managed System is the software that is subject of adaptation. At a given
time the managed system has a particular configuration that is determined by the
arrangement and settings of the running components that make up the Managed
System. The set of possible configurations can change over time. We refer to
the different choices for adaptation from a given configuration as the adaptation
options, or alternatively the possible configurations. Adapting the managed sys-
tem means selecting an adaptation option and changing the current configuration
accordingly. We assume that the Managed System is equipped with probes and ef-
fectors to support monitoring the system and apply adaptations. How these probes
and effectors are realised is out of scope of this paper. The Managed System is
deployed in an environment that can be the physical world or computing elements
that are not under control of the Managed System. The Managed System and the
environment may expose stochastic behavior.
TheManaging System comprises two sublayers: ChangeManagement and Goal
Management. Change Management adapts the Managed System at runtime, using
the MAPE components of the feedback loop that interact with the Knowledge
Repository. The MAPE components can trigger one another, for example, the
Analyser may trigger the Planner once analysis is completed. The Analyser is
supported by a Runtime Simulator that can run simulations on the models of the
Knowledge Repository during operation. In our current work on modular decision
making for self-adaptation, we consider single MAPE loops. Extensions to inter-
acting MAPE loops is subject of our future work. Goal Management enables to
adapt Change Management itself. Goal Management offers an interface to the user
to change the adaptation logic, for example, to change the models of the knowl-
edge repository, or change the MAPE functions. Changing the adaptation software
should be done safely, e.g., in quiescent states [123]. We do not elaborate in these
technical aspects as the primary focus of this paper is on Change Management.
Example – TAS is an example of a Managed System and a configuration of this
system is an orchestration of a set of concrete services. The adaptation options for
TAS are the different combinations of available concrete services. These possible
configurations can change over time, e.g., when concrete services are no longer
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ExecutorPlannerAnalyzerMonitor
Probes
Knowledge Repository
Effectors
Managed System
Change Management
Goal Management
Managing System
Runtime 
Simulator
Figure 5.3: High-level model for self-adaptation
available or new services appear. The current configuration can be adapted by
replacing one or more concrete services that provide better quality of service. TAS
exposes stochastic behavior both with respect to the actions invoked to the system
as changes in the quality and other parameters of the concrete services. To deal
with the uncertainties, a Managing System is added to TAS that aims to guarantee
the system goals regardless of the uncertainties.
We have developed a concrete realisation of the modular approach for decision
making in self-adaptive systems that we used for evaluation (see Section 5.5). For
additional information, we refer to the project website.1
5.4.2 Change Management
Fig. 5.4 shows the key elements of Change Management. We start with explaining
the elements of the Knowledge Repository. Then we explain the MAPE compo-
nents.
5.4.2.1 Knowledge Repository
The Managed System Model and Environment Model capture the essential ele-
ments of the managed system and its environment that are needed to make adap-
tation decisions. The Quality Models capture the characteristics of the different
qualities that are subject of adaptation. All the models are parameterised, where
1 homepage.lnu.se/staff/daweaa/ActivFORMS/Model-based-simulation.htm
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the parameters represent variability and/or uncertainty of model elements. A cen-
tral aspect of the modular approach for decision making in self-adaptive systems
is the use of distinct quality models. The approach does not assume any particular
types of models; any type of model that supports simulation at runtime (if needed)
can be used. In our current realisation, we use stochastic timed automate (STA) as
modeling language. STA are a stochastic extension of timed automata [19, 59]. A
timed automaton is a finite state machine extended with a set of real-valued clocks.
STA allow to represent uncertainties by probabilities associated with transitions in
the models. Furthermore, STA models can be parameterized to capture variations
or changes in the system or the environment.
For each quality model, a set of Simulation Queries is provided. A simulation
query enables determining an estimate for the value of a quality property for a
possible configuration by running one or more simulations on the configuration
model with the corresponding quality model. A simulation query is formulated as
simulate N [<= bound]{E1, .., Ek}, where N is the number of simulation runs
to be performed, bound is the time bound on the simulation runs, and E1, ..., Ek
are state-based expressions that need to be monitored during the simulation. The
time is the simulation time, where each tick represents a period of wall clock time.
So, a query simulates the system N times over a given period of time to provide
insight to the user on the behavior of the system for the expressions E1, ..., Ek.
The Adaptation Goals define the objectives that need to be realised by the
MAPE components. The modular approach for decision making in self-adaptive
systems supports any type of representation of adaptation goals. In our current
realisation, we represent adaptation goals as a set of rules defined over the quality
properties that are subject of adaptation.
Finally, the Current Adaptation Options list the possible configurations of the
managed system that may be ranked based on the adaptation goals. The Current
Plan comprises the set of actions that are required to adapt the current configuration
to the selected adaptation option.
Example – TheManaged System and Environment Model of TAS capture essential
aspects of the telecare system and its users. E.g., the environment model represents
the behavior of the user, where the preferences for user actions can be expressed as
probabilities. The model of the managed system captures the essential elements of
the TAS workflow. The concrete services that are used by the system are parame-
ters in the model. In TAS, we use distinct models for failure behavior of services,
service times of service invocations, and cost for using TAS. Each quality model
is provided with a simulation query that enables determining an estimate for the
value of a quality property for a possible configuration. For example, a query to
estimate the expected average failure rate of a possible configuration based on 35
simulations, each for a period of 100 time units could be:
simulate 35[<= 100]{AssistanceService.failureRate}
Examples of adaptation goals in TAS are:
R1 : averageCost <= 8 (⇥ 10 3)
R2 : averageResponseT ime <= 2.5 s (⇥ 10 3)
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The first rule states that the average cost per invocation should not exceed 8 units
per 1000 invocations. The second rule states that the average response time per
service invocation should be below 2.5 seconds per 1000 invocations.
The current adaptation options is a list of the possible configurations of the
managed system with estimates of the respective qualities. Here is an example
entry in this list:
{MAS1, DS4, AS5}, fRate= 0.12, cost = 8.5, sTime = 17
The current plan in TAS contains a set of required service replacements to trans-
fer the current configuration to the new configuration selected by the decision mak-
ing mechanism.
5.4.2.2 MAPE Components
The Monitor component tracks the behavior of the managed system and the en-
vironment through probes updating the runtime models. The monitor comprises
distinct Updating components for each runtime model. The approach does not
assume any particular type of updating mechanism. Examples are basic updat-
ing mechanisms that update the parameter values of models based on changes in
the underlying system or the environment, or more advanced mechanisms such as
Bayesian and reinforcement learners.
The Analyzer component analyses the up to date knowledge of the models to
determine whether an adaption is required. To that end, the Analyzer uses the Run-
time Simulator to estimate the qualities of each possible configuration. Concretely,
the Analyzer starts with selecting models (managed system model for a concrete
configuration, environment model, and a particular quality model. Then the Ana-
lyzer invokes the simulation query for the given quality model. The parameters of
the simulation query (N and bound) are configured based on the required accuracy.
The simulator uses the selected models to compute an estimate for the quality us-
ing the simulation query. This estimate is returned to the Analyzer. In our current
research, we use the standard error of the mean (SEM) as a measure to determine
the accuracy of the simulation queries. The SEM quantifies how precisely a sim-
ulation result represents the true mean of the population (and is thus expressed
in units of the data). SEM takes into account the value of the standard deviation
and the sample size. Concretely, we use the relative SEM (RSEM), which is the
SEM divided by the sample mean and expressed as a percentage. For example, a
RSEM of 5% represents an accuracy with a SEM of plus/minus 0.5 for a mean
value of 10. Evidently, more accurate results (better estimates) require smaller
RSEM values and thus more simulation runs. Currently, we empirically determine
the number of simulation runs required for a particular accuracy based on offline
experiments. Once the Analyzer has performed an analysis of all the qualities for
all the possible configurations, it writes the adaption options to the Knowledge
Repository.
The Planner component ranks the adaptation options based on the adaptation
goals and creates a plan for the highest ranked option. This plan is then used by
the Executor component to adapt the managed system.
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Example – The TAS Monitor comprises Updating components for the differ-
ent runtime models. The preferences of user actions of the environment model
are periodically updated based on information directly retrieved from the service
providers. The Updating mechanism of the managed system model tracks concrete
services that disappear or new concrete services that become available and updates
the knowledge accordingly. For the properties of the different quality models (fail-
ure rates, response time, queue lengths) we use simple learning algorithms that
track the averages of the respective properties over a period of time. The TAS An-
alyzer uses the Uppaal-SMC engine [59] to perform the simulations of the runtime
models. To determine the parameters of the simulation queries we performed a
series of offline experiments for different TAS configurations with different qual-
ities and parameter settings. Based on these results, we have set the number of
required simulations to 50 for a RSEM of 10% and to 125 for a RSEM of 5%. For
details of this experiments, we refer to the project website. The selection of the
adaption option for TAS is based on sequentially applying the rules that define the
adaptation goals. As an example, for an adaptation scenario that considers failure
rates, cost, and service time, first the possible configurations with a failure rate
below a required value are selected. From this set the possible configurations with
a cost below a certain value are selected. Finally, the configuration with the lowest
service time is selected and a plan is generated and executed to adapt the system.
5.5 Evaluation
We now evaluate the modular approach for decision making in self-adaptive sys-
tems using a prototype realisation of TAS. We start with presenting the different
runtime models that we used in the experiments. Then, we present the results of
a first series of experiments in which we consider failure rates and service invo-
cation costs. Next, we extend the first case taking into account the service time
of TAS, demonstrating the flexibility of the modular approach. We conclude with
experiments that show the scalability of the approach by comparing the adaptation
time with an exhaustive approach based on runtime quantitative verification.
5.5.1 Runtime Models
The runtime models of TAS are modeled using stochastic timed automata (STA);
an extension of timed automata with stochastic behavior. STA communicate
through broadcast signals and shared variables creating networks of STA.
Fig. 5.5 shows the environment model that represents the actions invoked to
TAS. We use a scenario where each time tick either a sample of the vital parame-
ters is taken from the user (with a probability value of p ANALYSIS) or the alarm
button is pushed by the user (with a probability p EMERGENCY, which is equal
to 1 - p ANALYSIS). A sample is sent for analysis via the signal medicalAnaly-
sis!, while pushing the alarm button triggers an emergency call via the emergency!
signal. The probabilities are updated at runtime. After invoking an action, TAS
processes the request. Once the service completes, the user is notified via the
serviced? signal.
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Figure 5.5: Environment model
Fig. 5.6 shows the model of the managed system. The system starts with as-
signing concrete services to the workflow using the function assignServices(AD,
MAS, DS) and then waits for incoming requests. The parameters AD, MAS, DS
can be assigned any concrete instance that is available of the alarm services, med-
ical analysis services, and drug services respectively. Upon receiving a request for
medical analysis or an emergency call, respectively the signals vitalParamMsg! or
the buttonMsg! are sent to the workflow model (i.e., a selected quality model as
we will discuss below). The managed system model keeps track of the number of
invocations, which is required by the quality models to calculate averages. After
invoking the workflow the request is processed in the Processing state until the
done? signal is received, which triggers a notification to the Environment model
via the serviced! signal.
Figure 5.6: Managed System model
Fig. 5.7 shows the quality model of failure behavior of the assistance service of
TAS. The model allows estimating failure rates of assistance service invocations.
An assistance service invocation fails if any of the services that is needed fails.
If the alarm service is directly invoked calculating the failure rate is straightfor-
ward and equal to the actual failure rate of the concrete alarm service that is used
(getASFR()). If the medical analysis service is invoked the failure rate is calcu-
119
5 Model-based Simulation at Runtime for Self-adaptive Systems
lated by summing the failure rate of the concrete analysis service plus a fraction of
the failure rate of the concrete alarm service or drug service, depending on service
that is required service (that is, the path that is taken based on the probabilities
p INDIRECT EMERGENCY and p CHANGE MEDICATION). Finally, the aver-
age failure rate is calculated using the total number of invocations. By increasing
the number of simulations of the model, the estimated average failure rate will get
closer to the real average. The simulation queries to estimate failure rates with an
accuracy of RSEM 10% and 5% respectively are:
simulate1[<= 50]AssistanceService.avgFRate
simulate1[<= 125]AssistanceService.avgFRate
Figure 5.7: Quality model: Failure rate
Fig. 5.8 shows the quality model to calculate estimated costs of using the assis-
tance service. The total cost of an invocation is equal to the sum of the costs of the
concrete services used. Similarly to estimating the failure rate, the total cost per
invocation depends on the path that is taken in the workflow, based on the proba-
bilities of the actions taken and types of services invoked. The simulation queries
to estimate average cost with RSEM 10% and 5% respectively are:
simulate1[<= 50]AssistanceService.avgCost
simulate1[<= 125]AssistanceService.avgCost
5.5.2 Experiments with Two Qualities
In the first experiment, we focus on two qualities: failure rate and cost. Concretely,
adaptation should guarantee the following quality requirements:
R1. failureRate <= 1.5 (⇥ 10 3)
R2. averageCost <= 8 (⇥ 10 3)
R3. Subject to R1 and R2 being satisfied, the failureRate should be minimized.
We use the TAS setting with five concrete instances per service type as described
in Section 5.3 and Table 5.1 in particular. We added uncertainty to probabilities of
120
5.5 Evaluation
Figure 5.8: Quality model: Cost
the service failure rates and invoked requests based on a normal distribution with
a standard deviation of 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. The experiments are performed
on a Macbook with 2.5 GHz Core i7 processor, and 16 GB 1600MHz DD3 RAM.
Fig. 5.9 shows the simulation results of all possible configurations of TAS and
selected configuration for adaptation at a given point in time. Each configuration
is represented by a dot that shows the estimated values for failure rate and aver-
age cost of that configuration. The rectangle area demarcated by the dotted lines
contains all the possible configurations that comply with requirementsR1 andR2.
Based on requirement R3 the configuration with the lowest failure rate is selected
for adaption. Note that the dot for each configuration is an estimate with an accu-
racy that is based on the simulation query used, in this particular case a query with
accuracy of SEM 5%.
Fig. 5.10 shows how the change of estimated quality properties over time due
to uncertainties, incl. changes in the user behavior and the quality properties. We
can see that the cost requirement (R2) of the initially selected configuration in Fig.
5.9 (Config 1 in Fig. 5.10) is violated. Hence, another configuration is selected
now (Config 2). This figure underpins the importance of adaptation at runtime.
We now discuss the results of adaptation. Fig. 5.11 shows the result of a series
of 10000 invocations of the assistance service with simulation queries of RSEM
5% and 10%. The managed system checks for adaptation every 500 invocations.
Aligned with requirements R1 and R2, we have calculated the failure rates and
average costs over a moving window of 1000 invocations. The boxplots for failure
rate show that the required value of 0.15 is satified. The boxplots for the average
cost show that the cost remains below the required 8 units at all times with some
exceptions for RSEM of 10%. The boxplots for adaptation times show the tradeoff
of getting stronger guarantees based on different accuracy levels, i.e., RSEM of
5% takes almost double the adaptation time as RSEM of 10%; the major part of
this time is used for runtime simulation to estimate the quality properties of the
adaptation options.
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Figure 5.9: Adaptation options with the selected configuration
5.5.3 Experiments with Three Qualities
We now demonstrate the flexibility of our approach by adding additional goals
and rules. Concretely, we add a new quality property that is subject of adaptation:
service time. Service time comprises two components: the response time of in-
vocations of concrete services and the waiting time due to queues with pending
invocations. Service time is an important concern in TAS as users may need to get
treatments quickly.
Table 5.2 shows initial estimated response times (in sec) and queue lengths
(pending invocations) for the concrete services.
Table 5.2: Average queue lengths and response times
S.No AS MAS DS
Rtime Qlen. Rtime Qlen. Rtime Qlen.
1 5.7 3 11.0 1 8.0 1
2 7.3 2 9.4 4 7.7 3
3 3.8 5 20.0 2 11.0 5
4 9.5 1 8.0 6 10.0 2
5 18.6 4 9.0 3 15.0 4
For the adaptation goals, we replace R3 as follows:
R3’. Subject to R1 and R2 being satisfied, the serviceTime should be minimized.
To realise this new requirement, we need to add a new quality model to the
knowledge repository, update the adaptation goals, add an Updating component for
122
5.5 Evaluation
5
10
15
20
0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
Failure Rate
C
os
t
Config 1 Selection
{ 4 , 4 , 5 }
Config 2 Selection
{ 4 , 4 , 2 }
Config 1 Value
Config 2 Value
Requirements
Figure 5.10: Differences between two configurations
the new quality model in the Monitor component and extend the decision making
logic to handle the new quality. Our current realisation supports such updates on
the fly, based on runtime executable formal models [79, 109] (see also the project
website).
Fig. 5.12 shows the quality model to estimate service times. The service time
per invocation is accumulated by the time the request has to wait in the queues
plus the actual execution time, depending on the path that is taken.
For simulation, we used the following query:
simulate1[<= 50]AssistanceService.avgST ime
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Figure 5.11: Results over 10000 runs for the first experiment
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Figure 5.12: Quality model: Service time
simulate1[<= 125]AssistanceService.avgST ime
Fig. 5.13 shows the simulation results of all possible configurations at a given
point in time and the configuration that is selected for adaptation. Among all the
configurations that comply to R1 and R2 (valid configurations), the one with the
lowest service time is selected for adaptation.
Fig. 5.14 shows the result of 10000 invocations of the assistance service for
RSEM of 10% and 5%. As for the first experiment, we show the quality properties
for a sliding window of 1000 invocations. The boxplots for failure rate show sim-
ilar results for RSEM 5% and 10%; both realise R1. The boxplots for cost show
that RSEM of 5% gives slightly better results, but RSEM of 10% violatesR2 some
times. The boxplots for service times are similar. Similar to the first experiment,
the boxplots for adaptation times show that RSEM of 5% takes almost double the
time as RSEM of 10%.
5.5.4 Scalability
To conclude, we compare the scalability of our approach with Runtime Quantita-
tive Verification (RQV), an exhaustively verification technique. For RQV, we used
a minimal discrete time Markov model of TAS and used PRISM for verification
of quality properties. We used the same setup as in first experiment and systemati-
cally increased the number of concrete services per service type. The probabilities
of actions and quality properties are assigned randomly. Fig. 5.15 compares the
time required for adaptation. The graph shows that the modular approach is signif-
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Figure 5.13: Adaptation options with selected configuration
icantly faster than RQV. On the other hand, RQV guarantees the required qualities,
while the accuracy of simulation is bound to the selected RSEM. Additional test
are required to further compare the tradeoffs of both approaches.
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Figure 5.14: Results over 10000 runs for the first experiment
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5.6 Conclusion and future work
This research contributes a novel modular approach for decision making in self-
adaptive systems. The approach is based on distinct runtime models for different
qualities supporting on the fly changes of quality models and adaptation goals. As
the approach uses simulation to estimate required quality properties, it is inherently
more efficient compared to exhaustive approaches. This is confirmed by initial test
results. However, the consequence of using simulation is a reduction of accuracy,
which may lead to temporal violations of requirements. On the other hand, the
approach allows to tradeoff the accuracy provided by the time that is required to
adapt. In the future, we are planning an depth comparison between the proposed
approach and exhaustive approaches. We also plan to extend the type of queries by
studying how we can use statistical model checking at runtime to support efficient
decision making in self-adaptive systems.
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Chapter 6
ActivFORMS: An Efficient Approach to
Engineer Self-Adaptive Systems with
Guarantees
In this chapter, we present the integrated ActivFORMS approach that provides
guarantees for the functional correctness of the feedback loop, efficient guarantees
about the adaptation goals, and support for changing adaptation goals on the fly.
This chapter is currently under review and copied from [205].
In this chapter, we take a holistic approach to engineer self-adaptive systems
with ActivFORMS. Figure 6.1 provides an overview of the research goals and
scientific approaches used in this chapter.
Model checking
Runtime simulation
Statistical model checking
Systematic empirical inquiry
(IoT security monitoring)
Scientific Approaches ActivFORMS(Final version)
Functional correctness of 
the feedback loop
Efficient adaptation 
guarantees
Changing adaptation goals
on the fly
Research Goals
RQ1:
RQ2:
RQ3:
Figure 6.1: Overview of the addressed research goals and used scientific approaches in this
chapter
ActivFORMS offers a set of templates to model and verify feedback loop mod-
els at design time. The verified models of the feedback loop are directly exe-
cuted to ensure correctness of the feedback loop (RQ1). Efficient guarantees for
the adaptation goals are provided using runtime simulation and statistical model
checking (RQ2). The ActivFORMS runtime supports on the fly changing of adap-
tation goals and the feedback loop model (RQ3).
My contribution to the research presented in this chapter is as follows: I con-
tributed 60% of the conceptualisation, 100% of the technical realisation, 100% of
the evaluation, and 20% of writing the chapter.
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ActivFORMS: An Efficient Approach to Engineer
Self-Adaptive Systems with Guarantees
Abstract
Self-adaptation provides a principled way to deal with uncertainties
at runtime. A self-adaptive system employs a feedback loop to contin-
uously monitor and adapt itself to achieve particular quality goals (i.e.,
adaptation goals) regardless of uncertainties such as changes in operat-
ing conditions or user requirements. Guaranteeing compliance of the
adaptation goals is challenging since the uncertainties can appear at any
time. Recent research suggests the use of formal techniques at runtime
to provide guarantees for adaptation goals. For example, a self-adaptive
Internet of Things (IoT) application tracks network interference to up-
date a parameterised Markov model of the system and verifies the up-
dated model to identify and apply a configuration with minimal packet
loss (i.e., the adaptation goal). Such approaches primarily focus on en-
suring the required quality of service, typically using exhaustive verifi-
cation. In this paper, we take a broader perspective and look at guaran-
tees for the functional correctness of the feedback loop, the efficiency
of providing guarantees for the adaptation goals, and support for deal-
ing with changing adaptation goals at runtime. To that end, we present
ActivFORMS (Active FORmal Models for Self-adaptation), a formally
founded model-driven approach for engineering self-adaptive systems.
ActivFORMS provides: 1) functional correctness of the feedback loop
by direct execution of formally verified models of the feedback loop us-
ing a reusable virtual machine, 2) efficient guarantees for the adaption
goals with a required level of confidence using statistical model check-
ing techniques at runtime, and 3) support for changing adaptation goals
on the fly and updating of verified models of the feedback loop that meet
the new goals. We demonstrate our approach for a real world IoT build-
ing security monitoring application deployed at KU Leuven.
6.1 Introduction
The increasing pervasiveness, connectivity, and mobility of computing devices in-
troduce uncertainties that pose severe challenges to software engineers. Providing
the required levels of quality, such as performance, reliability, and efficiency be-
comes particularly challenging for systems that must operate with dynamic avail-
able resources, goals that change, etc. These dynamics are often difficult to predict
at design time, hence, guaranteeing the required qualities can only be achieved at
runtime when the knowledge becomes available that is required to resolve the un-
certainties. Self-adaptation is widely considered as an effective approach to cope
with this complexity [48, 65, 133, 203]. Self-adaptation equips a system with
a feedback loop that tracks changes in the system and the environment, reasons
about the changes, and adapts the system to maintain the system goals or degrade
gracefully when necessary.
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In this research, we focus on architecture-based adaptation, which provides
a suitable level of abstraction and generality to handle system dynamics that
involve adaptation of components and their relations [84, 122, 150]. Central
in architecture-based adaptation is the separation between the domain concerns,
which are dealt with by the managed system (that is subject to adaptation), and the
adaptation concerns, which are dealt with by the managing system (by adapting
the managed system). A well-known approach to structure the managing system
is by means of a feedback loop divided into four components: Monitor, Analyze,
Plan, and Execute [117]. These components share common Knowledge (hence,
MAPE-K) that may contain data about the managed system, the environment, the
adaptation goals, and other working data that is shared among the MAPE compo-
nents [211].
One of the key challenges in engineering self-adaptive systems is providing
guarantees that the adaptation goals are being achieved. This is especially im-
portant for systems with strict goals. The basic underlying problem is that due
to uncertainties, these guarantees need to be delivered during the system’s entire
lifetime, from inception to and throughout operation. Over the past decade, a va-
riety of approaches have been proposed to provide such guarantees, ranging from
formal proof before deployment to testing at runtime [49, 185, 213, 214]. Our
focus here is on approaches that apply formal modeling and verification to realise
self-adaptation, which is the most popular approach studied so far [48, 133]. A
typical approach is described in [112], where the authors create formal models for
adaptive systems, verify the models and automatically translate the models into
executable programs. The approach guarantees conformance between the mod-
els and programs using model-based testing. Another typical example is presented
in [37], where quality goals of service-based systems are expressed as probabilistic
temporal logic formulae, which are then automatically analysed at runtime using
model checking techniques to identify and enforce optimal system configurations.
These representative examples show that the state of the art typically focusses
on ensuring the required quality of service. Guarantees for functional correctness
of the behaviour of the feedback loop components (i.e., the MAPE elements) and
their interactions is often ignored. Consequently, important properties are not eval-
uated, such as: does the monitor component update the knowledge correctly, does
the analysis component correctly identify deviations of the adaptation goals based
on the monitored data, or does the execute component perform the adaptation ac-
tions of the plan in the correct order? Guaranteeing such properties is important to
assure proper adaptation capabilities. Furthermore, existing approaches based on
the application of formal techniques at runtime typically rely on exhaustive veri-
fication, which is known to be computationally very demanding. Such techniques
are problematic in resource-constrained settings, such as for example the IoT. Fi-
nally, although runtime changes of goals is considered a very important type of
uncertainty [122, 165, 175], so far research on engineering self-adaptive systems
has not given sufficient attention to changing adaptation goals on the fly.
In this paper, we present ActivFORMS (Active FORmal Models for Self-
adaptation), an integrated formally founded and model-driven approach for en-
gineering self-adaptive systems. ActivFORMS tackles three limitations of current
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self-adaptation approaches: functional correctness of the feedback loop, efficient
decision making at runtime with guarantees, and support for on the fly changes of
adaptation goals. The contributions of ActivFORMS to the state of the art are:
1. ActivFORMS guarantees functional correctness of the feedback loop by di-
rect execution of formally verified models of the feedback loop using a
reusable virtual machine;
2. ActivFORMS provides efficient guarantees for the adaption goals with a re-
quired level of confidence using statistical model checking techniques at run-
time; and
3. ActivFORMS supports changing adaptation goals on the fly and updating the
verified models of the feedback loop that meet the new goals.
We evaluate ActivFORMS and compare it with a state of the art approach for a
real world IoT building security monitoring application deployed at KU Leuven.
The research presented in this paper is based on a number of assumptions. In
line with related research, see e.g. [37, 73, 164], we assume that the managed sys-
tem already exists and focus on its enhancement with self-adaptation capabilities
through the addition of a MAPE-K feedback loop. We assume that the managed
system has a limited, but potentially high number of possible configurations (adap-
tation options) that can dynamically change over time. This implies that system
parameters with a continuous domain that determine configurations need to be dis-
cretised. We also assume that the managed system is equipped with basic infras-
tructure for consistent adaptation (changing components, reconfigurations, etc.),
for which we can rely on existing solutions. Furthermore, we consider coopera-
tive systems with shared goals. Finally, we target systems for which dynamics in
the environment are significantly slower than execution of adaptations and com-
munication. These assumptions hold true for a large class of systems in which
software is coordinating or controlling entities that have an explicit location, in-
cluding systems with mobile nodes. Out of scope are real-time and competitive
systems (entities that pursue their own goals). These systems require dedicated
solutions (e.g., real-time operating systems) or pose specific security challenges
(e.g., establishing trust among elements).
The research presented in this paper leverages on initial work on ActivFORMS.
[109] focussed on functional correctness of feedback loops, while the work pre-
sented in this paper provides guarantees both for functional and quality properties
of self-adaptive systems. [209] explored the possibility to provide guarantees for
quality goals using simulation at runtime. In [40], an earlier version of Activ-
FORMS was used to provide guarantees for the functional correctness of MAPE-
based feedback loop models; guarantees for quality goals in that work was based
on runtime quantitative verification. In this paper, we provide guarantees for qual-
ity goals by applying statistical model checking at runtime. Furthermore, this
paper contributes a set of templates to design and verify MAPE-K feedback loops
that substantially extend and refine earlier versions [79]. Last but not least, in this
paper we provide full support for life updates of adaptation goals and MAPE-K
models.
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Note also that our work on FORMS [211] is very different from ActivFORMS
(despite the similarity of the names). FORMS defines a reference model for self-
adaptive systems specified in the Z language, comprising three perspectives on
self-adaptation: reflection, MAPE, and distribution. The only correspondence be-
tween FORMS and ActivFORMS is that ActivFORMS respects the separation of
concerns defined in the reflection perspective of FORMS and applies the basic
structure defined by its MAPE perspective. However, different from the reference
model defined by FORMS, ActivFORMS offers a concrete approach for engineer-
ing self-adaptive systems with guarantees for adaptation goals regardless of uncer-
tainties the system is subject to.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 6.2 we provide background on
timed automata and statistical model checking. Section 6.3 introduces a self-
adaptive IoT system that we use to illustrate and evaluate our research. In Sec-
tion 6.4, we present ActivFORMS that comprises four stages: model and verify
feedback loop, deploy feedback loop model with virtual machine, runtime verifi-
cation of adaptation goals and decision making, and evolution of adaptation goals
and feedback loop model. In Section 6.5, we evaluate ActivFORMS using the
system introduced in Section 6.3. Section 6.6 discusses related work on formal
approaches to self-adaptation and positions ActivFORMS in this landscape. Fi-
nally, we draw conclusions and outline directions for future work in Section 6.7.
6.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we provide background information on timed automata and statisti-
cal model checking and introduce basic terminology and concepts used in the rest
of the paper.
6.2.1 Timed Automata
A timed automaton (or behaviour) [4] is a finite state machine extended with a set
of real-valued clocks that progress synchronously. Ordinary variables can be read,
manipulated, and written as usual. Automata can be connected forming networks
of timed automata. The state of the system is then defined by the state of all
automata, the clock values, and the values of the ordinary variables. Only one
state per automaton, called control or active state (or current location), is active
at a time. Automata can synchronise through channels, which can be binary or
broadcast channels. For a binary channel, a sender x! can synchronize with a
receiver x? through a signal x. The sender will be blocked if there is no receiver.
A broadcast channel sends a signal to all the receivers; if there is no receiver,
the sender will continue. The edge of the automaton can be annotated with: a
guard, expressing a condition on the values of clocks and variables that must be
satisfied for the edge to be taken (e.g. y < 5); a synchronization action (e.g. x!)
which, when the edge is taken, forces a synchronization with other components on
a complementary action (e.g. x?); and an update defining actions to be taken when
a transition is made (e.g. a function reset() resets clock y to 0). The absence of a
guard is interpreted as the condition true.
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Uppaal [16] offers a model checking suite that supports modeling of behav-
iors and verification of properties. Behavior specifications can be complemented
with expressions specified in a C-like language to define data structures (struct
concept) and functions. Goals can be expressed in timed computation tree logic
(TCTL). TCTL expressions describe state and path formulae that can be verified,
such as reachability (a system should/can/cannot/... reach particular states), live-
ness (something eventually will hold), etc. Uppaal defines two types of transitions
between states: action transition and delayed transition. Action transitions can be
further divided into synchronization transition and internal transition. In a syn-
chronization transition automata synchronize via a channel as explained above. In
an internal transition, an automata moves from its current state (say S) to a next
state (say T) via an edge (e) when the conditions hold to make the transition, e.g.
the guard on the edge is satisfied, the invariant of T holds, etc. In a delayed tran-
sition only the clocks tick and no actual state transition is made (e.g. S remains
active in the controller while y <MAX TIME). Further progress in time might lead
to an invariant violation (y  MAX TIME) triggering a transition (S! T). Finally,
to enable modelling of atomicity of transition sequences (i.e. multiple transitions
with no time delay) states may be marked as committed. Committed states (marked
with a C in the location) are taken without time delay. Urgent states (marked with
a U ) are similar, but have a lower priority as committed states.
To support stochastic behaviours, a stochastic interpretation of the timed au-
tomata has been proposed [59]. In short, the stochastic interpretation replaces
the non-deterministic choices between multiple enabled transitions by probabilis-
tic choices based on the probability distributions. Uppaal supports modelling and
verification of networks of stochastic timed automata.
6.2.2 Statistical Model Checking
Statistical model checking (SMC) has been proposed as an efficient alternative to
traditional model checking that exhaustive travers all the states of the system [129].
The central idea of SMC is to check the probability p 2 [0, 1] that a modelM satis-
fies a property ', i.e., to check PM (')   p by performing a series of simulations.
SMC applies statistical techniques on the simulation results to decide whether the
system satisfies the property with some degree of confidence. To verify a quality
property it has to be formulated as a verification query.
Uppaal-SMC [59] is a tool for statistical model checking that supports different
types of verification queries; here we focus on probability estimation and simula-
tion. Probability estimation computes an estimation of probability p for an expres-
sion 'with an approximation interval [p ✏, p+✏] and confidence [1 ↵] in a given
time bound. A probability estimation query is formulated as p = Pr[bound](').
Simulation performs N simulations of the system model in a time bound to pro-
vide insight in the values of expected system behaviors. A simulation query is
formulated as simulate N [ bound]{E1, ..., Ek}, where N is the number of
simulations to be performed and E1, ..., Ek are the (state-based) expressions that
need to be monitored during the simulation. A benefit of SMC is that ✏, ↵, N , and
bound are parameters that allow designers to tradeoff the accuracy of the results
with the resources and the time required for verification. More accurate results
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require more resources and verification time, and vice versa. However, in con-
trast to exhaustive approaches (such as runtime quantitative verification [37]), a
simulation-based approach does not provide 100% guarantees, but an estimation
that is bound to a confidence interval [51, 59, 219].
In this research, we do not consider rare events for which specific techniques
such as importance sampling and importance splitting can be applied to statistical
model checking [131].
6.3 Self-Adaptive Internet of Things Application
This section introduces a self-adaptive system, called DeltaIoT, that we use to
illustrate ActivFORMS in Section 6.4 and to evaluate the approach in Section 6.5.
DeltaIoT system is a reference Internet-of-Things (IoT) application that enables
evaluating a new self-adaptation approach and comparing its effectiveness with
other solutions [111]. DeltaIoT comprises a simulator for offline experimentation
and a physical setup that can be accessed remotely for experimentation in the field.
DeltaIoT is part of the smart campus initiative by imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven.1
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Figure 6.2: DeltaIoT system with network topology
DeltaIoT consists of a collection of 15 LoRa-based IoT motes2 deployed in var-
ious buildings at the KU Leuven campus, see Fig. 6.2. In each building, motes are
strategically placed to provide access control to labs (via RFID sensor), to monitor
the occupancy status (via Passive infrared sensor) and to sense the temperature (via
heat sensor, an example is show top right of Fig. 6.2). The sensor data from all the
motes are relayed to the IoT gateway, which is deployed at a central monitoring
1 https://people.cs.kuleuven.be/ danny.weyns/software/DeltaIoT/
2 https://www.lora-alliance.org/What-Is-LoRa/Technology
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facility. Campus security personnel monitor the status of various buildings and
labs from the monitoring facility and take appropriate action whenever unusual
behaviour is detected in the buildings.
DeltaIoT uses wireless multi-hop communication. As shown in Fig. 6.2, each
IoTmote in the network relays its sensor data to the gateway. However, some of the
IoT motes, which are farther away from the gateway, have to relay their sensor data
via intermediate IoT motes. DeltaIoT uses time synchronised communication [66].
The communication in the network is organised in cycles, each cycle comprising
a fixed number of communication slots. Each slot defines a sender mote and a
receiver mote that can communicate with one another. The communication slots
are fairly divided among the motes. For example, the system can be configured
with a cycle time of 536 second (9.5 minutes) with each cycle comprising 268
slots, each of 2 seconds. For each link, 40 slots are allocated for communication
between the motes.
Each mote is equipped with three queues: buffer collects the messages produced
by the mote, receive-queue collects the messages from the mote’s children, and
send-queue queues the messages to be sent to the parent(s) during the next cycle.
The size of the send-queue is equal to the number of slots that are allocated to the
mote for communication. Before communicating, the messages of the buffer are
first moved to the send-queue. The remaining space is then filled with messages
from the receive-queue. Messages that arrive when the receive-queue is full are
lost (i.e., queue loss).
IoT applications are expected to last a long period of time on a single battery
(e.g. 10 years), while offering reliable communication with minimal latency. To
guarantee these quality properties, the motes of the network should be optimally
configured. Two key factors that determine the critical quality properties are the
transmission power of the motes and the selection of the parents to send messages
towards the gateway (more specially, the distribution of the messages sent via the
links to the respective parents). Guaranteeing the required quality properties is
complex as the system is subject to various types of uncertainties. Here, we con-
sider two primary types of uncertainty:
1. Network interference and noise: Due to external factors such as weather con-
ditions and the presence of other WiFi signals in the neighbourhood the qual-
ity of the communication between motes may be affected, which in turn may
lead to packet loss.
2. Fluctuating load of messages: The traffic load of messages produced by the
motes may fluctuate in ways that are difficult to predict (e.g., messages pro-
duced by a passive infrared sensor are based on the detection of motion of
humans).
Experiments in DeltaIoT run default for a period of 24 hours real time. Some
motes generate a constant number of messages over time, e.g. temperature sensors,
while others generate messages based on context, e.g. the presence of people. In
simulation mode, we use profiles for the uncertainties. The data of these profiles
was collected from field observations for a period of one week. The graph on the
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left hand side of Fig. 6.3 shows the fluctuations of the traffic load generated for
one of the motes in Fig. 6.2; the graph on the right hand side shows changes of
the signal to noise ratio of the communication path between two motes. Signal to
Noise Ratio (SNR) represents the ratio between the level of desired signal and
the level of the undesired signal, i.e. noise, which comes from the environment in
which the IoT system operates. The higher the interference, the lower the SNR,
resulting in higher packet loss. As an alternative for specific profiles, the traffic
load for motes can also be determined probabilistically (e.g. p = 0.5 generates
a traffic load with a probability 0.50), and similarly for the SNR, a value can be
picked stochastically in a range ± 5.0dB.
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Figure 6.3: Profiles of uncertainties for one of the motes in Figure 6.2.
The quality requirements for DeltaIoT that become adaptation goals for self-
adaptation are:
R1: The average packet loss3 should not exceed 10%.
R2: The energy consumption should be minimized.
In addition, the following adaptation goal should be added during execution:
R3: The average latency of messages should be less than 5% of the cycle
time.
DeltaIoT offers a client that comprises a Java package with Probe and Effector
classes. Listing 6.1 lists the methods of the probe that can be used to monitor
the IoT network and the effector to adapt the mote settings (both in the physical
network and the simulator).
Listing 6.1: DeltaIoT probe and effector methods.
ArrayList<Mote> getAllMotes();
ArrayList<QoS> getNetworkQoS(Period);
void setMoteSettings(MoteID, List<LinkSetting>);
void resetDefaultConfiguration();
getAllMotes returns an array with a representation of each mote of the network
for a cycle, including the traffic generated by a mote, the energy consumed, the
settings of the transmission power that a mote used to communicate with each of
its parent, the spreading factor used for each link,4 the SNR for each link, and the
3 The average is defined over a period of 24 hours.
4 Spreading Factor is defined as the number of chirps used per symbol, where the chirp rate is equal
to the bandwidth [8]. A higher spreading factor results in longer range but at the cost of more energy
consumption.
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distribution factor per link being the percentage of the messages sent by a source
mote over the link to each of its parents.5 getNetworkQoS returns statistical
data about the quality of service (QoS) of the overall network for a given period.
Currently this method returns data about packet loss, energy consumption, and
latency of the network.
setMoteSettings can be used to set the parameters for the parent links of a
mote with a given ID. A LinkSetting contains the source and destination node
of the link, the transmission power to be used to communicate via the link, and
the distribution factor for the link. Finally, resetDefaultConfiguration resets
the network settings to predefined values. This method can be used to bring the
system to a well-known state, e.g. as failsafe state.
6.4 ActivFORMS Approach
ActivFORMS offers an integrated approach to realise self-adaptation with guaran-
tees. The approach is based on monitor-analyse-plan-execute (MAPE) feedback
loops, which are the most common type of feedback loop used to engineer self-
adaptive software systems, see e.g. [37, 65, 117, 210]. Other types of adaptation,
e.g. based on principles from control theory (for a recent survey see [172]) are not
supported by ActivFORMS. The foundational principles of ActivFORMS are:
1. Model-driven: models are the central artifacts to achieve the adaptation goals
from design to operation, using model-based analysis, formal verification,
and direct model execution.
2. Continuous guarantees: new evidence for compliance of the adaptation goals
is continuously integrated to deal with the uncertainties that the system faces
across its lifetime.
3. Reuse: the approach offers (i) a set of application independent templates for
the design and verification of MAPE models; these templates can be instanti-
ated for the domain at hand, and (ii) a reusable virtual machine that supports
the execution of the feedback loop model at runtime.
Fig. 6.4 gives a high-level overview of ActivFORMS that spans four main stages
of the software lifecycle of feedback loops: design, deployment, runtime adapta-
tion, and evolution.
In Stage 1, model and verify feedback loop, based on stakeholder input, formal
models for the feedback loop of the self-adaptive system are specified and veri-
fied.1 In Stage 2, deploy feedback loop model with virtual machine the feedback
loop model together with the ActivFORMS runtime environment are deployed. In
Stage 3, verify adaptation goals and adapt, the feedback loop monitors the exe-
cuting managed system and its environment and adapts the system to ensure the
5 The total sum of the distribution factors for one mote is normally 100. If packets are duplicated and
sent to more than one parent, the sum of the distribution factors will be above 100.
1We use feedback loop model to refer to the integrated model of the complete feedback loop, and
MAPE models or models of the feedback loop to refer to the specific models of the different MAPE
elements.
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Figure 6.4: Overview of ActivFORMS approach
adaptation goals. In Stage 4, evolve adaptation goals and feedback loop model,
the adaption goals and the deployed feedback loop model can be updated on the
fly, for example to improve functions of the MAPE models or update the models
to deal with a new or changing adaption goals.
We explain the four stages of ActivFORMS now in detail. We illustrate each
phase with the DeltaIoT application. All reusable artifacts and concrete instantia-
tions for DeltaIoT are available at the AvtivFORMS project website.2
6.4.1 Stage 1: Model and Verify Feedback Loop
The goal of the first stage of ActivFORMS is to develop formally verified models
for the feedback loop of the self-adaptive system (MAPE Models and Knowledge,
see Fig. 6.4). The input elements of Stage 1 are: (1) the managed system that is
subject to adaptation; (2) domain knowledge; (3) a set of adaptation requirements;
(4) a set of MAPE model templates; and (5) the Uppaal model checker.
Stage 1 consists of three main activities: design feedback loop model, design
stub models, and specify and verify properties. We discuss these activities now in
detail.
6.4.1.1 Design Feedback Loop Model
In the first activity, the formal models of the MAPE loop and the knowledge are
specified (see Fig. 6.4). We start with the specification of the knowledge. Then we
zoom in on the MAPE models.
Knowledge. The knowledge consists of elements that are shared among the
MAPE elements. A central element of the knowledge is a configuration that cap-
tures the essential aspects of the managed system, its environment, and the qual-
2 https://people.cs.kuleuven.be/ danny.weyns/software/ActivFORMS/
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ities that are subject to adaptation. ActivFORMS provides a generic template to
define configurations. Listing 6.2 shows the template to define configurations.
Listing 6.2: Template to define configurations.
t ype s t r u c t {
<Element e lement>;
} ManagedSystem
type s t r u c t {
<i n t q u a l i t y P r o p e r t y >;
} Qu a l i t i e s
t yp e s t r u c t {
<i n t env i r onmen tP r ope r t y >;
} Envi ronment
t yp e s t r u c t {
ManagedSystem <managedSystem>;
Q u a l i t i e s <q u a l i t i e s >;
Envi ronment <env i ronment>;
} Con f i g u r a t i o n
AConfiguration is defined by the relevant elements of the managed system, a set
of quality properties, and the relevant properties of the environment in which the
managed system operates. To specialise the template for a concrete self-adaptive
system, software engineers need to replace the generic elements marked between
angle brackets with concrete domain specific elements. Additional elements may
be introduced as needed.
Example 1. We illustrate now configurations for DeltaIoT, see Listing 6.3. The
managed system of DeltaIoT consists of a set of motes. Each mote has a unique
identifier, an energy level, and a set of links. Links are defined by a source and a
destination mote, a power setting that is used by the source to send messages to the
destination, and a distribution factor that determines the percentage of messages
sent by the source over the link. The basic qualities of DeltaIoT configurations
are packet loss and energy consumption. The environment of Delta IoT is char-
acterised by two properties that represent uncertainties: the SNR per link and the
traffic load generated per mote.
Listing 6.3: Specification of DeltaIoT configurations.
t ype s t r u c t {
i n t sou rce ID ; i n t d e s t i n a t i o n I D ; i n t powe rS e t t i n g ; i n t d i s t r i b u t i o n F a c t o r ;
} Link
t ype s t r u c t {
i n t moteId ; i n t ene rgyLeve l ; Link l i n k s [MAX LINKS ] ;
} Mote
t ype s t r u c t {
Mote motes [MAXMOTES] ;
} ManagedSystem
type s t r u c t {
i n t packe tLo s s ; i n t energyConsumpt ion ;
} Qu a l i t i e s
t yp e s t r u c t {
Load motesLoad [MAXMOTES] ; SNR linksSNR [MA LINKS ] ;
} Envi ronment
t yp e s t r u c t {
ManagedSystem d e l t a I o T ;
Q u a l i t i e s q u a l i t i e s ;
Envi ronment env i r onmen t ;
} Con f i g u r a t i o n
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ActivFORMS provides a template for the specification of the knowledge; List-
ing 6.4 shows an excerpt of the template with the main elements.
Listing 6.4: Definition of Knowledge
/ / Knowledge =
/ / {Con f i g u r a t i o n , Adap t a t i o n Goals , Adap t a t i o n Opt ions , Plan , Qu a l i t y
Models}
<Con f i g u r a t i o n c u r r e n t C o n f i g u r a t i o n >;
/ / Ad ap t a t i o n Goals
<boo l o p t im i z a t i o nGo a l ( C o n f i g u r a t i o n gConf , C o n f i g u r a t i o n tConf ) {
/ / T e s t s whe the r a t e s t c o n f i g u r a t i o n ( tConf ) i s more op t ima l r e g a r d i n g
/ / a p r o p e r t y as a g iven c o n f i g u r a t i o n ( gConf ) }>
<i n t PROP;>
<boo l s a t i s f a c t i o n G o a l ( C o n f i g u r a t i o n conf , i n t PROP) {
/ / T e s t s whe the r a c o n f i g u r a t i o n ( con f ) s a t i s f i e s a g iven p r o p e r t y (PROP) }>
/ / Ad ap t a t i o n Op t i on s
t ype s t r u c t {
<ManagedSystem op t i on >;
<Qu a l i t i e s v e r i f i c a t i o n R e s u l t s >;
} Adap t a t i o nOp t i o n
Adap t a t i o nOp t i o n a d a p t a t i o nOp t i o n s [MAX OPTIONS ] ;
/ / P l an
t ype s t r u c t {
<i n t s tepType>;
<Element e lement>;
<i n t newValue>;
} <Step>
t y p e s t r u c t {
<Step s t e p s [MAX STEPS]>;
} Plan
/ / Qu a l i t y Models
/ /A ne twork of s t o c h a s t i c t imed au toma ta pe r q u a l i t y model
Knowledge comprises five elements: the current Configuration, a set of Adap-
tation Goals, a set of Adaptation Options, i.e. the possible configurations of the
managed system, a Plan consisting of adaptation steps that is dynamically com-
posed by the Planner (theMAPEmodels are explained below), and a set ofQuality
Models, one model for each adaptation goal.
The configuration represents current knowledge of the feedback loop about the
state of the managed system, the environment, and the qualities that are subject to
adaptation, as defined in Listing 6.2.
The adaptation goals define the objectives that need to be realised by the feed-
back loop. In this paper, we represent adaptation goals as functions. We dis-
tinguish between an optimizationGoal that tests whether a configuration tConf is
more optimal regarding a property as a given configuration gConf, and a satis-
factionGoal that tests whether a configuration (conf ) satisfies a given property
(PROP). However, other types of adaptation goals can be defined and applied in
ActivFORMS.
An adaptation option consist of two parts: a particular setting of the managed
system (option) and a placeholder for the verification results (verificationResults).
The Analyser dynamically computes the adaptation options. The verification re-
sults are added after the verifier has produced estimated values for the different
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qualities per adaptation option. The Planner then selects the best option based on
the verification results using the adaptation goals. In this paper, we assume that a
limited but possible large number of adaptation options can be identified whenever
adaptation is required. This implies that any system parameter that can be used for
adapting the managed system with a value in a continuous domain needs to be lim-
ited in range and be discretised. Heuristics can be applied to select the adaptation
options from a very large set, but this is out of scope of this paper.
A plan consists of a series of steps (Step), each defined by a stepType, the ele-
ment of the managed system to which the step applies, and the newValue that needs
to be applied to the element.
Finally, each quality model, specified as a stochastic timed automaton (or a net-
work of these), captures the characteristics of one of the qualities that is subject of
adaptation. A quality model, which is domain specific, is in essence an abstraction
of the managed system and its environment comprising behaviour and state related
to a particular quality property. This model enables a verifier to estimate the qual-
ity for a particular adaptation options. There are two types of parameters in the
quality models: (1) parameters that correspond to settings of the managed system
that are used to define adaptation options, and (2) uncertainties of the managed
system and its environment.
Example 2. We illustrate the knowledge specification for DeltaIoT. Listing 6.5
shows an excerpt of the knowledge definition for a DeltaIoT feedback loop.
Listing 6.5: Knowledge definition for DeltaIoT feedback loop.
Co n f i g u r a t i o n c u r r e n tD e l t a I o TCo n f i g u r a t i o n ; / / s e e L i s t i n g 3
/ / Adap t a t i o n Goals
i n t MAX PACKET LOSS = 10 ; / / max pa ck e t l o s s 10%
boo l s a t i s f a c t i o nG o a l P a c k e t L o s s ( C o n f i g u r a t i o n gConf , i n t MAX PACKET LOSS) {
re turn gConf . q u a l i t i e s . p a cke tLo s s < MAX PACKET LOSS ;
}
boo l op t im i z a t i onGoa lEne rgyConsump t i on ( C o n f i g u r a t i o n gConf , C o n f i g u r a t i o n
tConf ) {
re turn tConf . q u a l i t i e s . energyConsumpt ion < gConf . q u a l i t i e s .
energyConsumpt ion ;
}
/ / Ad ap t a t i o n Op t i on s
ManagedSystem d e l t a I o T 1 { . . . } ;
Q u a l i t i e s v e r i f i c R e s u l t s 1 = { . . . } ; . . .
Adap t a t i o nOp t i o n a d a p t a t i o nOp t i o n s [MAX OPTIONS] =
{{ d e l t a I oT 1 , v e r i f i c R e s u l t s 1 } , { d e l t a I oT 2 , v e r i f i c R e s u l t s 2 } , . . . } ;
/ / P l an wi th S t ep Types
cons t CHANGE POWER;
cons t CHANGE DISTRIBUTION ;
S tep s t e p 1 = {CHANGE POWER, l i n k2 1 , 5} ;
S t ep s t e p 2 = {CHANGE DISTRIBUTION , l i n k2 1 , 60} ; . . .
P l an p l an = { s t e p 1 , s t e p 2 , . . . }
The current configuration of the DeltaIoT network (currentDeltaIoTConfigu-
ration) is defined by the network of motes with the actual settings (transmission
power settings of the motes, distributions of messages to parents), the current val-
ues of quality properties (power loss and energy consumption), and uncertainties
(current traffic load of motes and SNR of links).
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The basic setting of the system uses two adaption goals. The first goal, satis-
factionGoalPacketLoss, tests whether the packet loss of a test configuration is not
higher as a given threshold (here defined as 10%). The second goal, optimization-
GoalEnergyCons, tests whether the energy consumption of a test configuration is
lower as that of a given configuration.
The adaptation options are defined by the settings that can be used to adapt the
network, i.e., transmission power and distribution of messages. The verification
results are the estimated values for packet loss and energy consumption for the
different settings of the managed system.
Two types of steps can be used to compose adaption plans: changing the power
settings of a mote to transmit messages to the a parent, e.g., {CHANGE POWER,
link2 1, 5} says that the transmission power of mote 2 along the link to mote
1 is set to 5; and change the distribution of messages sent to parents, e.g.,
{CHANGE DISTR, link2 1, 60} says that mote 2 will send 60% of its traffic to
mote 1.
The knowledge of the basic feedback loop model for DeltaIoT comprises two
quality models, one for packet loss and one for energy consumption. While these
models have to be designed and deployed with the MAPE models, they are only
used at runtime to support analysis. We discuss therefore the quality models in
Stage 3, see Section 6.4.3.
MAPE Models. ActivFORMS provides generic model templates that support
the specification of the MAPE feedback loops as a network of timed automata.
These templates are derived from extensive experience with modelling MAPE
loops for various applications, see for example [40, 94, 109, 170, 204, 209]. The
templates target self-adaptive systems with characteristics as described in the in-
troduction of this paper. The templates refine and significantly extend an initial set
of model templates presented in [79].
Fig. 6.5 shows model templates to specify MAPE loop models. The templates
use event triggering, e.g., the monitor automaton is activated by a probe signal with
new data from the managed system and/or the environment. ActivFORMS also
provide a set of time triggered templates, where MAPE models can be activated
periodically by an internal clock (see the project website).
TheMonitor waits inWaiting until it receives the monitor signal from the probe
(the interaction with the probe is specified below). After initialising local vari-
ables (initialize()), the monitor updates the knowledge elements with the data
collected by the probe, i.e., <updateSystemData()>, <updateQualitiesData()>,
and <updateEnvironmentData()> respectively. Subsequently, the monitor checks
analysisRequired() using the updated knowledge and triggers the analyser if anal-
ysis is needed (analyze!). The criteria to decide whether analysis is needed are
domain specific (for example based on the degree of changes in the environment
or the qualities of the system). If no adaptation is needed, the adaptation loop ends
(feedbackLoopCompleted!). Before returning to the waiting state, the monitor may
do some postProcessing(), e.g. resetting local variables.
When the Analyser is triggered, it starts with initialisation and then performs
an analyses (analyze()) to check whether an adaptation is needed. The criteria to
decide about the need for an adaptation are domain specific; they can be based on
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Figure 6.5: Reusable templates for specifying MAPE models
the degree to which properties monitored in the environment have been changed,
the degree of changes of qualities of the managed system, etc. If no adaption is
required, the feedback loop cycle ends (feedbackLoopCompleted!). If adaptation
is required, the analyser composes the adaptation options. Each adaptation option
is defined by assigning particular values to parameters of the managed system that
allow adapting the system. For each adaptation option, placeholders are provided
for the estimated quality properties. Subsequently, the analyser invokes the verifier
via the invokeVerifier signal. The verifier uses the adaptation options and the qual-
ity models to compute for each adaptation option estimated values for the different
qualities that are subject of adaptation. When the verifier completes verification
(verificationCompleted?) it returns the verification results to the analyser. The
analyser then applies useVerificationResults(), adding the verification results to the
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placeholders for each adaptation option. However, if verification exceeds a max
period of time (MAX VERIF TIME), the verification process is terminated. The
verifier then returns partial results and the analyser applies useFailSafeStrategy().
The failsafe strategy can either use the partial results to update the adaptation op-
tions or it can decide to use a failsafe configuration as single adaptation option.
Before triggering the planner, the analyser may do some postProcessing().
After initialisation, the Planner starts with selecting the bestAdaptationOption
based on the quality estimates using the function selectBestAdaptationOption().
This function applies the adaptation goals one by one to the adaptation options.
Now there are three possibilities. First: a validAdaptationOption() is found that is
not in use (!bestAdaptationOptionInUse). In this case the planner will start com-
posing an adaptation plan. Second: no valid adaptation option is found. In this
case the failsafe strategy will be applied. In case the resulting configuration is not
in use, the planner will start composing an adaptation plan; otherwise planning will
complete (feedbackLoopCompleted!). Third: the best adaptation option is already
in use. This will immediately complete planning. Composing a plan is done step
by step. For each step, the stepType is determined, the element (elem) of the man-
aged system that is subject of the adaptation step is identified, and the newValue
that needs to be used to adapt the element is determined. These data elements are
directly derived from the adaptation option that is selected for adaptation; only for
the elements of the managed system that are changed a plan step will be generated.
The step is then added to the plan (addStep(stepType, elem, newValue)). When all
the required steps are added to the plan (!hasStep) the executor is triggered via the
execute signal, possibly involving some postProcessing.
Finally, the Executor executes the plan when triggered by the planner. After
initialisation, the plan is executed step by step (ExecuteStep i). The signal step i!
triggers the effector to perform the adaptation action to the element of the managed
system defined by that step. When the plan is completed (allPlanStepsExecuted),
the executor can perform some final postProcessing completing the feedback loop
cycle.
To specialise the model templates for a given system, software engineers need
to: (1) replace the generic signals and functions marked between angle brackets
with concrete domain specific instances, and (2) implement the abstract functions
and guards for the domain at hand. In addition, particular elements of the models
can be refined when needed.
Example 3. Fig. 6.6 shows concrete instances of the templates for the analyser
and executor models for DeltaIoT. The instantiations for the monitor and planner
are available at the project website.
The Analyzer uses a set of domain-specific functions to analyse the current set-
ting. analyzeSystemSettings() checks whether the network settings (power and
distribution per link) are different from the expected settings (as applied in the last
adaptation step). A difference indicates that the last adaptation steps were not ef-
fected as expected or the settings changed for another reason. analyzePacketLoss()
and analyzeEnergyConsumption() check whether the packet loss and energy con-
sumption have increased significantly. Similarly, analyzeLinksSNR() and analyze-
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(b) Executor
(a) Analyzer
Figure 6.6: MAPE feedback loop model for DeltaIoT
MotesTraffic() check the changes of SNR of the links and the traffic load generated
by the motes. If any of the analysis functions return true, adaptation is needed
(adaptationNeeded()). The adaption options are then composed in two steps.
In the first step, the analyser computes the power setting per link that ensures re-
liable communication (i.e. SNR equal or just above zero). To that end, the analyser
uses link-specific functions SNR=↵ +  (power), where ↵ and   are values that
are determined per link before deployment based on a series of experiments. Fig.
6.7 shows an example of a function for one of the links of the DeltaIoT network.
The analyser determines the required power setting per mote and per link itera-
tively. The analyser starts with computing the SNR for the current power setting
using the function SNR=↵ +  (power) for the link. Then the analyser compares
the computed SNR with the current SNR measured by the probe; we denote the
difference as the SNR delta. If the computed value minus the delta is lower than
zero the power setting is incremented and the SNR delta is computed again. This
process is repeated until an SNR of at least zero is found. If the computed value
minus the delta is above zero the reduced power setting is reduced and the process
is repeated until an SNR of zero or just above zero is found. These power settings
are then used for all adaptation options.
In the second step, all the possible combinations of message distributions for all
links to all its parents are determined (in a range of [0...100] in steps of 20) (if there
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Figure 6.7: SNR to Power for one of the links of the DeltaIoT network (↵ = 7.29 and
  = 0.83)
is only one parent, all messages are sent to that parent). Each of these combinations
determine an adaptation option. Under the assumption that the network structure
does not change, these combinations do not change.
The MAX VERIF TIME in the DeltaIoT configuration is set for the given con-
figuration (e.g., for a setting with a cycle time of 9.5 minutes, the max verification
time is set is to 8 minutes). The function useVerificationResults() copies the esti-
mated values for packet loss and energy consumption determined by the verifier
for all adaptation options.
In DeltaIoT, we use the following failsafe strategy: if the partial verification
results contain at least one adaptation option that satisfies the adaptation goals the
best option is selected among these; if there is no such option, the settings of the
reference approach are applied with maximum power settings for each mote and
duplication of messages send to all parents.
The Executor of DeltaIoT applies two types of steps: ChangePower that adapts
the transmission power of a link with a newValue, and ChangeDistribution that
adapts the percentage of messages distributed of a link with a new value.
6.4.1.2 Design Stub Models
Recall that ActivFORMS assumes that the managed system is available, as a
legacy or a greenfield system, and that it is equipped with the necessary probes
and effectors. The verification of feedback loop models requires stub models (or
stubs) that capture the essential behaviours of the managed system, the environ-
ment, together with probes and effectors. In addition, a stub model is required that
captures the essential behaviour of the runtime verifier.
ActivFORMS provides a set of generic templates to define these stubs that need
to be instantiated for the given adaptation problem. To enable the verification
of the correctness of the feedback loop (see below), the stubs have to exercise
the possible paths through the MAPE models. This requires that the stubs take
the necessary input for the domain at hand, ensuring that all the different guard
combinations are satisfied.
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(a) Probe stub
(b) Effector  stub
Figure 6.8: Reusable templates for probe and effector stubs
Fig. 6.8(a) shows the Probe stub. From the Start state, the function initialise()
enables to configure the setting. The probe then starts collecting sample data from
the system, the relevant qualities, and the environment (getSampleData()). The
sample data is typically specified as a sequence of configurations (see Listing 6.2).
Once the data is collected, the probe triggers the monitor model of the feedback
loop via the monitor signal, which starts an adaptation cycle. As soon as the
feedback loop cycle completes (feedbackLoopCompleted signal), the probe enters
theWaiting state fromwhere it starts a new cycle as long as sample data is available
(hasSampleData()). The probe completes (End) when all sample data is processed.
Fig. 6.8(b) shows the Effector stub. In the Waiting state, the effector receives
the adaptation steps from the executor model. When a step is received, e.g.,
<step i?>, the effector applies the adaptation action on the corresponding element
of the managed system with the new value (i.e., <applyStep i(elem,newVal)>).
Once the adaptation plan is executed, the feedback loop notifies the effector via
the feedbackLoopCompleted signal. The effector can then check the adaptation
results. The verifyResults() function checks whether the configuration is adapted
as expected or not (ResultsCorrect or ResultsInCorrect). The effector then returns
to the Waiting state.
Fig. 6.9 shows the template for the Verifier stub. When the stub receives the
invokeVerifier signal it collects a sample with estimates of the qualities for a set of
adaptation options (predefined by the engineer). This set contains either complete
or partial verification results. In case the set is complete, control is returned (ver-
ificationCompleted!) to the analyser that can use the verification results. In case
the set is incomplete, the stub waits in PartiallyVerified until the analyser times
out (verification exceeds MAX VERIF TIME). The analyser is then notified that
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Figure 6.9: Template for the verifier stub
the verification was interrupted (verificationInterrupted!), after which the analyser
uses the failsafe strategy.
Example 4. Fig. 6.10 illustrates how the effector stub is instantiated for DeltaIoT.
The other stub instances are available at the project website.
Figure 6.10: Effector stub for DeltaIoT
The effector stub distinguishes between two types of steps: changePower? and
changeDistribution? The former one sets the transmission power for a given link
to newValue; the latter sets the the distribution factor for a given link to newValue.
6.4.1.3 Specify and Verify Properties
In the third activity of Stage 1, we specify and verify properties that check the
correctness of MAPE models. We specify properties in Timed Computation Tree
Logic (TCTL). As explained in Section 6.2, TCTL expressions allow to verify
properties such as safety, liveness, etc. We use the Uppaal tool [16] to verify the
MAPE models.
ActivFORMS provides a set of reusable properties that all MAPE models spec-
ified with the behaviour templates should comply to. This set of properties refine
and significantly extend an initial set of properties defined in [79]:
Pr1. Probe.DataCollected --> Monitor.KnowledgeUpdated
Pr2. Monitor.AnalysisRequired --> Analyzer.AnalysisDone
Pr3. Analyzer.AdaptationNeeded --> Verifier.VerificationDone
Pr4. Analyzer.QualityEstimatesReady -->
Planner.ComposeAdaptationPlan || Planner.BestOptionInUse
Pr5. Planner.<Step_i> --> Executor.<ExecuteStep_i>
Pr6. Executor.<ExecuteStep_i> --> Effector.<Step_i_Applied>
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Pr7. Planner.PlanCreated --> Executor.PlanExecuted
Pr8. Executor.PlanExecuted --> Effector.AdaptationCompleted
Pr9. Analyzer.VerificationTimeExceeded -->
Analyzer.UseFailSafeStrategy
Pr10 A[] !Effector.ResultsIncorrect
Pr11 E<> <Model.Location>
Pr12. A[] no deadlock
Property Pr1 states that when the probe collects data, the monitor will eventu-
ally use this data to update the knowledge in the repository. Property Pr2 states
that when the monitor identifies the need for an analysis, eventually the analyzer
will perform the analysis. Property Pr3 states that when the analyzer determines
the need for an adaptation, eventually the verifier will perform the verification.
Property Pr4 states that when the quality estimates of the adaptation options are
ready, eventually the planner will either compose an adaptation plan in case the
current configuration needs to be adapted or no new plan is required in case the
best option is already in use. Properties Pr5 and Pr6 state that each step of the
planner is eventually applied by the effector. Properties Pr7 and Pr8 state that
when the planner has created a plan, eventually the plan is executed by the effec-
tor via the executor. Property Pr9 states that when runtime verification exceeds
a predefined maximum time (MAX VERIF TIME), the analyser will use a failsafe
strategy to adapt the system. Property Pr10 states that location ResultsIncorrect
of the Effector model is never reached. Property Pr11 on the other hand states that
there exists a path to a given Location of a given Model; both location and model
are abstractly defined. For example, Planner.UseFailSafeStrategy checks that a
path exists to location UseFailSafeStrategy of the Planner model. This abstract
property allows checking whether the input used for verification is complete, i.e.
all paths of the models are traversed. Property Pr12 that is supported by Uppaal
allows verifying whether the system is deadlock free. The elements in angle brack-
ets need to be replaced by the domain specific instances of the concrete MAPE
models.
Example 5. We illustrate the property specification and verification for DeltaIoT.
Properties Pr1 to Pr4 and Pr7 to Pr10 and Pr12 can be directly applied to the
MAPE feedback loop model for DeltaIoT (see Figure 6.6). Pr5 and Pr6 and
Pr11 need to be instantiated for DeltaIoT:
//Generic property:
Pr5. Planner.<Step_i> --> Executor.<ExecuteStep_i>
Pr5a. Planner.ChangePower --> Executor.ChangePower
Pr5b. Planner.ChangeDistribution --> Executor.ChangeDistribution
//Generic property:
Pr6. Executor.<ExecuteStep_i> --> Effector.<Step_i_Applied>
Pr6a. Executor.ChangePower --> Effector.ChangePower
Pr6b. Executor.ChangeDistribution --> Effector.ChangeDistribution
//Generic property: Pr11 E<> <Model.Location>
Pr11. E<> Planner.UseFailSafeStrategy (selected property)
Figure 6.11 shows the time taken to verify the MAPE feedback loop properties
for a setup of DeltaIoT with 15 motes as shown in Figure 6.11 (averages of 30
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runs). For these experiments, we used a feedback loop that deals with two adap-
tation requirements (R1. Packet loss should be less than 10% and R2. Energy
consumption should be minimised). The models and stub data that we used for
the verification with the Uppaal model checker are available at the project website.
The results show that the overhead for design-time verification of the properties
that check the correctness of the MAPE feedback loop is totally acceptable for this
realistic IoT setting.
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Figure 6.11: Verification times for properties that check the correctness of the MAPE feed-
back loop
6.4.2 Stage 2: Deploy Feedback Loop with Virtual Machine
The goal of the second stage is to deploy and enact the verified feedback loop
model with the ActivFORMS virtual machine. The input elements of Stage 2
are: (1) the verified MAPE-K feedback loop model; (2) the ActivFORMS virtual
machine; (3) a statistical model checker; and (4) template classes for connecting
the probe, effector, and statistical model checker with the adaptation logic.
Stage 2 consists of four main engineering activities: instantiate virtual machine
with feedback loop model, connect probe and effector, connect statistical model
checker, and start virtual machine. We briefly explain each activity now.
6.4.2.1 Instantiate Virtual Machine with Feedback Loop Model
One of the distinct features of ActivFORMS is a virtual machine that can directly
execute the verified feedback loop model to adapt the managed system. Direct
model execution avoids model to code translation which is typically an error-prone
activity. We start with a brief overview of the ActivFORMS virtual machine. Then
we show how the virtual machine is instantiated with the feedback loop model of
the DeltaIoT application. For a detailed explanation of the virtual machine, we
refer to [107].
The virtual machine can interpret the feedback loop model according to the
semantics of networked timed automata. Internally, the virtual machine uses stan-
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dard compiler techniques to transform the models of the feedback loop with their
locations and edges to an internal graph representation. The labels on the edges
and states, e.g., guards, invariants, etc. are converted to task graphs. A task graph
consists of a list of tasks that need to be executed when activated, such as updat-
ing a variable, evaluating an expression, etc. Once the model is converted to a
graph representation, the virtual machine initialises all the signals and assigns a
unique identifier to each signal. The feedback loop can then be connected with
external components using the signal identifiers. ActivFORMS provides a set of
template classes to connect probes, effectors and a verification engine with the
feedback loop model. We explain the connection of these elements further in the
following sections. Once all external connections are establised and the models are
initialised, the feedback loop model is ready to be executed by the virtual machine.
In addition to the set of predefined classes that enable the feedback loop mod-
els to communicate with external components, the virtual machine also offers a
generic plug-in mechanism to attach arbitrary components to the virtual machine.
A plug-in that comes with ActivFORMS is a graphical user interface that visualises
the executing model and shows the status of user defined properties. Another plug-
in provided by ActivFORMS is a live update module that allows to update running
models on the fly. We elaborate on these two plug-ins in Stage 3 (verify adapta-
tion goals and adapt the managed system) and Stage 4 (evolution of models and
adaptation goals).
The ActivFORMS virtual machine has been thoroughly tested using an exhaus-
tive test suite. Furthermore, the virtual machine has been applied in a wide range
of self-adaptive systems, including a robotic system [109], in several case studies
including a smart house system, a security system, and two vehicular traffic sys-
tems [94], a digital story telling application [94], an e-health system [170, 206],
an unmanned underwater vehicle system and an service-based foreign exchange
trading system [40]. More information about how the virtual machine works and
the test suite with test results is available at the project website.
Example 6. Listing 6.6 shows how an instance of the ActivFORMS engine is
created, taking as input the path where the MAPE feedback model of DeltaIoT is
located.
Listing 6.6: Instantiate ActivFORMS with feedback loop of DeltaIoT.
ActivFORMSEngine engine = new ActivFORMSEngine("/models/DeltaIoT-MAPE.xml");
6.4.2.2 Connect Probe and Effector
Recall that ActivFORMS assumes that the managed system is equipped with
probes and effectors. To enable the MAPE feedback loop to monitor the managed
system and the environment through these probes and adapt the managed system
with the effectors, the feedback loop needs to be connected to the probe and the ef-
fector. To that end, ActivFORMS provides two template classes, ProbeConnector
and EffectorConnector, that support the engineer to implement these connections.
Realising the probe connection boils down to: (1) connect the monitor model with
the probe via the monitor channel, (2) implement the logic to receive data from
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the probe, (3) translate the data in a format that the monitor understands, (4) send
the translated data to the monitor. Realising the effector connection consists of:
(1) connect the executor model with the effector via the respective channels; (2)
effect the adaptation actions received from the executor model via the channels to
the managed system via the effector.
Example 7. Listing 6.7 shows how a connector is created that connects the
DeltaIoT probe with the monitor model through the monitor channel and how it
sends data from the probe to the monitor.
Listing 6.7: Connecting DeltaIoT probe with the monitor model.
public ProbeConnector(ActivFORMS engine, Probe probe) {
// Connect probe with monitor via the monitor channel identifier
monitor = engine.getChannel("monitor");
}
public void sendDataToFeedbackLoop() {
// Get data from probe
List<Mote> motes = probe.getAllMotes();
// Convert data into ActivFORMS readable format
data[0]="configuration.deltaIoTmotes[2].energyLevel="
+ motes.get(2).energyLevel;
data[1]="configuration.environment.linksSNR[0].SNR="
+ motes.get(2).links.get(0).SNR;
...
// Send data from probe to monitor
engine.send(monitor, data);
}
Listing 6.8 shows how a connector is created that connects the executor model
with the effector and how the effector receives adaptation actions from the executor
to effect the network settings.
Listing 6.8: Connecting the executor model with the DeltaIoT effector.
public EffectorConnector(ActivFORMSEngine engine, Effector effector) {
// Get channel identifiers from engine
changePower = engine.getChannel("changePower");
changeDistribution = engine.getChannel("changeDistribution");
// Connect executor model with effector via channels
engine.register(changePower, "link", "newVal");
engine.register(changeDistribution, "link", "newVal");
}
@Override
public synchronized void receive(int channelId, HashMap data) {
if (channelID == changePower){
// effect power settings for link through effector
}
else if (channelId == changeDistribution) {
// effect distribution settings for link through effector
}
}
6.4.2.3 Connect Statistical Model Checker
In ActivFORMS we use statistical model checking at runtime to support the anal-
ysis of adaptation options, i.e., to estimate the expected quality properties of the
adaptation goals. To enable the analyzer model to use the model checker the two
need to be connected. ActivFORMS provides a template class, SMCConnector,
that supports the engineer to implement this connection. Realising the connection
consists of the following steps: (1) connect the necessary channels, including a
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channel to invoke the verifier, a channel to stop verification (in case a time out
is detected by the analyzer), and a channel to return results when verification is
completed, (2) implement the logic to invoke the verifier for the different adapta-
tion options and collect the results, (3) implement the logic to stop the verification
process in case of a time out.
Example 8. Listing 6.9 shows how the analyser model for DeltaIoT is connected
with the SMC to support the analysis of adaptation options at runtime.
Listing 6.9: Connecting the analyzer model of DeltaIoT with statistical model checker.
public SMCConnector(ActivFORMSEngine engine, SMC smc) {
// Get channel identifiers and connect
invokeVerifier = engine.getChannel("invokeVerifier");
stopVerification = engine.getChannel("stopVerification");
verificationCompleted = engine.getChannel("verificationCompleted");
engine.register(...);
}
// Invoke verification and collect results
@Override
public synchronized void receive(int channelId, HashMap adaptationOptions) {
if (channelID == invokeVerifier) {
// For each adaptation option invoke SMC to estimate quality properties;
// Once all are done send results through the done signal
}
else if (channelId == stopVerifier) {
// Stop verification and send partial results through done signal.
}
}
6.4.2.4 Start Virtual Machine
When the ActivFORMS engine is created using the feedback loop model as input
and all the connections are established (with the probe, effector, and the verifier),
one more aspect needs to be dealt with before the virtual machine can be started.
In particular, the engineer needs to define the real time that corresponds to one
logical time unit in the model. The virtual machine provides a function setReal-
TimeUnit(int msTime) to support the engineer with this setting. Once this is done
the virtual machine can be started, enacting self-adaptation.
Example 9. Listing 6.10 shows the steps to start the virtual machine for DeltaIoT.
Listing 6.10: Start the virtual machine for the DeltaIoT network.
public void startAdaptation()){
ActivFORMSEngine engine;
engine = new ActivFORMSEngine("/models/DeltaIoT-MAPE.xml");
// Set model time unit to real time unit in milliseconds
engine.setRealTimeUnit(1000);
// Initialize connections
...
// Start the virtual machine
engine.start();
}
An instance of the virtual machine is created with the path where the feedback
loop model of DeltaIoT is situated. The real time that corresponds with one time
tick on the model is set to 1000. When the external connections with the probe,
effector, and the verifier are set, the engine is started.
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6.4.3 Stage 3: Runtime Verification of Adaptation Goals and De-
cision Making
The goal of the third stage is to ensure the adaptation goals. To that end, the ver-
ified feedback loop that is executed by the ActivFORMS virtual machine adapts
the managed system. The input elements of Stage 3 are: (1) the verified MAPE-
K feedback loop model running on the virtual machine; (2) a statistical model
checker connected with the analyzer model; and (4) the managed system con-
nected with the monitor and executor models. Facultative, the GUI can be con-
nected to the virtual machine allowing to inspect the running feedback loop model
and user defined properties.
We focus in Stage 3 on three main activities: analysis of adaptation options,
decision making, and inspection of the feedback loop in execution. Before we
explain these three activities in detail, we first give an overview of the runtime
architecture of ActivFORMS.
6.4.3.1 Runtime Architecture of ActivFORMS
The focus of ActivFORMS in Stages 1 and 2 (design and deployment time) is on
providing guarantees for functional correctness. This concerns both correctness of
the MAPE models and the virtual machine that executes the models. At runtime,
ActivFORMS complements functional correctness with guarantees for the adap-
tation goals. ActivFORMS aims to provide these guarantees in an efficient way,
i.e. with limited resources and adaptation time. To that end, ActivFORMS relies
on statistical model checking at runtime that can provide guarantees for the adap-
tation goals with a required level of confidence. We give a high-level overview of
the runtime architecture of ActivFORMS that shows the composition of the run-
time components. In the following sections, we zoom in on analysis and decision
making using runtime statistical model checking. Fig. 6.12 gives an overview of
the ActivFORMS runtime architecture.
The Managed System is the software that is subject of adaptation. At a given
time the managed system has a particular configuration that is based on the ar-
rangement and settings of the running components that make up the system. The
managed system is equipped with probes and effectors.
In line with the reference model of Kramer and Magee [122], the Managing
System comprises two sub-layers: Change Management and Goal Management.
Change management contains a feedback loop that is connected with the probes
and effectors of the managed system. Change management adapts the managed
system at runtime. Goal management on the other hand enables to inspect change
management and update the components of this layer on-the-fly.
As we explained before, in ActivFORMS the feedback loop of change man-
agement is realised by means of a network of timed automata that are directly
executed by the ActivFORMS virtual machine. In Fig. 6.12, these models are
represented as MAPE components that share knowledge maintained in the Knowl-
edge Repository. As the virtual machine executes the formally verified MAPE
models according to the semantics of timed automata, correctness is guaranteed at
runtime.
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Figure 6.12: ActivFORMS runtime architecture
TheMonitor uses Probes to monitor the managed system and the environment in
which the system operates. The collected data can be used to update the knowledge
of the knowledge repository directly, or learning mechanisms can be used, for
example Bayesian learning can use new data that becomes available to update
the probability of a parameter that quantifies an uncertainty of the system or the
environment. The Analyzer is supported by a Statistical Model Checker that can
run simulations on the models of the knowledge repository during operation. In
particular, the model checker can provide estimates of the quality properties for
each adaptation option of the system that is subject of adaptation. Recall that
we refer to the different choices for adaptation from a given configuration of the
managed system as the adaptation options. The Planner uses the adaptation goals
to select the best adaptation option and create a plan to adapt the managed system
accordingly. This plan is then executed by the Executor using the Effectors. In this
paper, our primary focus is on analysis of the adaptation options and the selection
of an option; we discuss these in detail below.
Goal Management consists of two complementary plug-in components, User
Interface and Online Update. The user interface component allows visualising the
executing feedback loop model and showing the state of user-defined properties.
The online update component enables users to update MAPE models or elements
of the knowledge repository during execution. Such updates are submitted through
the user interface that forwards the request to online update. Changing the models
and knowledge of change management needs to be done safely, i.e., in quiescent
states [123]. We discuss goal management in detail in the next Section 6.4.4.
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6.4.3.2 Analysis of Adaptation Options
The goal of analysis is to provide estimates for the different quality properties of
the adaptation options. In ActivFORMS, analysis is performed on first-class run-
time models for each quality property of interest using statistical model checking.
Analysis consists of four steps: (1) compose the adaptation options by assigning
values to the variables that represent the elements of the managed system that can
be adapted, (2) assign values to the uncertainties as observed by the monitor and
stored in the knowledge repository; the uncertainties are represented as variables
in the model, (3) invoke the model checker with the adaptation options and the
verification queries for the different quality models, (4) collect the verification re-
sults and use them to update the quality estimates of the adaptation options in the
knowledge repository. In case the verification process exceeds a pre-defined time
limit, verification is interrupted and a failsafe strategy is applied to decide about
adaptation. This completes analysis.
We rely on Uppaal-SMC for statistical model checking at runtime using two
types of queries: probability estimation (p = Pr[bound](')) and simulation
(simulate N [ bound]{E1, ..., Ek}). For a probability estimation query the sta-
tistical model checker applies statistical techniques to compute the number of runs
needed to produce a probability estimation p for expression ' of the quality model
with an approximation interval [p ✏, p+✏] and confidence (1 ↵) for a given time
bound. The values of ✏ and ↵ that determine the the accuracy of the results can be
set for each query. For a simulation query, the value of N determines the number
of simulations the model checker will apply in time bound to return values for
state expressions E1, ..., Ek of the quality model. For this type of query, it is the
responsibility of the designer to determine how many runs are needed to obtain a
required accuracy. In our current research, we use the relative standard error of the
mean (RSEM) as a measure to determine the accuracy of the simulation queries.
The standard error of the mean (SEM) quantifies how precisely a simulation result
represents the true mean of the population (and is thus expressed in units of the
data). SEM takes into account the value of the standard deviation and the sam-
ple size. RSEM is the SEM divided by the sample mean and is expressed as a
percentage. For example, a RSEM of 5% represents an accuracy with a SEM of
plus/minus 0.5 for a mean value of 10. Evidently, better estimates require smaller
RSEM values and thus more simulation runs. The number of simulations required
for a particular accuracy can be determined during offline experiments. If neces-
sary, additional experiments can be run in the background in case of significant
model changes. In our current research, we rely on offline experiments only.
Example 10. We illustrate now the analysis of adaptation options for packet loss in
DeltaIoT. For the analysis of energy consumption, we refer to the project website.
The quality model for packet loss consists of two interacting automata:
Topology and Network, shown in Fig. 6.13. The model is used to estimate
the packet loss for a given adaptation option, using the following query:
Listing 6.11: Verification query for packet loss model
Pr [<=1](<>Network.PacketLoss)
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(a) Topology
(b) Network
Figure 6.13: Quality model to estimate packet loss
We consider two types of uncertainties: the traffic load generated by the differ-
ent motes and the signal to noise ratio per link (SNR). For these uncertainties we
need to assign values in the model before the verification starts. A number of motes
generate a steady traffic load (i.e., motes Three, Eight, Nine, and Fifteen;
these mote periodically sample the temperature, see Fig. 6.2). The load generated
by these motes is represented by constants. Other motes generate a fluctuating
traffic load (i.e. based on the presence of humans). The load generated by these
motes is represented probabilistically in the model; e.g., pLoad(13) is the prob-
ability (expressed as a percentage) that mote Thirteen will generate traffic. The
values for pLoad are periodically updated by the gateway and collected by the
probe. The SNR per link depends on external factors such as network interference
and noise in the environment. For each link, the values for SNR are periodically
updated by the gateway and collected by the probe. These values are used to de-
termine the values of SNR for the model as explained in Example 3. The values
for traffic and SNR are assigned before verification starts. For a network with 15
motes as shown in Fig. 6.2, this results in 294 adaptation options.
The Topology automaton consists of 14 motes (Two to Fifteen) that send data
to the Gateway via their parents (see also Fig. 6.2). As explained in Section 6.3,
data communication in DeltaIoT is time synchronised, where communication over
links is turn-based. StartVerification (or any of the connected locations VF1, VF2
or VF3) triggers the mote that can communicate. The motes communicate such
that the packet loss along all the possible paths in the network are checked.
If a mote with only one parent communicates (e.g. Thirteen communicates with
Eleven), it signals the network automaton (data[moteId]!), where moteId is the ID
of the sending mote (ranging from 2 to 15). The network automaton then deter-
mines the packet loss (see below). If a mote has multiple parents the distribution
of data communicated to the parents is determined probabilistically based on the
values assigned for the adaptation option. E.g., the probability that mote Twelve
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sends data to mote Seven is pDist(12,7), while the probability that it sends data to
mote Three is pDist(12,3).
We now look at the Network automaton of the packet loss model. When a mote
(with identifier mId) communicates with a parent, the network automaton receives
the data[mId]? signal with the mote that sends data (setMote(mId)). The proba-
bility for packet loss is then calculated using the calcPacketLoss() function. The
probability that packets get lost during communication depends on the Signal-to-
Noise ratio (SNR) for the link. The values for the SNR along the different links are
periodically updated by the gateway and collected by the probe and the monitor.
Depending on the value of the packet loss either the transition PacketLossCal-
culated to PacketLoss is taken (communication failed) or the transition to Mes-
sageReceived is taken (communication was successful). After a successful com-
munication, the network automaton moves back to the Start location setting the
value recv=true. The Topology automaton will then continue with the next hop of
the communication along the path that is currently checked, until the Gateway is
reached. If a packet gets lost (recv=false), the communication along the path that
is currently checked ends. The verification process repeats until results with the
required accuracy are obtained.
6.4.3.3 Decision Making
The goal of decision making is to pick the best adaptation option based on the anal-
ysis results and the adaptation goals. ActivFORMS does not prescribe what deci-
sion making mechanism should be used. Any approach to define adaptation goals
and mechanism to select among the adaptation options based on the goals can be
applied. ActivFORMS comes with two predefined types of adaptation goals that
are defined as boolean functions: an optimization goal returns the most optimal
configuration of two given configurations for a given property, and a satisfaction
goal tests whether a given configuration satisfies a given property. The concrete
goals are applied in a predefined order to determine the best adaptation option.
Example 11. We illustrate now the decision making applied in DeltaIoT for a
setting with 15 motes and two adaptation goals. Packet loss is defined as a satis-
faction goal (packet loss < 10%) and energy consumption as a optimization goal
(minimize energy consumption) For the definitions of the functions of the goals,
we refer to Listing 6.5. First packet loss is applied, then energy consumption.
Figure 6.14 shows an overview of the adaptation options for DeltaIoT at a par-
ticular point in time. Each dot on the graph at the left hand side represents an
adaption option with its corresponding average values of the two quality proper-
ties. The dot marked in blue represents the configuration of the managed system
in use at the time the analyse is performed. The dots marked in green on the graph
at the right hand side represent adaptation options that comply with the adaptation
goal for packet loss. Finally, the dot marked in red on this graph represents the best
adaptation option, i.e., the candidate option with minimum energy consumption.
This option is selected for adaptation and a plan is composed by the planner that
adapts the current configuration to this new configuration. The selected adaptation
option at this particular point in time is expected to reduce packet loss to 9% and
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energy consumption to 25.6 compared to 11% and 25.7, i.e., the respective values
of the current configuration.
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Figure 6.14: Decision making at a particular point in time with two adaptation goals
6.4.3.4 Inspect the Feedback Loop in Execution
The third and last activity of Stage 3 is inspection of the executing feedback loop
model. The GUI plugin that comes with ActivFORMS allows operators to view
the MAPE loop models in operation. In addition, operators can define proper-
ties that are checked at runtime. The ActivFORMS runtime environment supports
four types of properties: (1) A[] !Mx.Ly, i.e. location Ly of model Mx is never
reached; (2) A[] bexpr1 op bexpr2, i.e. the operation on two boolean expressions
bexpr1 and bexpr2 should hold always, with op being a logical operator (&, k,
etc.) or a relational operator (<, >, etc.); (3) Mx.Ly –>Mu.Lv, i.e. if location
Ly of model Mx is reached then location Lv of model Mu should be reached
without time delay (the runtime environment verifies this property by checking
execution traces); and (4) Mx.Ly –>(t)Mu.Lv which is similar to property (3)
but with a time constraint defined by time t.
Example 12. We illustrate the inspection of the executing feedback loop model for
DeltaIoT. Figure 6.15 shows the GUI of ActivFORMS with a model of DeltaIoT
in execution and a set of properties that are verified at runtime.
The main user interface window shows properties of the second, the third, and
the fourth type (the first type does not apply to the DeltaIoT MAPE models). The
coloured circle on the left side to each property indicates the status of the property:
green indicates that the property holds, red indicates a violation. The status of the
properties over time can also be inspected via a log file. The model visualisation
window shows the analyser model in execution. The snapshot is taken at the time
when the verifier is performing a verification (state RuntimeVerfication).
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(a) Main user interface
(b) Model visualization
Figure 6.15: GUI of ActivFORMS in action for DeltaIoT
6.4.4 Stage 4: Evolution of Feedback Loop and Adaptation
Goals
The goal of the fourth stage is to support on the fly changes of the adaptation
goals and MAPE models. ActivFORMS support these runtime changes through
the goal management layer, see Fig. 6.12. We focus in this section on adding
a new adaptation goal and update the feedback loop models accordingly. The
approach for changing an existing goal or updating a feedback loop model for other
purposes (e.g., correct a bug or change one of the MAPE models) is similar. The
input elements of Stage 4 are: (1) a new adaptation requirement, (2) the MAPE-K
feedback loop models that are currently in use; (3) the Uppaal model checker, and
(4) the ActivFORMS runtime environment equipped with the user interface and
online update plug-ins.
Recall that in ActivFORMS, we assume that the probes and effectors are avail-
able to monitor and adapt the managed system as needed for the adaptation goals.
On the fly updates of adaptation goals and the feedback loop model that require an
update of the managed system itself, including the probes an effectors it provides,
is out of scope of this paper.
Stage 4 consists of three main engineering activities: specify new adaptation
goal and quality model, update and verify feedback loop model, enact feedback
loop model. The first and second activity are performed offline, the third activity
is performed on the running system using the components of the goal managing
layer. We explain now each of these activities.
6.4.4.1 Specify New Adaptation Goal and Quality Model
Support for changing adaptation goals during operation is considered a key aspect
of self-adaptation [47, 133, 175, 203]. However, there is limited research in this
area. With its model-driven and modular approach, ActivFORMS provides first-
class support for on the fly changes of adaptation goals. When a new requirement
appears, two steps are requited: (i) the new requirement needs to be translated to
an adaptation goal, and (ii) a quality model needs to be specified together with
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a verification query. Once deployed, the analyzer will use the quality model and
query to perform an analyse of the adaptation options. The planner will use the
new adaptation goal to select the best adaptation option. We discuss the updates
of the MAPE models below.
Example 13. We illustrate how latency is taken into account in DeltaIoT as an
additional quality property. Recall from Section 6.3 that DeltaIoT has a third addi-
tional requirement that needs to be activated at runtime: R3. The average latency
of messages should be less than 5% of the cycle time. This new requirement is
translated to an adaptation goal as follows:
Listing 6.12: Definition of adaptation goal for latency
type struct {
...
int latency;
} Qualities
int MAX_LATENCY = 5;
bool satisfactionGoalLatency(Configuration gConf, int MAX_LATENCY) {
return gConf.qualities.latency <= MAX_LATENCY;
}
Figure 6.16 shows the quality model to estimate latency for DeltaIoT.
(a) Mote
(b) Gateway
(c) System
Figure 6.16: Latency model for DeltaIoT
The model has a similar structure as the quality model to estimate energy con-
sumption (that is available at the project website). For the verification of the model,
we use the following query:
Listing 6.13: Verification query for latency model
simulate 30[<=1](<>Gateway.latency)
The query calculates per adaptation option the estimated latency for 30 simula-
tion runs (guaranteeing an RSEM of 5%). The adaptation options are the same as
for the other quality models (see Example 10). The System automaton activates the
motes one by one (moteId= nextTurn()). EachMote can then send messages to its
parents in the time slots dedicated to it (sendPackets(packets)). When the Gateway
gets it turn, it computes the latency based the proportion of messages that did not
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arrive (i.e., the messages that remained in queues) compared to the total number
of messages (i.e. the messages in the queues plus the messages that arrived). For
each simulation run the verifier assigns the uncertainty value for pTraffic(moteId)
per mote. The analyzer model uses the 30 results to compute and estimated aver-
age latency with the required accuracy.
6.4.4.2 Update and Verify Feedback Loop Model
Adding a new adaptation goal requires updates of the MAPE models. Typically,
the monitor model needs to be extended with support to track the new quality
property and possibly new uncertainties that relate to the adaptation goal. The
analyser needs to be extended with support to perform analysis of the new quality
property. To that end, the analyser relies on the statistical model checker to verify
the the new quality model using the verification query (both specified in the first
activity). The planner needs to incorporate the new adaptation goal in the existing
set of goals and use these updated set of goals to select the best adaptation option.
In addition, new types of plan steps may need to be incorporated in the planner.
Finally, the executor may need to be extended to be able to deal with new types of
plan steps.
Once the new elements are incorporated in the MAPE models, they need to be
verified to ensure their correctness. To that end, the initial stub models of probes,
effectors, and the verifier need to be updated to ensure that they feed the MAPE
models with proper input to check the correctness of the MAPE models. For the
verification, the initial verification properties can be checked again. The generic
properties that require an instantiation for the domain at hand (Pr5, Pr6, and
Pr11) may need to be extended. Finally, if necessary, additional domain specific
properties may need to be defined and verified. For updating and verifying the
MAPE models, we use the Uppaal tool.
Example 14. We illustrate the updates of the DeltaIoT models that are required to
deal with the latency goal. Figure 6.17 shows the updated analyser model. For the
other updated MAPE models, we refer to the project website.
Figure 6.17: Updated analyzer model for DeltaIoT to deal with latency
The Analyzer model is extended with two functions: analyzeLatency() checks
whether the latency of the network is above the threshold of maximum latency,
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and analyzeQueuesPerMote() checks whether the queues for each mote are satu-
rated or not. This data is taken into account when evaluating adaptationNeeded().
Furthermore, when the analyser invokes the verifier it will perform analysis of the
latency model in addition to packet loss and energy consumption.
For the verification of the updated MAPE models, we could reuse the initial set
of properties (see Example 5). As the changes of the models were limited, the
time to perform verification with Uppaal increased on average with less then 2%.
Detailed results are available at the project website.
6.4.4.3 Enact Feedback Loop Model
The final activity to evolve the feedback loop is to update and enact the running
models. Updating a running feedback loop model with ActivFORMS follows the
classical process of runtime updates based on quiescence [123]. A quiescent state
of a component is a state where no activity is going on in the component so that it
can be safely updated. In ActivFORMS the starting states (Waiting) of eachMAPE
model is the default quiescent state because the MAPE behaviours wait in these
states to be triggered to start their respective adaptation functions (otherwise, there
is some adaptation activity going on).
As explained in Section 6.4.2.1, in ActivFORMS, goal management is sup-
ported by a user interface and an online update component. The procedure to
update a running model is as follows:
1. The model update is loaded via the user interface;
2. The online update component tracks when the MAPE models enter quies-
cence states;
3. Once the models are in quiescence states the online update component notifies
the virtual machine to start updating the running feedback loop model;
4. The virtual machine halts the execution of the running feedback loop model
and all incoming signals are put into a waiting queue;
5. The virtual machine saves the state of the old model;
6. The virtual machine loads the updated MAPE models; new knowledge mod-
els are also loaded;
7. The state of the corresponding variables from the old models is copied to the
new models. New variables are initialised;
8. The virtual machine starts executing the new model;
9. Pending signals waiting in the queue are processed (first-in-first-out).
10. Normal execution continues.
Example 15. We illustrate the update of the MAPE models of DeltaIoT to incor-
porate the latency goal. Figure 6.18 (left) shows the ActivFORMS user interface to
perform on-the-fly updates of the feedback loop model and adaptation goals. The
window shows how the DeltaIoT-MAPE-Evolution model is selected for update.
The window on the right shows that updated models of the Monitor and Analyser
that are ready to start execution taking into account the latency goal.
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(a) Model update dialog (b) New model updated
Figure 6.18: Live updates of the MAPE models for DeltaIoT (user interface to perform
on-the-fly updates left hand side; the updated models ready for execution after the update
right hand side).
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Figure 6.19: Selection of the best adaptation option with three adaptation goals.
Figure 6.19 shows the selection of the best adaptation option with three adapta-
tion goals.
The diagram on the left hand side shows the adaptation options at a particular
point in time. The options that comply with the adaptation goals for packet loss
(<= 10%) and latency (<= 5%) are marked in green plus one in red. The diagram
on the right hand side highlights the same adaptation options; the red option is
selected for adaptation. The selected adaptation option has an expected packet
loss of 9.5%, a latency of 3.5%, and an energy consumption of 38.9.
The adaptation option marked in blue in both figures shows the option that
would have been selected if the latency goal would not have been taken into ac-
count. The figures illustrate that ensuring the latency goal may introduce a small
tradeoff against the other two adaptation goals.
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6.5 Evaluation of ActivFORMS
We evaluate ActivFORMS using the DeltaIoT network deployed at KU Leuven
shown in Figure 6.2. The default setup consists of 15 motes, each mote comprising
two elements: (1) a Raspberry Pi that is responsible for sensing, local processing,
and network management operations, and (2) a RN2483 LoRa module1 that is in
charge of radio communication. The output power of the LoRa module is 20.2mA
for power setting 0 and 38.9mA for power setting 15 at 3.3V. The gateway runs
on a regular server machine that is responsible for processing network data and
storing the network statistics in a database. The server offers an API to a probe
and effector to monitor and adapt the network. For the simulation tests we used a
Macbook with 2.5 GHz Core i7 processor, and 16 GB 1600MHz DD3 RAM. All
the data of the evaluation is available at the project website, including a link to the
DeltaIoT artifact [111] that can be used to replicate the experiments.
Unless mentioned differently, we run the default setup of the DeltaIoT network
with 15 motes for a period of 24 hours. The cycle time is set to 9.5 minutes, cor-
responding to 153 cycles in 24 hours. A cycle consists of two phases: the first 8
minutes are allocated to the motes to communicate date downstream to the gate-
way; the remaining 1.5 minutes are allocated for the communication of adaptation
messages from the gateway upstream to the motes. The maximum verification
time is set to 8 minutes. Each mote can generate 10 messages per cycle, subject to
its traffic load profile, see the description in Section 6.3. In each cycle, each mote
gets 40 slots of 2 seconds for communication. The size of the send-queue is 60,
which implies that messages in the queue are sent within two cycles. Messages
from children that arrive when the receive-queue is full are discarded. The values
for SNR are based on the actual conditions of the wireless communication. The
spreading factor of all motes is fixed (set to 8) in all experiments. In simulation
mode, the cycle time is set to 12 minutes with communication slots of 4 seconds,
and the spreading factor is set to 11. The values for uncertainties of SNR and
traffic load are based on empirical data as described in Section 6.3.
The evaluation consists of four parts. In part one, we compare the tradeoff be-
tween the accuracy of the verification results with the time required for verification
at runtime. In part two, we compare ActivFORMS with two other approaches: an
over-provisioning approach that is common in practice and an approach that uses
runtime quantitative verification (RQV [37]). In the third part, we test scalability.
In particular, we measure adaptation time and memory usage for network con-
figurations with an increasing number of motes. We compare the scalability of
ActivFORMS with RQV. Finally, in the fourth part, we dynamically incorporate
the latency goal in the DeltaIoT network with ActivFORMS and test the impact of
it. The tests in parts two and four are performed on the physical network; the test
in parts one and three are performed in simulation.
1 http://ww1.microchip.com/downloads/en/DeviceDoc/50002346C.pdf
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6.5.1 Tradeoff Between Accuracy and Adaptation Time
To evaluate the tradeoff between the accuracy of the verification results and the
adaptation time (which is primarily determined by the time required for verifica-
tion), we used a network setup with 15 motes and two adaptation goals: energy
consumption and packet loss. We run two experiments: in the first we measure the
tradeoff between accuracy of the verification results and the verification time; in
the second, we evaluated the quality of adaptation decisions for different settings.
Results. In the first experiment, we picked a random adaptation option and ap-
plied verification for both qualities. The graphs in Figure 6.20 plot the results
of 1000 runs. The results for energy consumption (graphs on the left hand side)
show that lower values for RSEM (i.e., more simulation runs) result in more ac-
curate verification results; e.g., the quartiles of the boxplots for RSEM=2% are
-0.52/+0.45 Coulomb compared to -0.18/+0.11 Coulomb for RSEM=0.5%. The
tradeoff is an increase in verification time; the median for RSEM=2% is 2ms
compared to 16ms for RSEM=0.5%. The results for packet loss are similar; more
accurate verification results (E defines the approximation interval p ± ✏ and A
defines the confidence 1  ↵) require more verification time.
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Figure 6.20: Tradeoff between accuracy and adaptation time with ActivFORMS
In the second experiment, we evaluated the quality of adaptation decisions for
a simulation run of 24 hours for the different settings. Figure 6.21 shows the
results. The boxplots show that settings that produce more accurate verification
results also produce better adaptation decisions. For example, for a setting with
A=0.20, E=0.05 and RSEM=2% the median for packet loss is 9% and for energy
consumption it is 37.3, compared to 7% and 37.0 respectively for a setting with
A=0.10, E=0.01 and RSEM=0.5%. The cost is an increase of adaptation time
from median 9.2 s to 19.9 s.
Conclusions. Runtime statistical model checking allows the user to set the ac-
curacy of the verification results (approximation interval and confidence). The test
results show that more accurate results (smaller approximation interval and higher
confidence) produce better adaptation decisions. However, the cost is an increase
of adaptation time.
166
6.5 Evaluation of ActivFORMS
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Pa
ck
et
 L
os
s (
%
)
Packet Loss
A=0.20,E=0.05
RSEM=2%
A=0.10,E=0.05
RSEM=1%
A=0.10,E=0.01
RSEM=0.5%
35
36
37
38
39
En
er
gy
 C
on
su
m
pt
ion
 (C
ou
lom
b)
Energy Consumption
A=0.20,E=0.05
RSEM=2%
A=0.10,E=0.05
RSEM=1%
A=0.10,E=0.01
RSEM=0.5%
10
15
20
25
30
35
Ad
ap
ta
tio
n 
Ti
m
e 
(s
)
Adaptation Time
A=0.20,E=0.05
RSEM=2%
A=0.10,E=0.05
RSEM=1%
A=0.10,E=0.01
RSEM=0.5%
Figure 6.21: Impact on quality properties for different verification settings
6.5.2 Comparison ActivFORMS with Reference Approach and
RQV
For the experiments in part two, we consider two adaptation goals: R1. Average
packet loss should be below 10% and R2. Energy consumption should be min-
imised. For R1, we used an approximation interval with "= 0.01 and confidence
↵ = 0.10, i.e., 90%. For R2, we used an RSEM of 0.5%, which requires 30 simu-
lation runs (see explanation in Section 6.4.3.2). We compare ActivFORMS with
a reference approach where all motes communicate at maximum power and send
all message to all their parents. This over-provisioning approach is common in
practice to assure high packet delivery performance at the cost of the lifetime of
the network. We also compare ActivFORMS with a state of the art analysis ap-
proach that uses RQV. For RQV, we translated the automata models for the quality
properties to a Discrete Time Markov Chain model for packet loss and a Markov
Decision Process model for energy consumption. For the verification at runtime
we enabled the analyser model to use the PRISM model checker [126] with the
default settings. For the definition of the RQV models, we refer to the project
website.
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Figure 6.22: Results for a DeltaIoT setting with 15 motes and two adaptation goals
Results. Figure 6.22 shows the results for runs of 24 hours, where adaptation
is applied every cycle of 9.5 minutes. The reference approach is able to realise
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R1 with a better result for packet loss as ActivFORMS (median of 6.6% versus
8.6% for the ActivFORMS). However, ActivFOMRS significantly reduces energy
consumption with about 27% (12.5 Coulomb compared to 17.2 for the reference
approach). RQV on the other hand realises a better result as ActivFORMS on
packet loss (median of 7.9%) and energy consumption as ActivFORMS (average
12.4 Coulomb). Although RQV applies exhaustive verification, due to time con-
straints (max 8 minutes verification time), the approach was able to verify only a
fraction of the possible adaptation options and hence is not able to find the best
solution. The right hand side of Figure 6.22 shows the adaptation times that are
almost completely used for verification. On average, ActivFORMS used 23.7 sec-
onds to compute the verification results and realise adaptation. RQV on the other
hand, used the complete available time slot for verification, resulting in an average
adaptation time of 495 seconds, i.e. 8.3 minutes.2
Statistical analysis of the data shows that there is no significant difference for av-
erage packet loss between ActivFORMS and RQV (p = 0.9993 using the paired
t-test3). The average energy consumption with ActivFORMS is slightly higher
compared to RQV (p < 0.00005 using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test). However,
relatively this increase is very small (the mean value of average energy consump-
tion with ActivFORMS is 12.7 compared to 12.4 for RQV).
Conclusions. Self-adaptation with ActivFORMS guarantees, with sufficient ac-
curacy and confidence, the packet loss requirement and improves on energy con-
sumption with about 27% compared to the reference approach. The approach is
able to realise self-adaptation within a time that is only a small fraction of the cy-
cle time of 9.5 minutes. On the other hand, RQV realises slightly better results for
both requirements, but it requires significantly more time to do so.
6.5.3 Scalability of ActivFORMS Compared with RQV
To evaluate the scalability of ActivFORMS and compare it with RQV, we mea-
sured the adaptation time and the memory usage for network settings with increas-
ing complexity. Concretely we increased the number of motes of the IoT network
from 5 to 25 in steps of 5. In each step, the number of adaptation options increased
based on 6m5 withm the number of motes; e.g., a setting with 10 motes has 36 op-
tions, while a setting with 25 mote has has 7776 options. We applied adaptation
for packet loss (approximation interval with "= 0.01 and confidence ↵ = 0.10) and
energy consumption (RSEM of 0.5%). All the models used for the experiments
are available at the project website.
Results. Figure 6.23 shows the results for ActivFORMS on the left hand side
and RQV on the right hand side. The graphs show the results of 100 runs, each
based on a random selected adaptation option for each of the IoT network from 5
to 25 motes. The results show that ActivFORMS scales well for networks up to 20
motes, both for verification time and memory usage. If we extrapolate the verifi-
cation time for a setting with 20 motes (median 168ms) that has 1296 adaptation
2Analysis was interrupted when the verification of the last option that was started within 8 min
completed.
3We used the Anderson-Darling test to select appropriate statistical tests.
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Figure 6.23: Results of the scalability tests
options, the total verification time would be 3.63min, which is less than half of
the available 8 minutes. For the configuration with 25 motes with 7776 adaptation
options, the total verification time would be 26.44min. However, if we relax the
verification settings slightly (approximation interval with "= 0.5 and confidence
↵ =0.10, and RSEM of 1%), the verification time with ActivFORMS decreases to
6.48min and the solution scales well, although with a bit less accurate results.
ActivFORMS requires between 75 and 100MB memory for verification. RQV on
the other hand does not scale for more complex networks. An extrapolation of
the verification time for 15 motes (median 17.45 s) with 216 adaptation options,
would require around 62.82min, which is 8 times higher as the available time of
8min. In addition, RQV requires 500 to 1800MB memory for verification.
Conclusions. The test results show that ActivFORMS scales well for IoT net-
work settings with 25 motes and up to 10K adaptation options. With RQV com-
plete verification is limited to settings with 10 motes. Furthermore, RQV requires
up to 18 times more memory as ActivFORMS.
6.5.4 Dynamically Incorporating Latency Goal
In part four, we dynamically add a latency goal to the running system and evaluate
the impact of it on the quality properties and the adaptation time. We used the same
setup as in part two with 15 motes and approximation interval with "= 0.01 and
confidence ↵ = 0.10. The test started with the packet loss and energy consumption
goals only. After 24 hours, the latency goal was dynamically added for another
24 hours. The latency model and the approach to add the goal dynamically is
explained in Examples 14 and 15.
Results. Figure 6.23 shows the test results. As we can see, adding the latency
goal drastically reduces the latency (median 0.00% of the cycle time with quartiles
±0.00 compared to 30.80% and -12.1/+5.8 for the ActivFORMS setup without
latency goal. This improvement has only a small effect on packet loss (median de-
creased from 6.64% to 7.95%) and energy consumption (median increased from
12.66 to 12.80 Coulomb). The verification of the latency model increased the
adaptation time from with 23.72 sec to 45.78 sec.
We also performed statistical analysis on the data of the reference approach and
ActivFORMS. For average energy consumption, ActivFORMS is significantly bet-
ter compared to the reference approach (p < 0.00005 using the Wilcoxon signed-
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rank test). The average packet loss of ActivFORMS is slightly higher compared
to the reference approach (p < 0.00002 using the paired t-test). However, rel-
atively this increase is very small (the mean value of average packet loss with
ActivFORMS is 0.07 compared to 0.08 for the reference approach). For the av-
erage latency on the other hand, ActivFORMS clearly outperforms the reference
approach (p < 0.00005 using the paired t-test).
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Figure 6.24: Impact of dynamically adding a latency goal
Conclusions. ActivFORMS provides first-class support for dynamic updates of
the adaptation logic. The test results show that adding a latency goal drastically
reduces latency of packet delivery. There is a small decrease in packet loss and a
small increase in energy consumption. However, about three times more adaption
time is required for the verification of the newly added goal.
6.6 Related Work
A vast body of work exists on assurance techniques for self-adaptive systems, for
recent overviews see [49, 58, 135, 213]. Aligned with the research presented in
this paper, we focus on approaches that use formal techniques to provide assur-
ances. We have structured related work in three groups: approaches that provide
assurances at design time, runtime approaches, and hybrid approaches. For each
group, we discuss a selection of representative approaches, based on classic work
and more recent work. The section concludes with a summary that positions Ac-
tivFORMS in the current landscape of research.
Design time approaches. [112] use Petri Nets to model adaptive systems; the
models are automatically translated to executable programs. Properties specified
in linear temporal logic (LTL) allow verifying invariants and constraints about
the system and its goals, e.g., “if adaptation is triggered, eventually it will be
applied,” or “the adaptive program should tolerate 2-packet loss throughout its
execution.” Conformance between the models and programs is guaranteed using
model-based testing. [9] deals with partial knowledge by automatically producing
service-oriented systems in two phases. The first phase (elicit) applies a technique
called StrawBerry that takes service descriptions to derive behaviour automata of
the service interactions. The second phase (integrate) takes the automata to au-
tomatically synthesise a service choreography that satisfies the system goal. The
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approach relies on tools to guarantee functional correctness-by-construction. [147]
presents a general approach to specify correctness criteria for the dynamic update
of a system and a technique to automatically compute a controller that handles the
transition from the old to a new specification. The approach syntheses a controller
that guarantees progress towards the update and performs a safe update, i.e., by
guiding the system to a safe state in which the update can start, ensuring that the
update will eventually occur and satisfy the new specification. [43] proposes an
approach for evaluating the resilience of self-adaptive systems by applying robust-
ness testing techniques to the controller to uncover failures that can affect system
resilience. The approach, that is based on probabilistic model checking, quantifies
the probability of satisfaction of system properties when the target system is sub-
ject to controller failures. The responses to malformed input between controller
and target system are used to classify robustness.
The related approaches in the first group provide guarantees based on the prin-
ciple of correctness-by-construction. Consequently, the guarantees are based on
the knowledge available at design time. With ActivFORMS, correctness-by-
construction is applied at design time to provide guarantees for the functional
correctness of the feedback loop. These guarantees are complemented with guar-
antees for quality goals obtained during operation based on data of uncertainties
collected at runtime.
Runtime approaches. [37] uses a runtime probabilistic model of an adaptive sys-
tem and applies runtime quantitative verification (RQV) to identify and enforce
optimal system configurations under changing conditions. Performance and reli-
ability goals are expressed as probabilistic temporal logic formulae. The MAPE
components exploit different tools to assure the quality goals. Techniques, such
as cashing and lookahead, can be used to improve the efficiency of RQV. [69]
presents a quantitative approach for making adaptation decisions under uncer-
tainty, called POISED. POISED builds on possibility theory (that is grounded
in fuzzy mathematics) to assess both the positive and negative consequences of
uncertainty. At runtime, POISED makes adaptation decisions, i.e., runtime recon-
figurations of its customisable software components, that result in the best range
of potential behaviour, improving the system’s quality of service. [75] proposes
an approach that relies on the mathematical foundation of control theory. The
approach automatically learns a system model and synthesises a controller at run-
time, providing control-theoretic guarantees for stability, overshoot, setting time
and robustness of system operating under disturbances, and this for one goal (set-
point). A Kalman filter and a change point detection mechanism are used to up-
date the system model on the fly. [145] applies proactive adaptation under uncer-
tainty. The approach uses a probabilistic model of the adaptive system in which
the adaptation decision is left underspecified through nondeterminism. At runtime,
a probabilistic model checker resolves the nondeterministic choices so that the ac-
cumulated utility over a horizon is maximised. The adaptation decision is optimal
over the horizon and takes into account the inherent uncertainty of the environment
predictions needed for looking ahead.
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The related approaches in the second group focus on guarantees for quality goals
obtained at runtime. These guarantees are derived from additional knowledge ob-
tained during execution. While existing work primarily relies on exhaustive verifi-
cation, which is time and resources demanding, ActivFORMS relies on statistical
model checking to provides guarantees for quality goals at runtime, which is more
efficient, though at the cost of some reduction of accuracy. In addition, Activ-
FORMS also provides guarantees for the functional correctness of the feedback
loop.
Hybrid approaches. FLAGS [13] proposes a goal-driven approach for self-
adaptation that spans design and runtime. The approach supports modelling both
crisp goals specified in linear temporal logic and fuzzy goals specified in fuzzy
temporal language. These models can then used at runtime to monitor goal viola-
tions that trigger a modification of the goal model to enforce adaptation on the run-
ning system. Related approaches are RELAX [217] that offers a textual language
for specifying requirements with first-class support for uncertainty, and [175] that
distinguishes between “awareness requirements” that describe the situations that
require adaptation and “evolution requirements” that prescribe what to do in these
situations. [200] offers a domain-specific language to model feedback loops and
their interactions. At design time feedback loop models are specified by means of
operations, runtime models, and interactions. An additional layer diagram speci-
fies the interactions between the feedback loops and the managed system. At run-
time, EUREMA offers an interpreter that directly interprets the models to realise
adaptation. Additionally, the models can be dynamically adjusted, supporting evo-
lution. [73] offers a mathematical framework for efficient run-time decision mak-
ing in two steps. At design time a pre-computation is applied taking a model of the
system and desired goals to generate a partially evaluated set of symbolic expres-
sions that represent verification conditions to be satisfied to meet the requirements.
At runtime, the actual values are bound to the variables enabling the expressions
to be evaluated efficiently. The focus of the work is on quality requirements, such
as reliability or energy consumption. [30] applies obstacle analysis, i.e., a goal-
oriented form of risk analysis whereby obstacles to system goals are identified,
assessed, and resolved through countermeasures. During requirements engineer-
ing, obstacle/goal trees are specified together with predicates that determine the
satisfaction rates of probabilistic goals. At runtime, the system is monitored and
the satisfaction rate of high-level goals is determined. When goals are not satis-
fied, alternative countermeasures are selected and the goal model is updated. The
running system is then adapted according to the selected countermeasures.
The related approaches in the third group combine assurance techniques at de-
sign time and runtime to provide guarantees for the system goals. In addition to
specific differences, such as efficient decision making at runtime, ActivFORMS
integrates design time and runtime guarantees with first-class support for deal-
ing with changing adaption goals and updating feedback loop models. The most
closely related approach is EUREMA [200]. However, this appraoch has no for-
mal basis and consequently cannot provide the guarantees that ActivFORMS can
give.
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Position of ActivFORMS in state of the art landscape. Table 6.1 summarises
the selection of representative related work and compares it with ActivFORMS.
The use of formal techniques in self-adaptive systems has gained increasing atten-
tion in recent years [135, 185, 213]. We observe that quantitative approaches are
currently dominant. In contrast to existing work, ActivFORMS is able to provide
guarantees for both the functional correctness of the feedback loop and the quality
goals of the adaptive system. By using a statistical approach, ActivFORMS is able
to provide guarantees for quality goals in an efficient way. There is a tradeoff in
accuracy, but the approach allows to set this tradeoff as required. In addition, Ac-
tivFORMS provides first-class support for changing the adaptation goals and the
feedback loop on the fly.
6.7 Conclusions and Future Work
Guaranteeing compliance of the adaptation goals in self-adaptive systems is chal-
lenging since the uncertainties can appear at any time. To tackle this challenge,
we presented ActivFORMS (Active FORmal Models for Self-adaptation), a for-
mally founded model-driven approach for engineering self-adaptive systems. Ac-
tivFORMS contributes to the state of the art an approach that provides: 1) func-
tional correctness of the feedback loop by direct execution of formally verified
models of the feedback loop using a reusable virtual machine, 2) efficient guar-
antees for the adaption goals with a required level of confidence using statistical
model checking at runtime, and 3) support for changing adaptation goals on the fly
and updating of verified feedback loop models that meet the new goals. We eval-
uated ActivFORMS with a real world IoT application deployed at KU Leuven.
The test results demonstrate that ActivFORMS can provide the required guaran-
tees for the stakeholder goals for a realistic IoT setup with 15 motes that is subject
to different types of uncertainties. Scalability tests show that ActivFORMS scales
well to setups with up to 25 motes, which cannot be handled by a state of the art
exhaustive runtime quantitative verification approach.
In future work, we plan to study how ActivFORMS can be applied to adaptation
problems with more complex types of uncertainties, such as uncertainties related
to the structure of models. We also plan to study how ActivFORMS can be applied
in systems that require multiple feedback loops that need to work together to solve
an adaptation problem.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
In this last chapter, we summarise the contributions of our research, we report
lessons learned from our experience, and outline a number of interesting paths for
the future research.
7.1 Conclusion
Many modern software systems have to deal with uncertainties at runtime. The
uncertainties originate from inadequate knowledge about the system at design
time, changing conditions in the operation conditions of the system, variations
in user needs, etc. Without any control mechanism, such a software system may
behave in undesired ways. Self-adaptation enables a software system to deal au-
tonomously with such uncertainties. Despite a vast body of research in the area of
self-adaptation, providing guarantees that adaptation goals are achieved is still a
open challenge. This thesis contributes ActivFORMS, a formally founded model-
driven approach for engineering self-adaptive software systems. The contributions
of ActivFORMS to the state of the art are the following:
1. An innovative approach that guarantees functional correctness of the feed-
back loop using a reusable virtual machine that directly executes the formal
models of the feedback loop. To support software engineers, we provided a
set of templates that assist designers in designing feedback loops.
2. An efficient approach to provide guarantees for the adaptation goals of the
system that combines simulation and statistical model checking at runtime.
The approach enables to tradeoff the resources required to provide guarantees
with the level of accuracy that is provided for the guarantees.
3. A novel approach to support changing adaptation goals on the fly by updating
the verified loop models that meet the new goals. This approach relies on the
principles of quiescence for the executing models of the feedback loop.
We applied ActivFORMS to multiple applications from different domains, in-
cluding a real-world deployment of an IoT building security monitoring that was
developed and evaluated in collaboration with VersaSense, an IoT company lo-
cated in Belgium. The evaluations results show that ActivFORMS successfully
provides the guarantees required by the stakeholders.
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7.2 Lessons learned
We report some important lesson learned during this research.
7.2.1 Use of Formal Techniques
ActivFORMS relies on various formal techniques. Formal techniques are being
used in software engineering for decades and we observe a similar trend in the
area of self-adaptation [132, 213, 214]. One concern often associated to the use
of formal techniques is the need for additional knowledge that is required to use
them. Using ActivFORMS requires the formal specification of stochastic timed
automata and properties expressed in computation tree logic as well as queries
required for statistical model checking. Our experience show that these languages
allow to specify a wide variety of solutions in a relatively intuitive way. Besides
our research, we used ActivFORMS also in several Master courses. Feedback
from the students confirm the usability of the modelling formalisms. However,
further research is required to confirm this observation.
7.2.2 Expressiveness of Formal Languages
During our research, we gradually learned the power of the formal languages we
used, but also some limitations in expressiveness. In our research, we relied on
the UPPAAL tool suite that uses networks of timed automata as modelling formal-
ism. Uppaal provides graphical modelling features combined with C-like language
constructs. We used these languages constructs for modelling feedback loops of
many applications to evaluate research results. We also used them for assignments
in Master level courses. Although we have not found any particular restrictions in
modelling feedback loops, we experienced limitations of the modelling language.
Examples are limited support for rich types, restrictions in reusability (compared
for example to Object-Oriented concepts), lack of libraries, and restrictions asso-
ciated with the communication through signals. Note that these limitations are
related to the specific formal languages we used in our research.
7.2.3 Scalability
Formal methods are often criticised for their limited scalability. This limitation
relates to the required resources such as processing power, memory and time. The
state space grows exponentially with the states in the system, causing the well-
known state explosion problem [53]. In ActivFORMS, we minimized this effect
using two strategies. At design time, we applied a modular approach where we
used appropriate stub models of the managed system and the environment, allow-
ing efficient verification of the correctness of the MAPE components. At runtime,
we combined simulation with statistical model checking that are both known to be
less resources demanding, although at the cost of bounds on the accuracy of the
results.
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7.3 Limitations
We report limitations of ActivFORMS that pave paths towards future work.
7.3.1 Limitations of the Simulation-based Approaches
ActivFORMS inherits the limitations of the simulation-based approaches, since
runtime simulation and statistical model checking approaches are used to effi-
ciently guarantee adaptation goals. There are a number of inherent limitations
of the simulation-based approaches compared to the exhaustive verification [130].
One of the key limitations is related to the accuracy of the results. The simulation-
based approach can not efficiently provide highly accurate result since the sample
size will grows very large, which in turn have the reverse effect on the efficiency of
the approach. Simulation based approaches also require special solutions in case
of so called rare events.
7.3.2 Limitations of the Virtual Machine
The virtual machine is implemented in Java and is based on standard compiling
techniques to execute the feedback loop models. The virtual machine has the
following limitations:
1. The system is not suitable for adaptation of time critical systems. Activ-
FORMS allow to set logical time of a model to a physical time, which means
that a tick of the model time can be set equivalent to milliseconds, seconds,
minutes, or even hours. Internally, the virtual machine uses a Java timer that
is invoked for each time tick. If the unit of the time tick is very small we
might end up in a situation where the virtual machine could not manage to
finish all the required computations in a particular time tick.
2. In our current implementation, the virtual machine is realized using Java tech-
nology that limit our approach to be used to settings where a Java virtual
machine is available to run the ActivFORMS virtual machine.
3. As we discuss in the previous section, there are limits in the expressiveness
of the formal language that is being used in our research. Earlier in this thesis
(e.g., chapter 1), we also highlighted a number of restrictions regarding the
types of updates of feedback loop models that ActivFORMS supports.
7.4 Future Work
We conclude with presenting interesting paths for future work starting from our
research results. We start with challenges in the short term and then discuss long
term challenges.
7.4.1 Short Term Challenges
Short term challenges closely connect with presented work.
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7.4.1.1 Online Verification of Correctness Feedback Loop
So far, we achieved functional correctness of the feedback loop using offline ver-
ification of TCTL properties. Once the offline verification is completed, the vir-
tual machine directly executes the formal model of the feedback loop according
to the formal semantics of timed automata. However, our approach may have
limitations in case a full verification of the feedback loop is not feasible before
deployment. Examples are incomplete knowledge about the environment, con-
straints about available resources such as processing power and memory, etc. On
the other hand at runtime, the virtual machine has full access to the model of the
feedback loop. The virtual machine can exploit the available runtime informa-
tion of the system to detect behaviour violations. The virtual machine can verify
the formal model of the feedback loop along the path the system follows. Activ-
FORMS already support runtime verification of a subset of the timed computation
tree logic (TCTL) properties, like constraints, safety, and liveness properties. We
demonstrate how to use these properties in the section 6.4.3. Advanced support
for online verification to automatically recover the system in case of an anomaly
is an interesting path for future research.
7.4.1.2 Dynamic Calculation of RSEM
In chapter 5 and 6 we used the relative standard error of the mean (RSEM) to de-
termine the number of simulations required for a quality model to estimate quality
goals. Hence, the number of simulation required for a particular RSEM is based
on offline experiments. Concretely, in the offline experiment, we take an average
of the number of simulations required for different adaptation options to reach the
required RSEM. But in reality, the RSEM may change dynamically due to vari-
ations in the uncertainty values and available adaptation options. Developing an
automatic approach that dynamically determines and adapts the RSEM for simula-
tion queries with a particumal accuracy under changing conditions is an interesting
path for further research.
7.4.2 Long Term Challenges
We discuss two long term challenges.
7.4.2.1 Domain Specific Modelling Languages
One interesting topic for further research is investigating domain-specific mod-
elling languages (DSML) for self-adaptation. A DSML can provide a high level of
abstraction to specify feedback loops and adaptation goals, hiding low-level details
of formalism. Furthermore, a DSML can be improve the efficiency for engineers to
create self-adaptation solutions by using domain-specific abstractions. At runtime,
a DSML model can automatically be converted into low-level formalism, such as
timed automata, and directly executed using domain-specific interpreters. These
domain-specific interpreters can provide domain-specific features that are not easy
to be implemented otherwise. An example of the domain-specific interpreter is the
virtual machine used in ActivFORMS approach that supports execution and update
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of the formal model of the feedback loop(s). Some initial examples of approaches
that use DSML in self-adaptation are presented in [91, 200].
7.4.2.2 Multiple Feedback Loops
Another line of research that to explore in the long term is to support coordination
between multiple feedback loops that work together to solve an adaptation prob-
lem. Multiple feedback loops can be deployed locally handling different concerns,
or distributed over different nodes/components of the software system working
together. In this thesis, adaptation of software systems is restricted to only one
feedback loop that interacts with the managed system and its environment. Sup-
porting coordination between multiple feedback loops would open the possibility
to realise self-adaptation in a decentralized setting. An interesting inspiring ap-
proach recently presented is [6].
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Appendix A
A Model Interpreter for Timed Automata
Abstract
In the model-centric approach to model-driven development, the
models used are sufficiently detailed to be executed. Being able to ex-
ecute the model directly, without any intermediate model-to-code trans-
lation, has a number of advantages. The model is always up-to-date and
runtime updates of the model are possible. This paper presents a model
interpreter for timed automata, a formalism often used for modeling and
verification of real-time systems. The model interpreter supports real-
time system features like simultaneous execution, system wide signals,
a ticking clock, and time constraints. Many existing formal representa-
tions can be verified, and many existing DSMLs can be executed. It is
the combination of being both verifiable and executable that makes our
approach rather unique.
A.1 Introduction
Model-driven development (MDD) is a software development methodology fo-
cusing on creating and exploiting domain models [167]. A domain model is an
abstraction that describes selected aspects of a specific domain. An important part
of MDD is the use of domain-specific modeling languages (DSML) [77]. Devel-
opers use DSMLs to efficiently build application models using elements of the
domain and often express design intent declaratively rather than imperatively.
In a model-centric approach, models of the system are established in sufficient
detail that the model can be executed, or used to generate executable code [167].
To achieve this, the models defined in a DSML might include, for example, rep-
resentations of persistent and non-persistent data, business logic, and presentation
elements. Integration to legacy data and services might require that the interfaces
to those models are also modeled.
There are two common approaches to model execution. In the code-generation
approach a DSML specified model can be translated to a program in a language
like Java that can later be executed using the standard Java virtual machine. This
approach works fine when the DSML is (roughly) a more abstract, richer version
of an ordinary programming language. However, code-generation runs into trouble
when the model has more declarative features like simultaneous execution, system
wide signals, and time constraints, that is, model features that have no simple
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counterpart in the target language into which it should be translated. Furthermore,
model updates at runtime are basically impossible and any manual change in the
generated code will ruin the connection to the model.
An alternative to code-generation is model interpretation that relies on the ex-
istence of a virtual machine able to directly read and run the model. The major
advantage of this approach is that model updates at runtime are possible (see Sec-
tion 5) and, as we will see in Section 3 and 4, the domain specific interpreter
can provide support for model specific declarative features like the ones presented
above. Having the model available at runtime also simplifies runtime verification
of model dependent system goals (see Section 5).
The goal of this paper is to present a model interpreter for timed automata [4],
first presented in [109]. Timed automata are an often used formalism to model
real-time systems and it supports features like simultaneous execution, system
wide signals, and time constraints1. Timed automata has a graphical represen-
tation suitable for humans and a corresponding XML based DSML suitable for
machine processing. Formal properties (system goals) of models described by
timed automata can be verified by a tool called UPPAAL [16]. In addition to han-
dling real-time features, it is the use of a domain specific model being verifiable,
executable in a real world scenario, and allowing model updates at runtime that
makes our approach rather unique. See related work in Section A.6 for more de-
tails.
Timed automata will be presented in Section 2. The model interpretation is done
in two steps: 1) The DSML defining the model is translated into an internal task
graph based executable model (Section 3), and 2) A virtual machine, specifically
designed for timed automata, interprets the executable model (Section 4). Step
1) is not novel since standard techniques from compiler design are used. The
virtual machine on the other hand has novel features extending the functionality of
a standard stack machine to handle a wide set of timed automata specific features.
Additional features of our approach (e.g. support for runtime model updates and
runtime verification) are discussed in Section 5. In Section 6 we present related
work, and in Section 7 we present summary and conclusions.
A.2 Timed Automata
A timed automaton [4] is a finite automaton extended with a finite set of real-
valued clocks. During a run of a timed automaton, all clock values increase with
the same speed. The clock values can be compared to integers and these compar-
isons form guards that may enable or disable transitions and therefore constrain
the automaton’s behavior.
UPPAAL [19] is an integrated tool environment for modeling, validation and
verification of real-time systems modeled as networks of timed automata. UP-
PAAL comes with an XML based description language in which systems of timed
automata can be defined, which is our DSML. UPPAAL also includes a number
1 See the uppaal.orgwebsite for a list of industrial projects using timed automata and the UPPAAL
verification tool.
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(a) Lamp (b) Lamp Controller (c) User
Figure A.1: The simple lamp example.
of tools for visualizing the automata, simulation, and model verification. The aim
of this section is to provide a brief introduction to timed automata as defined by
the UPPAAL DSML. It can be considered as a brief (and informal) summary of
the official UPPAAL tutorial [16], inspired by [97], with a focus on modeling and
interpretation of timed automata. To simplify the presentation we use standard au-
tomata terminology (e.g. state, transition) rather than the standard timed automata
terminology (e.g. location, fire an edge).
A.2.1 Networks of Timed Automata
A timed automaton is a finite-state machine extended with clock variables. All
clocks progress synchronously. In UPPAAL, a system is modelled as a network of
several such timed automata in parallel. The model is further extended with ordi-
nary variables and the state of the system is defined by the state of all automata, the
clock values, and the values of the variables. An automata may make a state transi-
tion separately or due to synchronization with another automata through channels.
For example, for a channel x, a sender x! can synchronize with a receiver x?
through a signal.
Figure A.1 shows three automata modelling a simple system with a lamp, a lamp
controller, and a button to be pressed by a user. At start, when both the lamp and
the controller are in state Off, if the user presses a button a signal press! is sent and
the controller moves to state TurningOn due to synchronization press? followed
by LowLight (sending a signal low!), and the lamp is turned on (due to low?). If
the user presses the button again, the lamp is turned off. However, if the user is
fast and within 5 time units presses the button twice, the lamp is turned on and
becomes bright. The clock y of the lamp controller is used to detect if the user was
fast (y < 5) or slow (y >= 5). The lamp stays bright for a certain period of time
BRIGHT TIME and then returns to Low state again.
We divide the models into two categories: environment models and system mod-
els. Environment models are used for simulation and enables offline verification of
the system by providing input and getting output. For example, the user and lamp
models are environment models in our lamp example. The system models are the
models that contain the actual domain functionality/logic. In our lamp example,
the lamp controller model is the system model.
183
A A Model Interpreter for Timed Automata
The edges of the automata are annotated with three types of labels: a guard,
expressing a condition (e.g. y < 5) on the values of clocks and variables that
must be satisfied for the edge to be taken; a synchronization action (e.g. press!)
which, when the edge is taken, forces a synchronization with other components on
a complementary action, and an update (e.g. the function call reset() which resets
clock y to 0) defining actions to be taken when a transition is made. All three types
of labels are optional: absence of a guard is interpreted as the condition true, and
absence of a synchronization action indicates an internal (non-synchronizing) edge
(e.g. BrightLight! TurningLow in the controller).
Only one state per automaton, called control or active state, is active at a time.
States can also be annotated with invariants expressing constraints on the clock
values for control to remain in a particular state. For example, the system can only
remain in BrightLight as long as the value of y is less than BRIGHT TIME.
UPPAAL defines two types of transitions between states: action transition and
delayed transition. Action transitions can be further divided into synchronization
transition and internal transition. If two complementary labeled edges (e.g. press!
and press?) in two different automata are enabled then they can synchronize and a
simultaneous synchronization transition is activated. In a delayed transition only
the clock ticks and no actual state transition is made (e.g. Bright remains ac-
tive in the controller while y < BRIGHT TIME and as long as no-one is pushing
the button). Further progress in time might lead to an invariant violation (y  
BRIGHT TIME) and an internal transition (Bright! TurningLow).
Finally, to enable modeling of atomicity of transition sequences in a given au-
tomaton (i.e. multiple transitions with no time delay) states may be marked as
committed (indicated by a c in the circle). Commited states (e.g. TurningOn in the
controller) make it possible to receive a signal (press? in Off ! TurningOn) and
send a signal (low! in TurningOn! LowLight) without any time delay.
A.2.2 The Timed Automata Modeling Language
The timed automata DSML is a straight forward XML markup of the transition
graphs described previously. States (locations in UPPAAL) are nodes with a num-
ber of attributes (id, name, commited, invariant, etc.) and transitions are
edges connecting source and target states (identified by their ids) with attributes
(guard, synchronization, assignment) describing the transition condi-
tions.
Figure A.2 shows an excerpt of the DSML for our lamp example. It starts with
a section of global declarations <declaration> with variables and signals that
are accessible anywhere in the system. In our lamp example, the global declaration
section consists only of signal declarations, i.e., press, off, low, and bright.
The declaration section is followed by one or more template definitions describ-
ing a single automaton. Templates have a name (element <name>), a set of local
variables and clocks (<declaration>), a set of states (<location>), an ini-
tial state (element <init>), and a set of transitions (<transition>).
The final DSML section, the system declaration, lists the automata instances
planned to be used in the system. The system section is a description of how the
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Figure A.2: Excerpt of the XML based DSML for the Lamp example.
system is going to be initialized. In our lamp example, we have one instance of
each of the User, Lamp and LampController automata. In general however, a sys-
tem might contain multiple instances (e.g. multiple users) of a single automaton.
A.3 Executable Model Generation
Figure A.3: Overview of the executable model generation.
A network of timed automata as described in Section A.2 is a system model
with sufficient detail to be interpreted. The model interpretation can be divided
into two steps: 1) Executable Model Generation, and 2) Model Execution. Both
are handled in sequence each time a model is executed. In this section we present
the model generation and in Section A.4 we present the model execution.
An overview of the executable model generation is presented in Figure A.3.
The input is an XML based DSML describing the system (Model.xml), the final
result (State Transition Graphs, Task Graphs) is an internal repre-
sentation of the system that later will be executed by our virtual machine. The
executable model generation is divided into two steps: 1) A compiler frontend that
parses the input XML file and creates a single abstract syntax tree (AST) and a
symbol table. 2) An executable model generator that traverses the AST to gener-
ate the final executable model representation.
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Figure A.4: AST for transition Low to TurningBright.
Figure A.5: Task
graph for guard y < 5
The compiler frontend uses standard compiler techniques and will not be de-
scribed in detail. In short, UPPAAL DSML is defined as a context-free grammar
that can easily be used to generate a parser using the Antlr [152] parser generator
tool. The resulting AST is then traversed once more to construct a symbol table, a
mapping from scopes to variable declarations. A scope in the UPPAAL DSML can
be a global declaration, system declaration, template declaration, or a function.
Figure A.4 shows a subtree of the AST representing the transition Low to
TurningBright in LampController. Apart from source and target information of
the transition (Source, Target subtrees) it also includes three labels: Guard
(y < 5), Synchronization (press?), and Assignment (y = 0).
The executable model representation later to be executed by a virtual machine
consists of two parts: 1) State transition graphs, one for each automata, and 2)
a number of Task graphs. The state transition graphs are just an internal graph
representation of the system’s timed automata as described in Section A.2. There
exists one graph for each automaton. The states are nodes and the transitions are
edges. Both nodes and edges are annotated with references to task graphs. Each
transition label (guard, synchronization, update) is represented by a separate task
graph, and each node attribute (invariant) is also represented as a task graph.
A task graph defines the control flow of a task graph evaluation. It consists of a
collection of task nodes that are connected with next and previous attributes. Each
task node has a task type attribute defining the role of that node. Examples of
task types are: DECL declares a variable, LITERAL defines a integer literal, BI-
NARY OP for binary operations, STORE/LOAD store/load a variable value from/to
the heap, END signals the termination of a task graph evaluation, etc. Depending
upon task type a node can have additional attributes, e.g. the task node for binary
operators have left and right attributes pointing to left and right expression nodes.
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Fig. A.5 shows the task graph for the guard y < 5 of the Low to
TurningBright transition in Lamp Controller. The execution order is defined
by the next edges (non-essential previous edges are omitted for simplicity) and the
less-then operator is represented as a binary operation (tagged with LT) with two
node type specific edges (left and right) referencing the values to be used in the
operator. The previous edge in the END node points to the final result of the task
graph evaluation.
In addition to task graphs generated due to various state and transition attributes
we also generate task graphs for all declarations of global variables and signals
defined in the <declaration> part of the AST, and for all clock and variable
declarations local to a certain automaton. These additional task graphs are not
directly referenced by any transition graph, they will be used in the initialization
phase of the virtual machine before the execution starts.
Task and transition graphs are generated in a single AST traversal. Due to space
limitations the actually used algorithm will not be presented here.
A.4 Model Execution
The model interpretation starts with an initialization phase (Section A.4.1) where
global and template variables are declared and initialized, the real-time time unit
is set, and connections to environment models are established. Then the actual
execution can start (Section A.4.2).
The core of the model interpreter is the timed automata virtual machine
(TAVM). Apart from heap and stack management the TAVM has two parts that
together are responsible for the actual execution. The state transition machine
(STM) is responsible for the state transitions, and the task graph interpreter (TGI)
is (on requests from the STM) evaluating task graphs. Several of the design de-
cisions for the TAVM are inspired by UPPAAL Tron [103], a model based testing
tool from UPPAAL.
A.4.1 Virtual Machine Setup
A.4.1.1 Declarations:
The first step is to execute global and system declarations by the task graph inter-
preter in order to initialize all variable and clock declarations used by the system.
For example, it declares what channels are going to be used. The system decla-
rations provide a list of automata instances that are to be executed by the virtual
machine. Finally, for each instantiated automaton, all local declarations are exe-
cuted and a list of initial active states is created.
A.4.1.2 Model time unit:
In timed automata, a time tick is an abstract entity that can be assigned to any real
time unit, e.g. milliseconds, seconds, minutes, etc. In order to correctly behave
as real-time clocks, the TAVM must know the real time unit of a tick. It there-
fore provides a method setRealT imeUnit(milliseconds) to set the time unit in
milliseconds. How clocks progress is discussed in more detail at Section A.4.2.
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Figure A.6: Overview of the Lamp example interpretation.
A.4.1.3 Environment connection:
As mentioned in Section A.2.2, the entire model is divided into two categories:
Environment models representing external components that interact with the run-
ning system, and system models that are to be executed in the TAVM. The TAVM
connects with the environment through signals defined in the automata model.
Figure A.6 shows an overview of the Lamp example interpretation. The input
is an XML based system specification (LampControllerModel.xml) that is used to
generate an executable model which is then fed to the TAVM for execution. At
runtime, TAVM must be connected to a real lamp and a real button. To realize
this in our approach, we replace the models of the environment with an actual
environment represented by the Lamp and User components in Figure A.6, and
the TAVM executes only the Lamp Controller model. A component in this case is
a piece of software which handles the communication with external devices.
The TAVM assigns a unique identifier to each channel. This identifier can
be used to send and receive signals from the TAVM. TAVM has a public inter-
face (named VM) providing a method getChannelId(“channel”) that can be
used to get channel identifiers. To send a signal, the VM interface provides a
send(channelId) method that can be used to send a signal from the environment
to the virtual machine. Data can also be sent using the send method as a string
expression like “a = 2”. These expressions are converted to task graphs on-the-
fly and evaluated by the task graph interpreter when a signal is consumed. More
details about how signals are consumed are provided in the next section.
The TAVM provides an abstract class Synchronizer, that should be extended by
components interested in receiving signals from the TAVM. A component regis-
ters itself for a certain channel by, first, getting the channel identifier using the
getChannelId method, and then call the register method provided by the VM
interface. The register method take three parameters: 1) a channel identifier
identifying which type of signal we are interested in, 2) an instantiation of the
Synchronizer class, that will receive the signals, 3) and a array of variable names
specifying what variable values we are interested in. The Synchronizer class de-
fines one abstract method receive that has two parameters: 1) a channel identifier
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that can be used to determine which signal is received, 2) the data that comes with
the signal.
A.4.2 Virtual Machine Execution
The TAVM provides a start method which starts the actual execution once the
setup is completed. Once started, the virtual machine is idle until triggered ei-
ther by input from the environment, or by a time tick. The heart of the TAVM
is the State Transition Machine (STM). The STM keeps track of all active nodes
and decides what and when transitions are triggered. The STM is using another
component, the Task Graph Interpreter (TGI), whenever a task graphs needs to be
evaluated. In what follows we first present the STM and then the TGI.
A.4.2.1 The State Transition Machine.
The STMmaintains a set of all active nodesN and a set S, representing the current
state, containing N and the values of all the variables and clocks. From now
on “state” refers to the global state S and we refer to individual timed automata
states/locations as nodes. Upon start, the STM checks all instantiated models and
execute those that are in a committed state. To do that, the STM checks (one
by one) all the active nodes in N , if a node is in a committed state, then STM
randomly selects one outgoing transition from that node and tries to execute it. If
that transition cannot be taken (e.g. a guard evaluates to false), STM tries another
one. This process is repeated until all committed nodes are handled, and will also
be repeated after each taken transition ending up in a committed state. The STM
supports non-determinism by randomly selecting nodes and transitions if multiple
available.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code for executing one transition which does not
interact with the environment. That is, it can only handle signals sent and received
within the system model. The handling of signals involving external components
is discussed later on.
In what follows, S0 is a temporary state that can be rolled back to S, or S can
become S0, and if there is no guard on a transition (or invariant on a node), then the
evaluation of the guard (invariant) expression returns true. Evaluation calls (e.g.
evaluateGuard(transition, S)) are calls to the task graph interpreter requesting
a task graph guard (transition) to be evaluated in a given state (S).
Algorithm 1 starts by making sure that a transition can only be taken when
the guard of the transition is true (line 2). If guard is true, and the transition
involves synchronization (line 3), then it makes sure that the guard of the receiving
transition is also true (line 6). After these preliminary checks we have a potential
transition to a new state and we clone the current state (S0  S, line 10) to make
sure that we can roll back to S if future steps fails. Then we start to evaluate the
update task graphs (line 11, 13), and verify that all invariants still holds (line 15).
These steps might update S0 and still fail. If they succeed we decide to make the
transition and update the current state S  S0 (line 16) and update N by adding
and removing the old and new active node (also for the signal receiving transition),
lines 17-22.
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A1 Algorithm for executing a transition
Input N set of all active nodes
Input S current state including N and the value of all variables and clocks
Input transition to be taken and it’s source node
Return true if transition accepted, otherwise false
1. recvTransition NULL
2. if evaluateGuard(transition, S) == true then
3. if transition.synch ! = null and transition.synch.type == SEND
then
4. channelId = evaluateSynchronization(transition, S)
5. recvTransition = findReceivingTransition(channelId,N, S)
6. if evaluateGuard(recvTransition) ! = true then
7. return false
8. end if
9. end if
10. S0  S
11. evaluateUpdate(transition, S0)
12. if recvTransition! = null then
13. evaluateUpdate(recvTransition, S0)
14. end if
15. if checkAllInvariants(N,S0) == true then
16. S  S0
17. N.remove(node)
18. N.add(transition.targetNode)
19. if recvTransition ! = null then
20. N.remove(recvTransition.srcNode)
21. N.add(transition.targetNode)
22. end if
23. return true
24. else
25. discard(S0)
26. return false
27. end if
28. end if
29. return false
In order to communicate with the environment, we must modify our algorithm at
a few places. For sending a signal to the environment, and after getting channelId
of the sender, we must look at the list of registered synchronizers. If any synchro-
nizer is found registered for the same channel, we take the transition after execut-
ing update task graph and evaluating all the invariants. Then we call the receive
method of the associated instance of the Synchronizer class with the requested
data.
When a signal is received from the environment, the STM finds the receiving
transition through channelId, and execute the guard and update task graphs. It
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can happen that the system models in the STM and the environment models are
not synchronized, and there is no transition at the moment who could receive the
signal. STM then takes a flexible approach, and if the signal is not consumed,
that signal is moved to a queue. Then the queue of signals is checked repeatedly
whenever the clock ticks or a new signal arrives to consume the pending signals.
The STM maintains an internal timer, whose time period can be configured as
discussed in Section A.4.1. The STM keeps an internal data structure for all the
clocks in the model. When the timer ticks, the STM temporarily increases the
time of all the clock variables modelled in the automata, i.e, S0 and checks the
invariants of all enabled nodes. If all the invariants hold, the STM increases time
for all the clock variables permanently S  S0 and the timer goes to wait state.
If the invariants of any active nodes are violated by the temporary increment of
the timer, the STM reverts the time increment S and executes those nodes first,
whose invariants are violated, by evaluating their transitions as discussed in the
Algorithm 1. If a node can not take a transition, then the system ends in a timelock
(this points to a design flaw in the model). The STM will then stop execution and
throw a T imelockException.
If the selected time tick unit is very small we might end up in a situation where
the TAVM can not manage all the required computations (or transitions) before
the next tick. In addition to the general STM overhead this might occur when
waiting for an external signal or due to certain time consuming TGI computations
to check if a transition is possible or not. Our implementation handles this situation
by buffering the time ticks and then executes them as soon as possible. This is (of
course) problematic since it might cause a delay in the signals sent to the real world
components. Thus, for each application, the real time unit to be used should be
chosen carefully to make sure that the TAVM always manage to do all the required
work before the next tick.
A.4.2.2 The Task Graph Interpreter.
The task graph interpreter (TGI) evaluates task graphs on request from the STM.
On initialization of the model, the STM requires the TGI to evaluate the initial-
ization expressions for all the declared variables. Later on the TGI evaluates the
guard and other transition and state attributes to take transitions as described pre-
viously in Algorithm 1. The TGI keeps track of a heap which stores all the global,
system and template declarations, and a stack to store the state of local variables
and function parameters when a call occur. Algorithm 2 shows an excerpt of the
algorithm used by the TGI. With each evaluation request the STM also provides
the processId that is needed to know which variables belongs to which instanti-
ated model. For evaluating global and system declarations, the STM uses 0, and
 1 respectively as processId. TheCT (Current Task) always points to the current
task. Upon receiving a request for evaluation, the TGI checks the task type (line
3, 6, 10) and takes the appropriate action. Once a task is evaluated, CT moves to
the next task (line 20). This process is repeated until CT reaches the END task,
which stops the task graph evaluation and the result of the evaluation is returned.
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A2 Algorithm for task graph interpretation
Input taskGraph to be executed and the model instance identifier processId
Return Result of the task graph evaluation
1. CT  taskGraph.getF irst()
2. while CT /2 END do
3. if CT 2 LOAD then
4. varName CT.getV arName()
5. CT.value = heap.get(processId).get(varName)
6. else if CT 2 STORE then
7. varName CT.getV arName()
8. value CT.getPrev().getvalue()
9. heap.get(processId).get(varName).setV alue(value)
10. else if CT 2 BINARY OP then
11. op CT.getOp()
12. if op 2 LT then
13. CT.value = CT.getLeft().getV alue() <
CT.getRight().getV alue()
14. else
15. ... more operators here
16. end if
17. else
18. ... more tasks here
19. end if
20. CT  CT.getNext()
21. end while
22. return CT.getPrev().getvalue()
A.4.3 Validation
Apart from extensive in-house testing, our model interpreter has been evaluated
in various adaptive systems. The original idea was presented in [109] where the
adaptation logic of a robotic system is formally verified and executed by the model
interpreter. Later on the model interpreter was evaluated in several case studies,
including a smart house system, a security system, and two vehicular traffic sys-
tems [79]. Other applications where we applied the model interpreter are a digital
story telling application and an e-health system [170]. See the project website [1]
for more details about these case studies.
A.5 Additional Features and Future Work
Direct access to the model at runtime provides many additional advantages. Some
of these features are already implemented and tested (Section A.5.1) whereas oth-
ers can be considered as future work (Section A.5.2). See [109] for more details.
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A.5.1 Additional Features
System Model Updates. The model interpreter supports online updates of the
system models, which is crucial to deal with bugs, or adding new functionality to
the running system. Our approach follows the classical process of runtime updates
based on quiescence states [123]. The model interpreter provides a method
changeModel(model) which receives an updated model description (DSML).
After that, the interpreter waits until each automaton of the current model reaches
a quiescence state (i.e., no ongoing input or time triggered transactions) and
interrupts the execution. The state of the current model is then saved and any new
external inputs received while the update takes place are stored in a buffer. The
interpreter then generates a new executable model (Section A.3) and initialize
that model (Section A.4.1). Next, the interpreter restores the saved state of the
previous model to the updated model and initializes new variables if applicable.
Finally, the TAVM restarts the execution using the updated model.
Goal Verification. The model interpreter provides basic support for run-
time verification of system goals. The goal manager component in the interpreter
provides a function addGoal(goal, client) that register goals to be monitored. A
goal is a boolean expression involving clocks and variables (e.g. y  10). The
client is an implementation of the GoalClient interface registering to receive
updates of the goal status. When a goal is registered the interpreter converts it to a
task graph and start to notify the client every time a goal status is changed. Using
this approach an interested component can track state changes and check whether
the system goals hold or are violated. This feature was used in [109] to verify the
correctness when updating the feedback loop models to deal with a new set of
adaptation goals in a self-adaptive system.
Model Visualization. The model interpreter also comes with a graphical
user interface allowing a user to inspect the running model, its ongoing execution,
and to monitor variable values. This is useful for debugging the running system.
The model interpreter provides a probe for interested components to get updates
of the running model. The goal manager used in the goal verification uses the
probe to listen to the updates and notifies the graphical user interface which
display the current status of the model, see, e.g., Fig. 13-15 in [109].
A.5.2 Future Features
The goal manager currently used for both goal verification and model visualization
has certain limitations. For example, goal types are limited to only boolean expres-
sions. In the future we plan to provide an interface offering plug and play facilities
for arbitrary external components, and this new interface should give access to the
complete model of the system (including the environment models) and allow every
type of expression that can be represented as a task graph to be evaluated. This
new machine interface opens up the possibility for a wide range of components to
be attached to the virtual machine.
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Our primary candidate for such plugin component is online verification. UP-
PAAL is foremost an offline verification tool. Given a model and a set of TCTL
properties, the tool can prove that these properties are never invalidated. However,
due to the so-called state explosion problem, incomplete knowledge about envi-
ronment and memory constraints, offline verification may not be achieved. The
interpreter on the other hand has runtime access to the complete model and can
after each transition verify that the provided TCTL properties, converted to task
graphs, are still valid. It is not a formal verification, it is however a pragmatic
approach to verify that the running system behaves correctly. We are currently
implementing an online verification component providing support for a subset of
the timed computation tree logic (TCTL) properties, like constraints, safety and
liveness properties.
Another possible approach to model checking problem is to delegate that work
to other model checking tools. For example, using the plugin mechanism the
model interpreter should be able to incorporate other trusted external modules
(e.g., runtime model checking engines to support continuous verification at run-
time).
A.6 Related Work
Ever since D.C. Schmidt’s seminal paper on Model-Driven Software Engineering
in 2006 [167] the interest for various aspects of model-driven design has flour-
ished. In our approach we take the model-centric approach one step further and
consider the model not only as a vehicle for code-generation, but also as a design
specification suitable for verification. The number of existing models (DSMLs)
that can be verified, executed in a real world environment, and that allows runtime
model updates are rather few.
The Foundational Subset of Executable UML (fUML) defines the semantics for
a subset of UML that can be executed by the fUML execution engine [143]. The
fUML execution engine executes an in-memory representation of fUML models.
Progress in the verification of these models has recently been achieved [128] but,
to the best of our knowledge, no progress has been made yet for runtime model
updates.
Ghezzi et al. [91] introduce adaptive model-driven execution to mitigate non-
functional uncertainties. Using UML interaction diagrams a Markov decision
model of the system is generated. The model is augmented with probability distri-
bution of different execution paths of the system. The model is then executed by
an ad-hoc interpreter that drives the execution of the system according to specified
probabilities to guarantee the highest utility for a set of quality properties. In their
model each state is associated with an implementation of an abstract functionality
of the system, and the interpreter invokes the implementations while state-by-state
traversing the automaton, whereas we model and execute the actual implementa-
tion of the system. Markov decision models are well-known to allow probabilistic
model checking and verification tools are available [126].
194
A.7 Summary and Conclusions
Anlauf et al. [5] presents an interpretable language XASM (Extensible Abstract
State Machine). XASM uses a notion of external functions as defined in ASMs
to realize a component-based modularization. The support environment of XASM
consists of the XASM-compiler translating XASM programs to C source code, the
runtime system, and the graphical debugging and animation tool. This approach
lacks support for runtime update of the model, and although computer-aided ver-
ification of ASM models is possible in theory, it is well-known to be difficult in
practice [176].
A.7 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a model interpreter for timed automata, a formalism
often used for modeling and verification of real-time systems. In addition to han-
dling real-time features, it is the use of a domain specific model being verifiable,
executable in a real world scenario, and allowing model updates at runtime that
makes our approach rather unique. Given a model of the system the interpreter
converts it into an executable model that can be interpreted by a timed automata
virtual machine. Contrary to traditional approaches, where models are converted
to code, using a model interpreter provides a number of additional advantages:
1) models are executed directly without converting them to a source code; hence
no model-based testing is required, 2) models can be replaced at runtime without
stopping the system, e.g., to add new functionality, 3) models can be used to ver-
ify system properties at runtime, 4) and it is also possible to visualize the running
models. Our virtual machine can handle real-time system features like simulta-
neous execution, system wide signals, a ticking clock, and time constraints, not
usually handled by ordinary stack based virtual machines. We included a future
work section pointing out the possibility to use a model of the entire system to
perform online verification.
A byte code version of the model interpreter can be downloaded from the project
website [1].
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Appendix B
DeltaIoT: A Self-Adaptive Internet of
Things Exemplar
Abstract
Internet of Things (IoT) consists of networked tiny embedded com-
puters (motes) that are capable of monitoring and controlling the phys-
ical world. Examples range from building security monitoring to smart
factories. A central problem of IoT is minimising the energy consump-
tion of the motes, while guaranteeing high packet delivery performance,
regardless of uncertainties such as sudden changes in traffic load and
communication interference. Traditionally, to deal with uncertainties
the network settings are either hand-tuned or over-provisioned, result-
ing in continuous network maintenance or inefficiencies. Enhancing the
IoT network with self-adaptation can automate these tasks. This paper
presents DeltaIoT, an exemplar that enables researchers to evaluate and
compare new methods, techniques and tools for self-adaptation in IoT.
DeltaIoT is the first exemplar for research on self-adaptation that pro-
vides both a simulator for offline experimentation and a physical setup
that can be accessed remotely for real-world experimentation.
B.1 Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) are composed of tiny embedded computers (motes)
equipped with low-power wireless networking, sensors and actuators. These motes
form networks that are capable of monitoring and controlling the physical world
and thereby connecting digital processes to our physical environment. IoT are
expected to have a broad impact across diverse domains such as manufacturing
[218], farming [119] and monitoring of remote medical facilities [159]. Due to
size and cost concerns, IoT motes typically offer limited computation, storage and
energy resources. This demands careful design of the IoT network. Realising ef-
ficient IoT systems is particularly important as wireless communication consumes
the majority of energy for a typical IoT device [2].
IoT network technologies are growing in both maturity and capability [156].
The state-of-the-art offers both short-range multi-hop networks with very high reli-
ability [66] and single-hop networks that offer a range of several kilometers [159].
Through careful configuration of the network settings both approaches can achieve
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multi-year battery lifetimes and high levels of reliability. However, finding the
right network settings is hard as IoT applications are subject to a variety of uncer-
tainties, such as sudden changes in traffic load and communication interference.
Traditionally, the network settings are either hand-tuned or over-provisioned to
deal with uncertainties, resulting in continuous network maintenance or inefficien-
cies.
Self-adaptation [48, 134, 203] provides the means to automate these tasks. To
that end, a feedback loop can be deployed on top of the network to monitor and
assess the motes and the environment to autonomously adapt the IoT system. Ex-
amples of research that apply dynamic adaptation of IoT networks are [18, 45,
136, 169, 190, 202]. Exemplars enabling researchers to evaluate and compare new
self-adaptation solutions have been proposed for different domains, e.g. for client-
server systems [50], cloud environments [14], service-based systems [204], and
cyber-physical systems [120]. However, there is no exemplar available to support
researchers in IoT.
This paper presents an IoT exemplar to support research on self-adaptation in
IoT. The exemplar applies multi-hop communication in IoT, where each IoT mote
must have a path towards the gateway along other motes. Our motes use LoRa
radio technology supporting long range communication.1 The focus is on dy-
namically adapting the settings of the IoT network under various types of uncer-
tainties. The examples in this paper apply architecture-based adaptation, realised
by means of a Monitor-Analyse-Plan-Execute-Knowledge feedback loop (MAPE-
K) [65, 116, 211]. However, the exemplar does not prescribe a particular type of
self-adaptation realisation.
The DeltaIoT exemplar comprises a simulator for offline experimentation and a
physical setup of 25 motes that can be accessed remotely for experimentation in the
field. The IoT system is deployed at the Campus of the Computer Science Depart-
ment of KU Leuven. DeltaIoT is the first exemplar for research on self-adaptation
that provides both a simulator and a physical setup for experimentation. Detailed
information of the DeltaIoT exemplar is available via the exemplar website.2
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section B.2, we intro-
duce the DeltaIoT exemplar and provide scenarios for comparing self-adaptation
solutions. Section B.3 explains the architecture of both the physical IoT net-
work and the simulator. We also present the unified interface that supports self-
adaptation of the IoT system. In Section B.4, we explain how to set up an exper-
iment with DeltaIoT and illustrate how adaptation can be realised using a simple
example. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section B.5.
B.2 DeltaIoT Exemplar and Adaptation Scenarios
The DeltaIoT exemplar is part of the smart campus initiative by DistriNet, KU
Leuven Belgium. DeltaIoT consists of a multihop network based on LORA com-
1 https://www.lora-alliance.org/What-Is-LoRa/Technology
2 https://people.cs.kuleuven.be/danny.weyns/software/DeltaIoT/
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Figure B.1: DeltaIoT network topology
munication comprising 25 motes that are distributed in various buildings of the
Department of Computer Science at KU Leuven. Figure B.1 shows a subset of 15
of the IoT motes deployed in various buildings at the campus.
In each building, motes are strategically placed to provide access control to labs
(via RFID sensor), to monitor the occupancy status (via passive infrared sensor)
and to sense the temperature (via temperature sensor). The sensor data from all the
buildings are relayed to the IoT gateway, which is deployed at a central monitoring
facility. Campus security personnel monitor the status of various buildings and
labs from the monitoring facility, and take appropriate action whenever the unusual
behaviour is detected in the buildings.
As shown in Figure B.1, each IoT mote in the network relays its sensor data to
the gateway. Some of the IoT motes are not within the direct reach of the central
gateway and have to relay their sensor data via intermediate motes. This method of
communication is called multi-hop communication. In multi-hop communication,
each IoT mote must have a path towards the gateway. To that end, each IoT mote
in the network interacts with other motes to form paths towards the gateway. This
process requires the configuration of each IoT mote. Radio communication typi-
cally dominates the energy consumption of IoT motes. However, IoT applications
are expected to last longer on a single battery, while offering reliable communica-
tion. It is therefore important to reduce the energy consumption of the IoT motes,
while guaranteeing high packet delivery performance.
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For reliable and efficient communication, the IoT motes should be optimally
configured. However, the packet delivery performance and energy consumption of
IoT motes are influenced by a number of uncertainties leading to different adap-
tation scenarios for DeltaIoT, which are presented in Table B.1. These generic
scenarios are organised by type of uncertainty that makes self-adaptation neces-
sary, type(s) of adaptation required, and type(s) of goals that these adaptations aim
to meet. Within these scenarios, we propose the evaluation and comparison of
different self-adaptation solutions based on quality attributes and metrics that are
summarised in Table B.2.
Scenario 1 considers interference of the wireless network. The aim is to reduce
packet loss and minimise energy consumption by adapting the transmission power
of motes (higher power will results in less errors but increase energy consumption)
and/or adapt the proportion of traffic send by the motes to their respective parents
(select links with lower levels of messages lost, taking into account the energy
consumed). Scenario 2 considers fluctuations in the traffic generated by motes
(or their children) in addition to interference of the network. The goals and the
types of adaptation are the same as for scenario 1. Scenario 3 considers the same
types of uncertainties as scenario 2, however the adaptation goals are to minimise
both packet loss and energy consumption. This scenario offers the modification of
the spreading factor as an additional type of adaptation. The spreading factor is
a measure for the number of bits encoded per symbol of a transmitted packet. A
higher spreading factor results in longer communication range and more redundant
data but at the cost of a reduced payload of the message and an increase of the
time on air requiring more energy [159]. Scenario 4 considers motes that are lost
(temporary or permanently). To minimise the packet loss, the paths to the gateway
can be adapted. Scenario 5 considers the challenging problem of mobile motes in
an IoT setting. To minimise packet loss and maintain connectivity, the motes can
dynamically add and remove links. Finally, scenario 6 considers a decentralised
setting where multiple gateways manage traffic in subnets of the overall network.
The particular focus of the scenario is on deciding the traffic routed to the different
gateways (for example by the motes at the borders of the subnets). To minimise
packet loss and energy consumption, and balance the energy consumption in the
subnets, the gateways have to agree on the traffic routed to each of the gateways.
To evaluate and compare solutions the following parameters can be measured:
the number of packets sent and received (for reducing packet loss), the energy
consumption of individual motes and the whole network (for minimising energy
consumption; in Coulomb), the smallest number of lost packages (for minimis-
ing packet loss), the links added and removed (for maintaining connectivity while
minimising packet loss), and the energy consumption in subnets managed by the
different gateways (for balancing energy consumption).
B.3 Architecture of DeltaIoT
We explain now the architecture of DeltaIoT and the interface that supports prob-
ing and effecting the IoT system. We also explain how adaptation can be realised.
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Table B.2: Quality attributes and metrics for the evaluation and comparison of self-adapta-
tion solutions to DeltaIoT.
Quality attribute Metric
Reduce packet loss Bounded number of packets lost
in the network
Minimise energy con-
sumption
Energy consumption of the en-
tire network
Minimise packet loss Smallest possible number of
packet lost
Maintain connectivity New links added and old links
removed
Balance energy con-
sumption
Energy consumption in subnets
managed by gateways
Finally, we give an overview of the architecture of the DeltaIoT simulator that
provides a compatible interface to realise self-adaptation.
B.3.1 Architecture of DeltaIoT Deployed at KU Leuven
Figure B.2 shows the architecture of the DeltaIoT system that consists of four tiers:
network tier, gateway tier, management tier, and managing system tier. We briefly
explain the role of each tier, from bottom to top.
B.3.1.1 IoT Network Tier
The IoT network tier consists of the IoT motes connected via a wireless commu-
nication network. Figure B.1 shows an example topology of the network.
B.3.1.2 Gateway Tier
The gateway tier is the root for the IoT network. All the IoT motes in the network
transmit their data to the gateway, which is then consumed by the users based on
their application requirements. Thus, all the IoT motes must have a route towards
the gateway.
B.3.1.3 Management Tier
The IoT motes and the gateway can be monitored and managed via the manage-
ment tier. The management tier consists of three key building blocks:
Webservice Engine: connects DeltaIoT to the external world via Internet
through a web service. This service enables an external entity to query the sta-
tus of the network and modify the network settings. We explain the format of
interactions with the Webservice engine below.
Statistics Engine: is responsible for collecting and storing network statistics.
All the network related information is maintained in a database. This building
block provides information about the packet delivery performance and the energy
consumption of all the IoT motes in the network.
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Management Tier
(Webservice Engine, Statistics Engine, 
Network Settings Engine)
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IoT Network Tier
(Motes connected via Wireless Network)
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Figure B.2: Architecture of DeltaIoT Deployed at KU Leuven
Network Settings Engine: interacts with the IoT network via the gateway to
collect data and adapt the network settings of the IoT motes. We explain the format
of interactions with the IoT network below.
B.3.1.4 Managing System Tier
The managing system tier contains the entity that is responsible for managing the
IoT network via the management tier. In a traditional setting, network manage-
ment is done manually by a system administrator. In a self-adaptive setting, the
management tier consists of a feedback loop that automatically deals with adap-
tation of the network settings based on a set of adaptation goals. The exemplar
offers a Java client to access the web service provided by the Webservice engine.
B.3.2 Interface to Realise Self-Adaptation
The Webservice Engine provides an interface for probing and effecting the IoT
system. This interface is defined in a WSDL file.1 Access to the web service
is regulated, as only one entity is allowed to perform self-adaptation at a time.
The exemplar website provides details how users can register and access the web
service. We first give an overview of the web service interface. Then we explain
how adaptation of the IoT network can be realised.
As explained above, the exemplar offers a client that comprises a Java package
with Probe and Effector classes. The client hides the details of the interaction with
the web service. Listing B.1 lists the methods of the probe that can be used to
monitor the IoT network.
Listing B.1: DeltaIoT probing methods.
ArrayList<Mote> getAllMotes();
1 This file provides a description of the operations and messages of the web service in the Web
Services Description Language.
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double getMoteTrafficLoad(MoteId);
double getMoteEnergyLevel(MoteId);
int getLinkPowerSetting(Source, Destination);
int getLinkSpreadingFactor(Source, Destination);
double getLinkSignalNoise(Source, Destination);
int getLinkDistributionFactor(Source, Destination);
ArrayList<QoS> getNetworkQoS(Period);
The method getAllMotes returns an array with a representation of all the motes
of the network. The methods getMoteTrafficLoad and getMoteEnergyLevel
return the traffic generated by a mote and the energy consumed for that traffic re-
spectively. The method getLinkPowerSetting returns the setting of the trans-
mission power that a source mote uses to communicate with a parent (destination
mote). A higher power setting results in lower packet loss but at the cost of more
energy consumption. Similarly, the method getLinkSpreadingFactor returns
the value of the spreading factor for a link. Recall that a higher spreading fac-
tor results in longer range but at the cost of a reduced payload and more energy
consumption. The method getLinkSignalNoise returns the signal to noise ratio
(SNR) for a link between a source and destination mote. SNR represents the ratio
between the level of the desired signal and the level of the noise, which comes
from the environment in which the IoT system operates. SNR provides informa-
tion about the quality of the link by estimating the ratio between the interfering
RF signal and the data RF signal. The lower the SNR, the higher the interference,
resulting in higher packet loss. Finally, the method getLinkDistributionFactor
returns the percentages of the messages sent by a source mote over a link to one
of its parents. The total sum of the distribution factors for one mote is normally
100.2 The last method, getNetworkQoS returns statistical data about the quality
of service (QoS) of the overall network for a given period. Currently this method
returns data about packet loss and energy consumption of the network.
Listing B.2 lists the methods that can be used to adapt the IoT network, i.e.,
adapt the network settings of the motes.
Listing B.2: DeltaIoT effecting methods.
void setMoteSettings(MoteID, List<LinkSetting>);
void resetDefaultConfiguration();
The method setMoteSettings allows to set the parameters for the parent links
of a mote with a given ID. A LinkSetting contains the source and destination
node of the link, the transmission power and spreading factor to be used to com-
municate via the link, and the distribution factor for the link. Finally, the method
resetDefaultConfiguration resets the network settings to the original values.
This method can be used to bring the system to a well-known state, e.g. as failsafe
state.
B.3.3 Adaptation of the DeltaIoT Network
Adaptation of the IoT network is based on the adapting the network settings of
the motes that participate in the IoT network. We explain adaptation with the
2 If packets are duplicated and sent to more than one parent, the sum of the distribution factors will
be above 100.
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Figure B.3: Excerpt topology with a network setting and result
excerpt subnet shown in Figure B.3. Each link between a pair of motes connects a
source node with a destination node. The radio transmission by the source node is
received by a destination node. In this context, we assume that a communication is
unicast, where each transmission from a source node reaches a single destination
node.3 Furthermore, the communication between the source and destination is
successful only if the transmitted packet from the source reaches the destination
node. Unsuccessful transmission implies a packet loss.
A mote mi produces traffic Ti. Each mote sends both the traffic it produces
and the traffic it receives from its children to one of its parents. The gateway
collects all traffic for the user. The network setting for a mote s to communi-
cate a packet over a link to a parent d (i.e. the destination) is defined as a tuple:
(P(s,d), SF(s,d), n(s,d)), where P(s,d) is the transmission power used for the com-
munication over the link, SFs,d is the setting for the spreading factor used for
the communication,and n(s,d) is the distribution factor, i.e., the percentage of the
traffic that is sent by mote s to parent d. As explained above, the sum of the
distribution factors for one mote is normally 100.
For each link in the network, we offer external entities the possibility of chang-
ing the settings for P(s,d), SF(s,d) and n(s,d). The power setting P(s,d) can be
set between -3 and 18 to get a required SNR for the communication to a parent.
The spreading factor SF(s,d) can be set to a value in a range from 7 and 12. The
spreading factor can be selected per link or it can be fixed for the mote or the net-
work as a whole. Figure B.4 shows the relationship between the power settings
and the SNR for one of the links in the network with a spreading factor set to 11.
The data of this example is based on experimental data from observations in the
field. The distribution factor n(s,d) can be set from 0 to 100 in steps of 10. From
Figure B.3, we can see that some motes in the network may have more than one
parent link. In such cases, the packets from a source mote can reach the gateway
via multiple links. It is therefore important to select links for each mote so that the
packets from the source mote reaches the gateway successfully. This link selection
process involves analysing the characteristics of each link. Some links may have
high packet loss compared to other links. The packet delivery performance of a
3 This assumption is based on time-synchronised scheduling of message communication [66].
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Figure B.4: Transmission power to SNR relation (for Link between Mote11 and Mote1
with a spreading factor of 11)
link depends on the characteristics of the operational environment and the wireless
interference [223].
The power settings of the motes along with the spreading factors and the se-
lection of paths determine the energy consumption and the packet loss of the IoT
network. To determine the network performance, the management tier collects
data about the packet loss pl(s,d) and the energy consumption ec(s,d) for a given
network settings (P(s,d), SF(s,d), n(s,d)) and store the data in the database.
For reliable data exchange between source and destination motes, the source
motes should transmit packets through the links with low packet loss. In order to
choose an optimal route for each mote, the management tier collects the SNR along
with the packet loss for each link. An adaptation approach should choose links
with a higher SNR to minimise packet loss. However, this may increase the load
at some motes in the network resulting in high energy consumption. Therefore,
the link selection process should also do a fair packet distribution across the links
in the network. Unfair allocation may quickly drain the batteries of some motes,
which reduces the lifetime of the entire network.
B.3.4 Architecture of DeltaIoT Simulator
The DeltaIoT exemplar also offers a simulator for experimentation. The simulator
enables to test and compare new adaptation solutions fast. In the simulator, the
activities of the network during a specified period of wall clock time can be simu-
lated in one run; the default period is 15 minutes. The interface to apply adaptation
with the simulator and the physical IoT system are fully compatibel. This allows
researchers first to experiment and test a self-adaptation solution in simulation, be-
fore testing it on the physical network. Figure B.5 shows the architecture of the
DeltaIoT simulator.
Node, Gateway, Mote, Link, and Packet are the basic elements of the IoT
network. These elements correspond to the IoT Network Tier and the Gateway Tier
in Figure B.2. NetworkManagement provides the functionality for collecting
and processing network data and changing the network settings. This element
corresponds to the Management Tier in Figure B.2. The SimulationClient offers
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Figure B.5: Architecture of DeltaIoT Simulator
a probe and effector to apply self-adaptation to the IoT network. The probe and
effector methods are identical to those in Listings B.1 and B.2.
We use the concept of a Profile to specify uncertainties in the simulated sys-
tem. A profile is defined by a file that contains a series of values that represent a
property of the system or its environment over time. LinkInterference defines
the levels of interference on a link over time, while MoteTraffic defines the
traffic generated by a mote over time. Figure B.6 shows some example profiles
of uncertainties provided by the exemplar. We collected the data for these graphs
from field observations over a period of one week. The graphs at the top show
fluctuations of the traffic of two motes for 24 hours; the graphs at the bottom show
changes of the signal to noise ratio.
Finally, Simulator enables a user to perform a simulation of a network con-
figuration. The user can define a network configuration, i.e. topology of the IoT
network with predefined network settings. The exemplar provides two predefined
configurations: (i) a default network configuration with 15 motes as shown in
Figure B.1, and (ii) a reference configuration where each mote in the network
communicates at maximum power, and sends/forwards all its messages to all its
parents. This over-provisioning approach is common in practice to assure high
packet delivery performance at the cost of the lifetime of the network. A user can
then define a simulation run by means of simulationScript. This script defines
the sequence of activities of a simulation run. The exemplar provides a default
script that defines a series of activities in 96 periods, each period corresponding to
15 minutes of network activity followed by an adaptation cycle.
B.4 Experimentation with DeltaIoT
Evaluating adaptive solutions is a four-step process, which we illustrate below
using a simple example.
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Figure B.6: Profiles of uncertainties for two motes in Figure B.1 (mote 10 left, mote 13
right)
Step 1: Download the exemplar software and supporting material at the exem-
plar website. Register to get the credentials to get remote access to the DeltaIoT
network. Define the self-adaptation problem.
Step 2: Design a self-adaptation solution; i.e. model and implement a MAPE-K
feedback loop that is connected with the probe and effector.
Step 3: Test the solution using the DeltaIoT simulator. Users can download
existing solutions from the website to compare the newly developed solution.
Step 4: Apply and evaluate the solution with the physical network setup. To
that end, the user has to use the credentials she/he received after registration.
Example. For step 1, we consider the adaption problem of scenario two in Ta-
ble B.1: reduce packet loss and minimise energy consumption when dealing with
communication interference and fluctuating traffic. We use the network topology
shown in Figure B.1 and the default settings of the IoT network and fixed the
spreading factor to 11.
In step 2, we design a self-adaptation solution consisting of a MAPE-K feed-
back loop. We briefly explain the functions of each of the MAPE elements; the
Appendix added to this paper gives the pseudo code of the MAPE-K loop imple-
mentation. The Monitor periodically checks the status of the motes via the probe
and updates the Knowledge accordingly. It then invokes the Analyser. The An-
alyzer checks for each link in the network the signal to noise ration, the power
setting, and the distribution factor. If any of the settings are not optimal, the Anal-
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Figure B.7: Simulation results of the simple self-adaptation solution
yser invokes the Planner. The Planner generates a plan that gradually improves the
network settings of the motes that are not optimal and invokes the Executor. The
Executor completes the cycle by invoking the effector to apply the adaptations to
the IoT network.
In step 3, we test the self-adaptation solution using the DeltaIoT simulator and
compare the adaption approach with a reference approach (for the latter, each mote
communicates at maximum power, and sends/forwards all its packets to all its
parents). Figure B.7 shows test results for a run that corresponds with a period of
one day (96 periods of 15 minutes, with self-adaptation applied after each period).
The results show that the self-adaptation approach significantly reduces energy
consumption compared to the reference approach. The cost however, is an increase
in the packet delivery performance.
In step 4, we test the self-adaptation solution using the physical DeltaIoT setup.
We compare the simple self-adaption solution with the reference approach for a
run of half a day (48 periods of 15 minutes, with self-adaptation applied after
each period). The test results in Figure B.8 show that the simple self-adaptation
approach reduces the energy consumption (mean value of 22 compared to 33 for
the reference approach) at the cost of an increase of the packet loss (mean value of
0.17 compared to 0.05 for the reference approach).
The exemplar website provides additional evaluation results obtained with Ac-
tivFORMS. In ActivFORMS, self-adaptation is realised by formally specified and
verified MAPE-K models that are directly executed at runtime to adapt the IoT
network (using a dedicated virtual machine) [109]. ActivFORMS exploits sta-
tistical model checking at runtime to select configurations that comply with the
self-adaptation goals [209].
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Figure B.8: Test results of the physical IoT system
B.5 Conclusions
With a growing number of IoT projects, such as smart homes, industrial fa-
cility tracking and control, and sea pollution monitoring, these system are being
deployed in highly uncertain and rapidly changing environments. These uncer-
tainties are often not completely known at deployment time, making IoT an im-
portant emerging domain for research on self-adaptation. In this paper, we pre-
sented the DeltaIoT exemplar that promotes research through enabling the compar-
ison of different self-adaptation solutions in the domain of IoT. DeltaIoT supports
researchers by reducing the time required to build, evaluate, and compare self-
adaptation solutions. DeltaIoT is the first exemplar for research in self-adaptation
that combines a simulator with a real world setup for experimentation. We hope
that the research community will use the DeltaIoT exemplar to evaluate and com-
pare novel solutions in adaptive and self-managing IoT systems, and drive their
further development. The exemplar is available via the project website and the
DARTS exemplar website: http://dx.doi.org/10.4230/DARTS.3.1.
4.
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Listing B.3: DeltaIoT effecting methods.
module Monitor
K.motes = probe.getAllmotes()
invoke Analyzer()
module Analyzer
foreach(mote in K.motes) {
foreach(link in mote.links) {
// Check whether SNR > 0 and Power == 0
// OR SNR < 0 && Power == 15
if (!isPowerOptimal(link))
adaptationRequired = true;
}
if (mote.links > 1) {
// check power settings of links
if (!allLinkUseSamePower(mote))
adaptationRequired = true;
}
}
if (adaptationRequired) invoke Planner
module Planner
foreach(mote in K.motes) {
foreach(link in mote.Link) {
if (!isPowerOptimal(link)) {
if (link.SNR < 0)
addStep(link, CHANGE_POWER, link.power+1)
if (link.SNR > 0)
addStep(link, CHANGE_POWER, link.power-1)
}
}
if (mote.links > 1) {
if (!allLinkUseSamePower(mote)) {
link1 = mote.links[0]
link2 = mote.links[1]
if (link1.power > link2.power) {
addStep(link, CHANGE_DIST, link1.dist-10)
addStep(link, CHANGE_DIST, link2.dist+10)
}
else {
addStep(link, CHANGE_DIST, link1.dist+10)
addStep(link, CHANGE_DIST, link2.dist-10)
}
}
}
}
invoke Executor
module Executor
foreach(step in K.planningSteps) {
if (step.type == CHANGE_POWER) {
effector.setLinkPower(step.link, step.value)
}
else if (step.type == CHANGE_DIST) {
effector.setLinkDistribution
(step.link, step.value)
}
}
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ing Trustworthy Self-Adaptive Software with Dynamic Assurance Cases. In IEEE Transactions
on Software Engineering (TSE). arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.06350. IEEE.
• Weyns, D., & Iftikhar, M. U. (2016). Model-Based Simulation at Runtime for Self-Adaptive
Systems. In IEEE International Conference on Autonomic Computing (ICAC’16), (pp. 364-
373). IEEE.
• Weyns, D., & Iftikhar, M. U. (2017). ActivFORMS: An Efficient Approach to Engineer Self-
Adaptive Systems with Guarantees. Submitted under review.
• Iftikhar, M. U., Lundberg, J., & Weyns, D. (2016). A Model Interpreter for Timed Automata. In
International Symposium on Leveraging Applications of Formal Methods (ISoLA’16) (pp. 243-
258). Springer.
• Iftikhar, M. U., Ramachandran, G. S., Bollanse, P., Weyns, D., & Hughes, D. (2017). DeltaIoT: A
Self-adaptive Internet of things Exemplar. In Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium
on Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems (SEAMS’17) (pp. 76-82).
IEEE.
Additional research publications that are not included in this thesis:
• Iftikhar, M. U., & Weyns, D. (2017), ActivFORMS: A Runtime Environment for Architecture-
Based Adaptation with Guarantees, In IEEE International Conference on Software Architecture
Workshops (ICSAW’17), pp. 278-281. IEEE.
• Algabroun, H., Iftikhar, M. U., Al-Najja, B., & Weyns, D. (2017). Maintenance 4.0 Framework
Using Self-Adaptive Software Architecture. In Second International Conference on Mainte-
nance Engineering (IncoME-II’17).
• Iftikhar, M. U., & Weyns, D. (2016). Towards runtime statistical model checking for self-
adaptive systems. Technical report published in Department of Computer Science, KU Leuven,
Belgium. CW Reports vol:CW693.
• Abbas, N., Andersson, J., Iftikhar, M. U., & Weyns, D. (2016). Rigorous Architectural Rea-
soning for Self-Adaptive Software Systems. In 1st Workshop on Qualitative Reasoning about
Software Architectures (QRASA), (pp. 11-18). IEEE.
• Shevtsov, S., Iftikhar, M. U., &Weyns, D. (2015). SimCA vs ActivFORMS: Comparing Control-
and Architecture-Based Adaptation on the TAS Exemplar. In Proceedings of the 1st International
Workshop on Control Theory for Software Engineering (CTSE15) (pp. 1-8). ACM.
• Iftikhar, M. U., &Weyns, D. (2014). Assuring System Goals under Uncertainty with Active For-
mal Models of Self-Adaptation. In Companion Proceedings of the 36th International Conference
on Software Engineering (ICSE’14) (pp. 604-605). ACM.
213
• Weyns, D., Iftikhar, M. U., & Sderlund, J. (2013). Do External Feedback Loops Improve
the Design of Self-Adaptive Systems? A Controlled Experiment. In Proceedings of the 8th
International Symposium on Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems
(SEAMS’13) (pp. 3-12). IEEE. [Google scholar citations till October 2017: 25]
• Iftikhar, M. U., & Weyns, D. (2012). A Case Study on Formal Verification of Self-Adaptive
Behaviors in a Decentralized System. In Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on
Foundations of Coordination Languages and Self Adaptation (FOCLASA’12) arXiv preprint
arXiv:1208.4635. EPTCS. [Google scholar citations till October 2017: 42]
• Weyns, D., Iftikhar, M. U., De La Iglesia, D. G., & Ahmad, T. (2012). A Survey of Formal
Methods in Self-Adaptive Systems. In Proceedings of the Fifth International C* Conference on
Computer Science and Software Engineering (C3S2E ’12) (pp. 67-79). ACM. [Google scholar
citations till October 2017: 90]
• Weyns, D., Iftikhar, M. U., Malek, S., & Andersson, J. (2012). Claims and Supporting Evi-
dence for Self-Adaptive Systems: A Literature Study. In Proceedings of the 7th International
Symposium on Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems (SEAMS’12) (pp.
89-98). IEEE. [Google scholar citations till October 2017: 47]
• Iftikhar, M. U., & Weyns, D. (2012). Model Checking of Self-Adaptive Behaviors in a Multi-
Agent System for Traffic Monitoring. In 10th European Workshop on Multi-Agent Systems (EU-
MAS’12).
Bibliography
[1] ActivFORMS: Active Formal Models for Self-Adaptation. https : / /
people . cs . kuleuven . be / ˜danny . weyns / software /
ActivFORMS/. 2016.
[2] I. F. Akyildiz et al. “A survey on sensor networks”. In: IEEE Communi-
cations Magazine 40.8 (Aug. 2002), pp. 102–114. ISSN: 0163-6804. DOI:
10.1109/MCOM.2002.1024422.
[3] J. Almeida et al. “Resource Management in the Autonomic Service-
Oriented Architecture”. In: 2006 IEEE International Conference on Auto-
nomic Computing. June 2006, pp. 84–92. DOI: 10.1109/ICAC.2006.
1662385.
[4] R. Alur and D. L. Dill. “A theory of timed automata”. In: Theoretical Com-
puter Science 126.2 (1994), pp. 183–235. ISSN: 0304-3975.
[5] M. Anlauff. “Abstract State Machines - Theory and Applications: Inter-
national Workshop, ASM 2000 Monte Verita`, Switzerland, March 19–
24, 2000 Proceedings”. In: Springer, 2000. Chap. XASM- An Extensible,
Component-Based Abstract State Machines Language, pp. 69–90. ISBN:
978-3-540-44518-0. DOI: 10.1007/3-540-44518-8_6.
[6] P. Arcaini, E. Riccobene, and P. Scandurra. “Formal Design and Verifi-
cation of Self-Adaptive Systems with Decentralized Control”. In: ACM
Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive System 11.4 (Jan. 2017), 25:1–
25:35. ISSN: 1556-4665. DOI: 10.1145/3019598.
[7] Assurances for Self-Adaptive Systems - Principles, Models, and Tech-
niques. Vol. 7740. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2013.
ISBN: 978-3-642-36248-4.
[8] A. Augustin et al. “A Study of LoRa: Long Range and Low Power Net-
works for the Internet of Things”. In: Sensors 16(9) (2016).
[9] M. Autili, P. Inverardi, and M. Tivoli. “Automated Integration of Service-
Oriented Software Systems”. In: International Conference on Fundamen-
tals of Software Engineering, FSEN. Springer, 2015.
[10] A. Aziz et al. “Model-checking continuous-time Markov chains”. In: ACM
Transactions on Computational Logic 1.1 (2000), pp. 162–170. ISSN:
1529-3785.
215
[11] C. Baier and J.-P. Katoen. Principles of Model Checking (Represen-
tation and Mind Series). The MIT Press, 2008. ISBN: 026202649X,
9780262026499.
[12] C. Baier et al. “Model-Checking Algorithms for Continuous-TimeMarkov
Chains”. In: IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 29.6 (2003),
pp. 524–541.
[13] L. Baresi, L. Pasquale, and P. Spoletini. “Fuzzy Goals for Requirements-
Driven Adaptation”. In: Proceedings of the 2010 18th IEEE International
Requirements Engineering Conference. RE ’10. IEEE Computer Society,
2010, pp. 125–134. ISBN: 978-0-7695-4162-4. DOI: 10 . 1109 / RE .
2010.25.
[14] C. Barna et al. “Hogna: A Platform for Self-adaptive Applications in Cloud
Environments”. In: Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on
Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems. SEAMS
’15. IEEE, 2015.
[15] B. Becker et al. “Symbolic Invariant Verification for Systems with Dy-
namic Structural Adaptation”. In: 28th International Conference on Soft-
ware Engineering. ACM, 2006, pp. 72–81. ISBN: 1-59593-375-1. DOI:
10.1145/1134285.1134297.
[16] G. Behrmann, A. David, and K. G. Larsen. “A Tutorial on UPPAAL”. In:
Formal Methods for the Design of Real-Time Systems: 4th International
School on Formal Methods for the Design of Computer, Communication,
and Software Systems, SFM-RT 2004. LNCS 3185. Springer, Sept. 2004,
pp. 200–236.
[17] G. Behrmann et al. “UPPAAL 4.0”. In: QEST’06. 2006, pp. 125–126.
[18] N. Bencomo et al. “Genie: Supporting the Model Driven Development of
Reflective, Component-based Adaptive Systems”. In: Proceedings of the
30th International Conference on Software Engineering. ICSE ’08. ACM,
2008. ISBN: 978-1-60558-079-1.
[19] J. Bengtsson and W. Yi. “Lectures on Concurrency and Petri Nets: Ad-
vances in Petri Nets”. In: Springer, 2004. Chap. Timed Automata: Seman-
tics, Algorithms and Tools, pp. 87–124. ISBN: 978-3-540-27755-2. DOI:
10.1007/978-3-540-27755-2_3.
[20] M. Benjamin et al. “Autonomy for Unmanned Marine Vehicles with
MOOS-IvP”. In: Marine Robot Autonomy. Springer, 2013, pp. 47–90.
ISBN: 978-1-4614-5658-2. DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-5659-9_2.
[21] A. Bianco and L. de Alfaro. “Model checking of probabilistic and nonde-
terministic systems”. In: FSTTCS’95. 1995, pp. 499–513.
[22] P. Bishop and R. Bloomfield. “A Methodology for Safety Case Devel-
opment”. In: Industrial Perspectives of Safety-critical Systems. Springer,
1998, pp. 194–203. ISBN: 978-3-540-76189-1. DOI: 10.1007/978-1-
4471-1534-2_14.
[23] G. Blair, N. Bencomo, and R. B. France. “Models@ run.time”. In: Com-
puter 42.10 (Oct. 2009), pp. 22–27. ISSN: 0018-9162. DOI: 10.1109/
MC.2009.326.
[24] R. Bloomfield and P. Bishop. “Safety and Assurance Cases: Past, Present
and Possible Future— an Adelard Perspective”. In:Making Systems Safer.
Springer, 2010, pp. 51–67. ISBN: 978-1-84996-085-4. DOI: 10.1007/
978-1-84996-086-1_4.
[25] P. Bordia et al. “Uncertainty during organizational change: Types, conse-
quences, and management strategies”. In: Journal of business and psychol-
ogy 18.4 (2004), pp. 507–532.
[26] V. Braberman et al. “Controller Synthesis: From Modelling to Enact-
ment”. In: 35th International Conference on Software Engineering. 2013,
pp. 1347–1350. ISBN: 978-1-4673-3076-3.
[27] O. Brukman, S. Dolev, and E. K. Kolodner. “A Self-stabilizing Autonomic
Recoverer for Eventual Byzantine Software”. In: Journal of Systems and
Software 81.12 (Dec. 2008), pp. 2315–2327. ISSN: 0164-1212. DOI: 10.
1016/j.jss.2008.04.028.
[28] Y. Brun et al. “Engineering Self-Adaptive Systems Through Feedback
Loops”. In: Software Engineering for Self-Adaptive Systems. Springer,
2009, pp. 48–70. ISBN: 978-3-642-02160-2. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-
642-02161-9_3.
[29] R. Buizza, M. Milleer, and T. Palmer. “Stochastic representation of model
uncertainties in the ECMWF ensemble prediction system”. In: Quarterly
Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society 125.560 (1999), pp. 2887–
2908.
[30] A. Cailliau and A. V. Lamsweerde. “Runtime Monitoring and Resolution
of Probabilistic Obstacles to System Goals”. In: 12th International Sym-
posium on Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems.
IEEE, 2017.
[31] R. Calinescu, K. Johnson, and Y. Rafiq. “Developing self-verifying
service-based systems”. In: Automated Software Engineering (ASE), 2013
IEEE/ACM 28th International Conference on. Nov. 2013, pp. 734–737.
DOI: 10.1109/ASE.2013.6693145.
[32] R. Calinescu, K. Johnson, and Y. Rafiq. “Using Observation Ageing
to Improve Markovian Model Learning in QoS Engineering”. In: 2nd
ACM/SPEC International Conference on Performance Engineering. 2011,
pp. 505–510.
[33] R. Calinescu. “General-Purpose Autonomic Computing”. In: Autonomic
Computing and Networking. Springer, 2009, pp. 3–30.
[34] R. Calinescu, S. Gerasimou, and A. Banks. “Self-adaptive Software with
Decentralised Control Loops”. In: FASE’15. Vol. 9033. LNCS. Springer,
2015, pp. 235–251. ISBN: 978-3-662-46674-2. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-
662-46675-9_16.
[35] R. Calinescu and M. Z. Kwiatkowska. “Using Quantitative Analysis to
Implement Autonomic IT Systems”. In: ICSE’09. 2009, pp. 100–110.
[36] R. Calinescu et al. “Adaptive Model Learning for Continual Verification of
Non-functional Properties”. In: 5th ACM/SPEC International Conference
on Performance Engineering. 2014, pp. 87–98.
[37] R. Calinescu et al. “Dynamic QoS Management and Optimization in
Service-Based Systems”. In: IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
37.3 (May 2011), pp. 387–409. ISSN: 0098-5589. DOI: 10.1109/TSE.
2010.92.
[38] R. Calinescu et al. “Self-adaptive software needs quantitative verification
at runtime”. In: Communications of the ACM 55.9 (Sept. 2012), pp. 69–77.
ISSN: 0001-0782. DOI: 10.1145/2330667.2330686.
[39] R. Calinescu et al. “Synthesis and Verification of Self-aware Computing
Systems”. In: Self-Aware Computing Systems. Springer, 2017, pp. 337–
373. ISBN: 978-3-319-47474-8. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-47474-
8_11.
[40] R. Calinescu et al. “Engineering Trustworthy Self-Adaptive Software with
Dynamic Assurance Cases”. In: IEEE Transactions on Software Engineer-
ing ( c  2017 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission).
[41] J. Ca´mara et al. “Analyzing Latency-Aware Self-Adaptation Using
Stochastic Games and Simulations”. In: ACM Transactions on Au-
tonomous and Adaptive Systems 10.4 (Jan. 2016), 23:1–23:28. ISSN: 1556-
4665. DOI: 10.1145/2774222.
[42] J. Ca´mara et al. “Optimal planning for architecture-based self-adaptation
via model checking of stochastic games”. In: 30th Annual ACM Sympo-
sium on Applied Computing. 2015, pp. 428–435.
[43] J. Camara et al. “Robustness-Driven Resilience Evaluation of Self-
Adaptive Software Systems”. In: IEEE Transactions on Dependable and
Secure Computing 14.1 (2017), pp. 50–64.
[44] M. Caporuscio et al. “GoPrime: A Fully Decentralized Middleware for
Utility-Aware Service Assembly”. In: IEEE Transactions on Software En-
gineering 42.2 (Feb. 2016), pp. 136–152. ISSN: 0098-5589. DOI: 10.
1109/TSE.2015.2476797.
[45] A. Cerpa and D. Estrin. “ASCENT: adaptive self-configuring sensor net-
works topologies”. In: IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing 3.3 (July
2004), pp. 272–285. ISSN: 1536-1233. DOI: 10.1109/TMC.2004.16.
[46] T. Chen et al. “Automatic Verification of Competitive Stochastic Systems”.
In: Proc. 18th International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the
Construction and Analysis of Systems (TACAS’12). Vol. 7214. LNCS.
Springer, 2012, pp. 315–330.
[47] B. H. C. Cheng and J. M. Atlee. “Research Directions in Requirements
Engineering”. In: Future of Software Engineering. IEEE, 2007, pp. 285–
303. ISBN: 0-7695-2829-5.
[48] B. H. Cheng et al. “Software Engineering for Self-Adaptive Systems”.
In: Springer, 2009. Chap. Software Engineering for Self-Adaptive Sys-
tems: A Research Roadmap, pp. 1–26. ISBN: 978-3-642-02160-2. DOI:
10.1007/978-3-642-02161-9_1.
[49] B. H. C. Cheng et al. “Models@run.time: Foundations, Applications, and
Roadmaps”. In: Springer, 2014. Chap. Using Models at Runtime to Ad-
dress Assurance for Self-Adaptive Systems, pp. 101–136. ISBN: 978-3-
319-08915-7. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-08915-7_4.
[50] S. W. Cheng, D. Garlan, and B. Schmerl. “Evaluating the effectiveness
of the Rainbow self-adaptive system”. In: 2009 ICSE Workshop on Soft-
ware Engineering for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems. May 2009,
pp. 132–141. DOI: 10.1109/SEAMS.2009.5069082.
[51] E. M. Clarke et al. “Statistical Model Checking in BioLab: Applications
to the Automated Analysis of T-Cell Receptor Signaling Pathway”. In: 6th
International Conference on Computational Methods in Systems Biology.
Springer, 2008.
[52] E. M. Clarke, E. A. Emerson, and A. P. Sistla. “Automatic Verification of
Finite-state Concurrent Systems Using Temporal Logic Specifications”.
In: ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems 8.2 (Apr.
1986), pp. 244–263. ISSN: 0164-0925. DOI: 10.1145/5397.5399.
[53] E. M. Clarke et al. “Model Checking and the State Explosion Problem”. In:
Tools for Practical Software Verification: LASER, International Summer
School 2011, Elba Island, Italy, Revised Tutorial Lectures. Springer, 2012,
pp. 1–30. ISBN: 978-3-642-35746-6. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-
35746-6_1.
[54] E. Clarke, D. Long, and K. McMillan. “Compositional model checking”.
In: Proceedings. Fourth Annual Symposium on Logic in Computer Science.
1989, pp. 353–362.
[55] J. M. Cobleigh, D. Giannakopoulou, and C. S. Pa˘sa˘reanu. “Learning as-
sumptions for compositional verification”. In: 9th International Confer-
ence on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems
(TACAS). 2003, pp. 331–346.
[56] Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement. ISO/IEC 15408 – Common
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Re-
vision 4. Sept. 2012.
[57] A. Computing et al. “An architectural blueprint for autonomic computing”.
In: IBM White Paper 31 (2006).
[58] M. Cordy et al. “Model Checking Adaptive Software with Featured Tran-
sition Systems”. In: Assurances for Self-Adaptive Systems. Vol. 7740.
LNCS. Springer, 2013, pp. 1–29. ISBN: 978-3-642-36248-4. DOI: 10.
1007/978-3-642-36249-1_1.
[59] A. David et al. “Uppaal SMC Tutorial”. In: International Journal on Soft-
ware Tools for Technology Transfer 17.4 (Aug. 2015), pp. 397–415. ISSN:
1433-2779. DOI: 10.1007/s10009-014-0361-y.
[60] E. Denney and G. Pai. “A Formal Basis for Safety Case Patterns”. In:
Comp. Safety, Reliability, and Security. Vol. 8153. LNCS. Springer, 2013,
pp. 21–32. ISBN: 978-3-642-40792-5. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-
40793-2_3.
[61] E. Denney, I. Habli, and G. Pai. “Dynamic Safety Cases for Through-life
Safety Assurance”. In: ICSE’15. 2015, pp. 587–590.
[62] N. R. D’Ippolito et al. “Synthesis of Live Behaviour Models”. In: 18th
ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Foundations of Software En-
gineering. 2010, pp. 77–86. ISBN: 978-1-60558-791-2. DOI: 10.1145/
1882291.1882305.
[63] N. D’Ippolito et al. “Hope for the Best, Prepare for the Worst: Multi-tier
Control for Adaptive Systems”. In: Proceedings of the 36th International
Conference on Software Engineering. ICSE 2014. ACM, 2014, pp. 688–
699. ISBN: 978-1-4503-2756-5. DOI: 10.1145/2568225.2568264.
[64] N. D’Ippolito et al. “Synthesis of live behaviour models for fallible do-
mains”. In: 33rd International Conference on Software Engineering. 2011,
pp. 211–220. DOI: 10.1145/1985793.1985823.
[65] S. Dobson et al. “A Survey of Autonomic Communications”. In: ACM
Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive System 1.2 (Dec. 2006),
pp. 223–259. ISSN: 1556-4665.
[66] D. Dujovne et al. “6TiSCH: deterministic IP-enabled industrial internet (of
things)”. In: IEEE Communications Magazine 52.12 (Dec. 2014), pp. 36–
41. ISSN: 0163-6804. DOI: 10.1109/MCOM.2014.6979984.
[67] A. Elkhodary, N. Esfahani, and S. Malek. “FUSION: a framework for en-
gineering self-tuning self-adaptive software systems”. In: FSE’10. 2010,
pp. 7–16.
[68] I. Epifani et al. “Model evolution by Run-time Parameter Adaptation”. In:
31st International Conference on Software Engineering. 2009, pp. 111–
121. DOI: 10.1109/ICSE.2009.5070513.
[69] N. Esfahani, E. Kouroshfar, and S. Malek. “Taming uncertainty in self-
adaptive software”. In: ESEC/FSE. 2011. ISBN: 978-1-4503-0443-6. DOI:
10.1145/2025113.2025147.
[70] European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation. Safety Case De-
velopment Manual. 2006.
[71] A. Filieri, C. Ghezzi, and G. Tamburrelli. “A formal approach to adap-
tive software: continuous assurance of non-functional requirements”. In:
Formal Asp. Comput. 24.2 (2012), pp. 163–186.
[72] A. Filieri, C. Ghezzi, and G. Tamburrelli. “Run-time Efficient Probabilistic
Model Checking”. In: ICSE’11. 2011, pp. 341–350. DOI: 10.1145/
1985793.1985840.
[73] A. Filieri, G. Tamburrelli, and C. Ghezzi. “Supporting Self-Adaptation via
Quantitative Verification and Sensitivity Analysis at Run Time”. In: IEEE
Transactions on Software Engineering 42.1 (2016), pp. 75–99.
[74] A. Filieri, L. Grunske, and A. Leva. “Lightweight Adaptive Filtering for
Efficient Learning and Updating of Probabilistic Models”. In: Proceedings
of the 37th International Conference on Software Engineering - Volume 1.
ICSE ’15. IEEE, 2015, pp. 200–211. ISBN: 978-1-4799-1934-5.
[75] A. Filieri, H. Hoffmann, and M. Maggio. “Automated Design of Self-
adaptive Software with Control-theoretical Formal Guarantees”. In: Pro-
ceedings of the 36th International Conference on Software Engineering.
ICSE 2014. ACM, 2014, pp. 299–310. ISBN: 978-1-4503-2756-5. DOI:
10.1145/2568225.2568272.
[76] V. Forejt et al. “Incremental Runtime Verification of Probabilistic Sys-
tems”. In: Runtime Verification. Vol. 7687. LNCS. Springer, 2012,
pp. 314–319.
[77] M. Fowler. Domain-specific Languages. Pearson Education, 2010.
[78] E. M. Fredericks, B. DeVries, and B. H. C. Cheng. “Towards Run-time
Adaptation of Test Cases for Self-adaptive Systems in the Face of Un-
certainty”. In: 9th International Symposium on Software Engineering for
Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems. 2014, pp. 17–26. ISBN: 978-1-4503-
2864-7. DOI: 10.1145/2593929.2593937.
[79] D. G. de la Iglesia and D. Weyns. “MAPE-K Formal Templates to Rig-
orously Design Behaviors for Self-Adaptive Systems”. In: ACM Transac-
tions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems 10.3 (Sept. 2015), 15:1–15:31.
ISSN: 1556-4665. DOI: 10.1145/2724719.
[80] S. Gallotti et al. “Quality Prediction of Service Compositions through
Probabilistic Model Checking”. In: Proc. 4th International Conference
on the Quality of Software-Architectures, QoSA 2008. Vol. 5281. LNCS.
Springer, 2008, pp. 119–134. ISBN: 978-3-540-87878-0.
[81] M. Galster and D. Weyns. “Empirical Research in Software Architecture:
How Far have We Come?” In: 2016 13th Working IEEE/IFIP Confer-
ence on Software Architecture (WICSA). Apr. 2016, pp. 11–20. DOI: 10.
1109/WICSA.2016.10.
[82] J. Garcı´a-Gala´n et al. “User-centric Adaptation of Multi-tenant Services:
Preference-based Analysis for Service Reconfiguration”. In: Proceedings
of the 9th International Symposium on Software Engineering for Adaptive
and Self-Managing Systems. SEAMS 2014. ACM, 2014, pp. 65–74. ISBN:
978-1-4503-2864-7. DOI: 10.1145/2593929.2593930.
[83] D. Garlan and B. Schmerl. “Model-based adaptation for self-healing sys-
tems”. In: WOSS. 2002.
[84] D. Garlan et al. “Rainbow: Architecture-Based Self-Adaptation with
Reusable Infrastructure”. In: Computer 37.10 (Oct. 2004), pp. 46–54.
ISSN: 0018-9162. DOI: 10.1109/MC.2004.175.
[85] E. Gat. “Artificial Intelligence and Mobile Robots”. In: MIT Press, 1998.
Chap. Three-layer Architectures, pp. 195–210. ISBN: 0-262-61137-6.
[86] I. Georgiadis, J. Magee, and J. Kramer. “Self-organising Software Archi-
tectures for Distributed Systems”. In: Proceedings of the First Workshop
on Self-healing Systems. WOSS ’02. ACM, 2002, pp. 33–38. ISBN: 1-
58113-609-9. DOI: 10.1145/582128.582135.
[87] S. Gerasimou, R. Calinescu, and A. Banks. “Efficient Runtime Quanti-
tative Verification Using Caching, Lookahead, and Nearly-optimal Re-
configuration”. In: Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on
Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems. SEAMS
2014. ACM, 2014, pp. 115–124. ISBN: 978-1-4503-2864-7. DOI: 10 .
1145/2593929.2593932.
[88] S. Gerasimou, G. Tamburrelli, and R. Calinescu. “Search-Based Synthesis
of Probabilistic Models for Quality-of-Service Software Engineering”. In:
30th International Conference Automated Software Engineering (ASE’15).
2015.
[89] S. Gerasimou et al. “UNDERSEA: An Exemplar for Engineering
Self-Adaptive Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (Artifact)”. In: 2017
IEEE/ACM 12th International Symposium on Software Engineering for
Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems (SEAMS). 2017.
[90] L. Gherardi and N. Hochgeschwender. “RRA: Models and tools for
robotics run-time adaptation”. In: Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS),
2015 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on. Sept. 2015, pp. 1777–1784.
DOI: 10.1109/IROS.2015.7353608.
[91] C. Ghezzi et al. “Managing Non-functional Uncertainty via Model-driven
Adaptivity”. In: Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on Soft-
ware Engineering. ICSE ’13. IEEE, 2013, pp. 33–42. ISBN: 978-1-4673-
3076-3.
[92] C. Ghezzi et al. “Mining Behavior Models from User-intensive Web Ap-
plications”. In: 36th International Conference on Software Engineering.
2014, pp. 277–287.
[93] D. Gil de la Iglesia. “A formal approach for designing distributed self-
adaptive systems”. PhD thesis. Linnaeus University Press, 2014.
[94] D. Gil de la Iglesia and D. Weyns. “Guaranteeing robustness in a mobile
learning application using formally verified MAPE loops”. In: 2013 8th
International Symposium on Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-
Managing Systems (SEAMS). SEAMS. 2013. ISBN: 978-1-4673-4401-2.
[95] GSNWorking Group Online.Goal Structuring Notation Standard, Version
1. Nov. 2011.
[96] H. Hansson and B. Jonsson. “A Logic for Reasoning about Time and Re-
liability”. In: Formal Aspects of Computing 6.5 (1994), pp. 512–535.
[97] K. Havelund et al. “Formal Methods for Real-Time and Probabilistic Sys-
tems”. In: Springer. Chap. Formal Verification of a Power Controller Us-
ing the Real-Time Model Checker Uppaal, pp. 277–298. ISBN: 978-3-540-
48778-4. DOI: 10.1007/3-540-48778-6_17.
[98] R. Hawkins, I. Habli, and T. Kelly. “The principles of software safety as-
surance”. In: 31st International System Safety Conference. 2013.
[99] R. Hawkins, I. Habli, and T. Kelly. “Principled Construction of Software
Safety Cases”. In: SAFECOMP 2013 Workshop on Next Generation of
System Assurance Approaches for Safety-Critical Systems. 2013.
[100] R. Hawkins et al. “Assurance cases and prescriptive software safety cer-
tification: A comparative study”. In: Safety Science 59 (2013), pp. 55–71.
ISSN: 0925-7535. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.
2013.04.007.
[101] R. Hawkins et al. “Using a software safety argument pattern catalogue:
Two case studies”. In: Comp. Safety, Reliability, and Security. Springer,
2011, pp. 185–198.
[102] C. M. Hayden et al. “Specifying and Verifying the Correctness of Dy-
namic Software Updates”. In: International Conference on Verified Soft-
ware: Theories, Tools, Experiments. VSTTE’12. Springer, 2012, pp. 278–
293. ISBN: 978-3-642-27704-7. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-27705-
4_22.
[103] A. Hessel et al. “Formal Methods and Testing: An Outcome of the
FORTEST Network, Revised Selected Papers”. In: Springer, 2008.
Chap. Testing Real-Time Systems Using UPPAAL, pp. 77–117. ISBN: 978-
3-540-78917-8. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-78917-8_3.
[104] C. M. Holloway. “Why Engineers Should Consider Formal Methods”. In:
In 1997 AIAA/IEEE 16th Digital Avionics Systems Conference. 1997, p. 9.
[105] P. Horn. Autonomic computing: IBM’s Perspective on the State of Infor-
mation Technology. 2001.
[106] M. C. Huebscher and J. A. McCann. “A survey of autonomic computing—
degrees, models, and applications”. In: ACM Computer Survey 40.3
(2008), pp. 1–28. ISSN: 0360-0300.
[107] M. U. Iftikhar, J. Lundberg, and D.Weyns. “AModel Interpreter for Timed
Automata”. In: Leveraging Applications of Formal Methods, Verification
and Validation: Foundational Techniques: 7th International Symposium,
ISoLA 2016, Imperial, Corfu, Greece, October 10–14, 2016, Proceedings,
Part I. Springer, 2016, pp. 243–258. ISBN: 978-3-319-47166-2, 2016.With
permission of Springer.
[108] M. U. Iftikhar and D. Weyns. “A Case Study on Formal Verification of
Self-Adaptive Behaviors in a Decentralized System”. In: Foundations of
Coordination Languages and Self Adaptation, FOCLASA, ArXiv e-prints
(Aug. 2012). arXiv: 1208.4635 [cs.SE].
[109] M. U. Iftikhar and D. Weyns. “ActivFORMS: Active FORmal
Models for Self-adaptation”. In: Proceedings of the 9th Interna-
tional Symposium on Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-
Managing Systems. SEAMS 2014. ACM, 2014, pp. 125–134. ISBN:
978-1-4503-2864-7, c  2014 ACM, Inc. Reprinted by permissions,
https://doi.org/10.1145/2593929.2593944.
[110] M. U. Iftikhar and D. Weyns. “Towards runtime statistical model checking
for self-adaptive systems”. In: (2016).
[111] M. U. Iftikhar et al. “DeltaIoT: A Self-Adaptive Internet of Things Ex-
emplar”. In: 12th International Symposium on Software Engineering for
Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems. c  2017 IEEE. Reprinted, with per-
mission.
[112] J. Zhang and B. Cheng. “Model-based development of dynamically adap-
tive software”. In: 28th International Conference on Software Engineer-
ing. ACM, 2006.
[113] K. Johnson, R. Calinescu, and S. Kikuchi. “An Incremental Verification
Framework for Component-Based Software Systems”. In: 16th Interna-
tional ACM Sigsoft Symposium on Component-Based Software Engineer-
ing. 2013, pp. 33–42.
[114] G. Karsai and J. Sztipanovits. “A model-based approach to self-adaptive
software”. In: Intelligent Systems and their Applications, IEEE 14.3 (May
1999), pp. 46–53. ISSN: 1094-7167. DOI: 10.1109/5254.769884.
[115] T. Kelly and R. Weaver. “The Goal Structuring Notation – A Safety Argu-
ment Notation”. In: Assurance Cases Workshop. 2004.
[116] J. Kephart. “Research challenges of autonomic computing”. In: Interna-
tional Conference on Software Engineering. 2005.
[117] J. Kephart and D. Chess. “The Vision of Autonomic Computing”. In:Com-
puter 36.1 (Jan. 2003), pp. 41–50. ISSN: 0018-9162. DOI: 10.1109/MC.
2003.1160055.
[118] N. Khakpour, F. Arbab, and E. Rutten. “Synthesizing structural and behav-
ioral control for reconfigurations in component-based systems”. In: For-
mal Aspects of Computing 28.1 (2016), pp. 21–43. ISSN: 1433-299X. DOI:
10.1007/s00165-015-0346-y.
[119] R. Khan et al. “Future Internet: The Internet of Things Architecture, Pos-
sible Applications and Key Challenges”. In: 2012 10th International Con-
ference on Frontiers of Information Technology. Dec. 2012, pp. 257–260.
DOI: 10.1109/FIT.2012.53.
[120] M. Kit et al. “An Architecture Framework for Experimentations with Self-
adaptive Cyber-physical Systems”. In: Symposium on Software Engineer-
ing for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems. SEAMS ’15. IEEE, 2015.
[121] J. Knight, J. Rowanhill, and J. Xiang. “A Safety Condition Monitoring
System”. In: 3rd International Workshop on Assurance Cases for Software
Intensive Systems. 2015.
[122] J. Kramer and J. Magee. “Self-Managed Systems: an Architectural Chal-
lenge”. In: Future of Software Engineering, 2007. FOSE ’07. May 2007,
pp. 259–268. DOI: 10.1109/FOSE.2007.19.
[123] J. Kramer and J. Magee. “The Evolving Philosophers Problem: Dynamic
Change Management”. In: IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
16.11 (Nov. 1990). ISSN: 0098-5589.
[124] C. M. Krishna. “Real-Time Systems”. In: Wiley Encyclopedia of Electri-
cal and Electronics Engineering. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2001. ISBN:
9780471346081. DOI: 10.1002/047134608X.W1683.
[125] C. Krupitzer et al. “A survey on engineering approaches for self-adaptive
systems”. In: Pervasive and Mobile Computing 17, Part B (2015), pp. 184–
206. ISSN: 1574-1192. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
pmcj.2014.09.009.
[126] M. Kwiatkowska, G. Norman, and D. Parker. “PRISM 4.0: Verifica-
tion of Probabilistic Real-time Systems”. In: Computer aided verification.
Springer. 2011, pp. 585–591.
[127] M. Lahijanian, S. B. Andersson, and C. Belta. “Formal Verification and
Synthesis for Discrete-Time Stochastic Systems”. In: IEEE Transactions
on Automatic Control 60.8 (2015), pp. 2031–2045. DOI: 10.1109/TAC.
2015.2398883.
[128] Y. Laurent et al. “Formalization of fUML: An Application to Process Veri-
fication”. In: Advanced Information Systems Engineering. Springer. 2014,
pp. 347–363.
[129] A. Legay and B. Delahaye. “Statistical Model Checking : An Overview”.
In: CoRR abs/1005.1327 (2010).
[130] A. Legay, B. Delahaye, and S. Bensalem. “Statistical Model Checking: An
Overview.” In: RV 10 (2010), pp. 122–135.
[131] A. Legay, S. Sedwards, and L.-M. Traonouez. “Rare Events for Statisti-
cal Model Checking an Overview”. In: Reachability Problems. Springer,
2016.
[132] R. de Lemos et al. “Software Engineering for Self-adaptive Systems: Re-
search Challenges in the Provision of Assurances”. In: Software Engineer-
ing for Self-Adaptive Systems III. Lecture Notes in Computer Science vol.
9640: Springer, 2017.
[133] R. de Lemos et al. “Software Engineering for Self-Adaptive Systems II: In-
ternational Seminar, Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, October 24-29, 2010 Re-
vised Selected and Invited Papers”. In: Springer, 2013. Chap. Software
Engineering for Self-Adaptive Systems: A Second Research Roadmap,
pp. 1–32. ISBN: 978-3-642-35813-5. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-
35813-5_1.
[134] R. de Lemos et al. “Software Engineering for Self-Adaptive Systems: A
Second Research Roadmap”. In: Software Engineering for Self-Adaptive
Systems II. Vol. 7475. LNCS. Springer, 2013, pp. 1–32. ISBN: 978-3-642-
35812-8. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-35813-5_1.
[135] R. de Lemos et al. “Software Engineering for Self-Adaptive Systems: As-
surances (Dagstuhl Seminar 13511)”. In: Dagstuhl Reports 3.12 (2014),
pp. 67–96. ISSN: 2192-5283. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4230/
DagRep.3.12.67.
[136] L. Li et al. “Modeling and Analyzing the Reliability and Cost of Service
Composition in the IoT: A Probabilistic Approach”. In: 2012 IEEE 19th
International Conference on Web Services. June 2012, pp. 584–591. DOI:
10.1109/ICWS.2012.25.
[137] B. Littlewood and D. Wright. “The Use of Multilegged Arguments to
Increase Confidence in Safety Claims for Software-Based Systems”. In:
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 33.5 (2007), pp. 347–365.
[138] C. Lu et al. “Feedback Control Real-Time Scheduling: Framework, Mod-
eling, and Algorithms*”. In: Real-Time Systems 23.1 (2002), pp. 85–126.
ISSN: 1573-1383. DOI: 10.1023/A:1015398403337.
[139] F. D. Macı´as-Escriva´ et al. “Self-adaptive systems: A survey of current
approaches, research challenges and applications”. In: Expert Systems
with Applications 40.18 (2013), pp. 7267–7279. ISSN: 0957-4174. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2013.07.033.
[140] J. Magee and T. Maibaum. “Towards Specification, Modelling and Anal-
ysis of Fault Tolerance in Self Managed Systems”. In: Proceedings of the
2006 International Workshop on Self-adaptation and Self-managing Sys-
tems. SEAMS ’06. ACM, 2006, pp. 30–36. ISBN: 1-59593-403-0. DOI:
10.1145/1137677.1137684.
[141] S. Mahdavi-Hezavehi et al. “A systematic literature review on methods
that handle multiple quality attributes in architecture-based self-adaptive
systems”. In: Information and Software Technology 90.Supplement C
(2017), pp. 1–26. ISSN: 0950-5849. DOI: https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.infsof.2017.03.013.
[142] V. P. L. Manna et al. “Formalizing correctness criteria of dynamic up-
dates derived from specification changes”. In: Proceedings of the 8th In-
ternational Symposium on Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-
Managing Systems. 2013, pp. 63–72.
[143] S. J. Mellor and M. Balcer. Executable UML: A Foundation for Model-
Driven Architectures. Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing Co., Inc.,
2002. ISBN: 0201748045.
[144] N. Metropolis et al. “Equation of state calculations by fast computing ma-
chines”. In: The journal of chemical physics 21.6 (1953), pp. 1087–1092.
[145] G. A. Moreno et al. “Proactive Self-adaptation Under Uncertainty: A Prob-
abilistic Model Checking Approach”. In: Foundations of Software Engi-
neering. ACM, 2015.
[146] J. M. Murphy et al. “Quantification of modelling uncertainties in a large
ensemble of climate change simulations”. In: Nature 430.7001 (2004),
pp. 768–772.
[147] L. Nahabedian et al. “Assured and Correct Dynamic Update of Con-
trollers”. In: 11th International Symposium on Software Engineering for
Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems. ACM, 2016, pp. 96–107. ISBN: 978-
1-4503-4187-5.
[148] E. Y. Nakagawa et al. “The State of the Art and Future Perspectives in
Systems of Systems Software Architectures”. In: Proceedings of the First
International Workshop on Software Engineering for Systems-of-Systems.
SESoS ’13. ACM, 2013, pp. 13–20. ISBN: 978-1-4503-2048-1. DOI: 10.
1145/2489850.2489853.
[149] North European Functional Airspace Block. NEFAB Project—Safety Case
Report, Version 3.01. Dec. 2011.
[150] P. Oreizy, N. Medvidovic, and R. N. Taylor. “Architecture-based Runtime
Software Evolution”. In: Proceedings of the 20th International Confer-
ence on Software Engineering. ICSE ’98. IEEE Computer Society, 1998,
pp. 177–186. ISBN: 0-8186-8368-6.
[151] P. Oreizy et al. “An Architecture-Based Approach to Self-Adaptive Soft-
ware”. In: IEEE Intelligent Systems 14.3 (May 1999), pp. 54–62. ISSN:
1541-1672. DOI: 10.1109/5254.769885.
[152] T. J. Parr and R. W. Quong. “ANTLR: A Predicated-LL(K) Parser Genera-
tor”. In: Software Practice and Experience 25.7 (July 1995), pp. 789–810.
ISSN: 0038-0644. DOI: 10.1002/spe.4380250705.
[153] D. Perez-Palacin, R. Calinescu, and J. Merseguer. “Log2Cloud: Log-based
Prediction of Cost-performance Trade-offs for Cloud Deployments”. In:
28th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing. 2013, pp. 397–404.
[154] D. Perez-Palacin and R. Mirandola. “Uncertainties in the Modeling of
Self-adaptive Systems: A Taxonomy and an Example of Availability Eval-
uation”. In: Proceedings of the 5th ACM/SPEC International Conference
on Performance Engineering. ICPE ’14. ACM, 2014, pp. 3–14. ISBN: 978-
1-4503-2733-6. DOI: 10.1145/2568088.2568095.
[155] A. Pnueli. “The temporal logic of programs”. In: 18th Annual Symposium
on Foundations of Computer Science. 1977, pp. 46–57. DOI: 10.1109/
SFCS.1977.32.
[156] H. B. Po¨tter and A. Sztajnberg. “Adapting Heterogeneous Devices into
an IoT Context-aware Infrastructure”. In: Proceedings of the 11th In-
ternational Symposium on Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-
Managing Systems. SEAMS ’16. ACM, 2016.
[157] H. Psaier and S. Dustdar. “A survey on self-healing systems: approaches
and systems”. In: Computing 91.1 (2011), pp. 43–73. ISSN: 0010-485X.
DOI: 10.1007/s00607-010-0107-y.
[158] T. Quatmann et al. “Parameter Synthesis for Markov Models: Faster Than
Ever”. In: 14th International Symposium on Automated Technology for
Verification and Analysis (ATVA). 2016, pp. 50–67.
[159] G. Ramachandran et al. “uPnP-WAN: Application of LoRa and its deploy-
ment in DR Congo”. In: Proceedings of the 9th International Conference
on Communication Systems and Networks. 2017.
[160] P. J. G. Ramadge and W. M. Wonham. “The control of discrete event sys-
tems”. In: Proceedings of the IEEE 77.1 (Jan. 1989), pp. 81–98. ISSN:
0018-9219. DOI: 10.1109/5.21072.
[161] E. Reisner et al. “Using Symbolic Evaluation to Understand Behavior in
Configurable Software Systems”. In: ACM/IEEE International Conference
on Software Engineering. ICSE ’10. ACM, 2010, pp. 445–454. ISBN: 978-
1-60558-719-6. DOI: 10.1145/1806799.1806864.
[162] Royal Academy of Engineering. Establishing High-Level Evidence for the
Safety and Efficacy of Medical Devices and Systems. Jan. 2013.
[163] J. Rushby. The Interpretation and Evaluation of Assurance Cases. Tech.
rep. SRI-CSL-15-01. Comp. Science Laboratory, SRI International, 2015.
[164] M. Salehie and L. Tahvildari. “Self-adaptive Software: Landscape and Re-
search Challenges”. In: ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive
Systems 4.2 (May 2009), 14:1–14:42. ISSN: 1556-4665. DOI: 10.1145/
1516533.1516538.
[165] P. Sawyer et al. “Requirements-Aware Systems: A Research Agenda for
RE for Self-adaptive Systems”. In: 2010 18th IEEE International Require-
ments Engineering Conference. Sept. 2010, pp. 95–103.
[166] B. Schmerl et al. “Challenges in Composing and Decomposing Assurances
for Self-Adaptive Systems”. In: Software Engineering for Self-Adaptive
Systems (SEfSAS) 3. 9640. Springer, 2017.
[167] D. C. Schmidt. “Model-driven Engineering”. In: COMPUTER-IEEE
COMPUTER SOCIETY- 39.2 (2006), p. 25.
[168] D. Schneider and M. Trapp. “Conditional Safety Certification of Open
Adaptive Systems”. In: ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive
Systems 8.2 (July 2013), 8:1–8:20. ISSN: 1556-4665. DOI: 10.1145/
2491465.2491467.
[169] K. Shah and M. Kumar. “Distributed Independent Reinforcement Learn-
ing (DIRL) Approach to Resource Management in Wireless Sensor Net-
works”. In: 2007 IEEE International Conference on Mobile Adhoc and
Sensor Systems. Oct. 2007, pp. 1–9. DOI: 10.1109/MOBHOC.2007.
4428658.
[170] S. Shevtsov, M. U. Iftikhar, and D. Weyns. “SimCA vs ActivFORMS:
Comparing Control- and Architecture-based Adaptation on the TAS Ex-
emplar”. In: Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Control
Theory for Software Engineering. CTSE 2015. ACM, 2015, pp. 1–8. ISBN:
978-1-4503-3814-1. DOI: 10.1145/2804337.2804338.
[171] S. Shevtsov and D. Weyns. “Keep It SIMPLEX: Satisfying Multiple Goals
with Guarantees in Control-based Self-adaptive Systems”. In: 24th ACM
SIGSOFT International Symposium on Foundations of Software Engineer-
ing (FSE’16). 2016, pp. 229–241.
[172] S. Shevtsov et al. “Systematic Literature Review on Control-Theoretical
Software Adaptation”. In: IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
(2017).
[173] A. Solomon et al. “Business Process Adaptation on a Tracked Simula-
tion Model”. In: Proceedings of the 2010 Conference of the Center for
Advanced Studies on Collaborative Research. CASCON ’10. IBM Corp.,
2010, pp. 184–198. DOI: 10.1145/1923947.1923967.
[174] G. Sousa, W. Rudametkin, and L. Duchien. “Extending Dynamic Software
Product Lines with Temporal Constraints”. In: Proceedings of the 12th
International Symposium on Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-
Managing Systems. SEAMS 17. ACM, 2017.
[175] V. E. Souza et al. “Requirements-driven Software Evolution”. In: Comput.
Sci. 28.4 (Nov. 2013), pp. 311–329. ISSN: 1865-2034. DOI: 10.1007/
s00450-012-0232-2.
[176] M. Spielmann. “Abstract State Machines: Verification Problems and Com-
plexity”. PhD thesis. Bibliothek der RWTH Aachen, 2000.
[177] D. Spinellis. “Notable Design Patterns for Domain Specific Languages”.
In: Journal of Systems and Software 56.1 (Feb. 2001), pp. 91–99. ISSN:
0164-1212. DOI: 10.1016/S0164-1212(00)00089-3.
[178] J. Spriggs. GSN – The Goal Structuring Notation. A Structured Approach
to Presenting Arguments. Springer, 2012.
[179] S. D. Stoller et al. “Runtime Verification with State Estimation”. In: Pro-
ceedings of the Second International Conference on Runtime Verification.
RV’11. Springer, 2012, pp. 193–207. ISBN: 978-3-642-29859-2. DOI: 10.
1007/978-3-642-29860-8_15.
[180] G. Su et al. “An Iterative Decision-Making Scheme for Markov Decision
Processes and Its Application to Self-adaptive Systems”. In: 19th Interna-
tional Conference on Fundamental Approaches to Software Engineering
(FASE). 2016, pp. 269–286.
[181] J. Swanson et al. “Beyond the Rainbow: Self-adaptive Failure Avoidance
in Configurable Systems”. In: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSOFT
International Symposium on Foundations of Software Engineering. FSE
2014. ACM, 2014, pp. 377–388. ISBN: 978-1-4503-3056-5. DOI: 10 .
1145/2635868.2635915.
[182] D. Sykes, J. Magee, and J. Kramer. “FlashMob: Distributed Adaptive Self-
assembly”. In: Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Soft-
ware Engineering for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems. SEAMS ’11.
ACM, 2011, pp. 100–109. ISBN: 978-1-4503-0575-4. DOI: 10.1145/
1988008.1988023.
[183] P. Tabuada. Verification and Control of Hybrid Systems. Springer, 2009.
[184] B. Takhedmit and K. Abbas. “A parametric uncertainty analysis method
for queues with vacations”. In: Journal of Computational and Applied
Mathematics 312.Supplement C (2017). ICMCMST 2015, pp. 143–155.
ISSN: 0377-0427. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cam.
2016.02.031.
[185] G. Tamura et al. “Towards Practical Runtime Verification and Valida-
tion of Self-Adaptive Software Systems”. In: Software Engineering for
Self-Adaptive Systems II. Vol. 7475. Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
Springer, 2013.
[186] G. Tamura et al. “Software Engineering for Self-Adaptive Systems II: In-
ternational Seminar, Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, October 24-29, 2010 Re-
vised Selected and Invited Papers”. In: Springer, 2013. Chap. Towards
Practical Runtime Verification and Validation of Self-Adaptive Software
Systems, pp. 108–132. ISBN: 978-3-642-35813-5. DOI: 10.1007/978-
3-642-35813-5_5.
[187] C. T¸a˘pus¸, I.-H. Chung, and J. K. Hollingsworth. “Active Harmony: To-
wards Automated Performance Tuning”. In: ACM/IEEE Conference on
Supercomputing. SC ’02. IEEE Computer Society Press, 2002, pp. 1–11.
[188] G. Tesauro et al. “A multi-agent systems approach to autonomic comput-
ing”. In: Third International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Mul-
tiagent Systems. 2004, pp. 464–471.
[189] J. Tretmans. “Formal methods and testing”. In: Springer, 2008.
Chap. Model based testing with labelled transition systems, pp. 1–38.
ISBN: 3-540-78916-2, 978-3-540-78916-1.
[190] S. Tschirner, L. Xuedong, and W. Yi. “Model-based Validation of QoS
Properties of Biomedical Sensor Networks”. In: Proceedings of the 8th
ACM International Conference on Embedded Software. EMSOFT ’08.
ACM, 2008.
[191] UK Civil Aviation Authority. Unmanned Aircraft System Operations in
UK Airspace — Guidance. CAP 722. Sixth Edition. 2015.
[192] UK Health & Safety Commission. The use of computers in safety-critical
applications. 1998.
[193] UK Ministry of Defence. Defence Standard 00-56, Issue 4: Safety Man-
agement Requirements for Defence Systems. June 2007.
[194] UK Office for Nuclear Regulation. The Purpose, Scope, and Content of
Safety Cases, Rev. 3. July 2013.
[195] University of Virginia Dependability and Security Research Group. Safety
case repository. 2014.
[196] US Dept. Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration.
Infusion Pumps Total Product Life Cycle—Guidance for Industry & FDA
Staff. 2014.
[197] S. Uttamchandani et al. “CHAMELEON: A Self-Evolving, Fully-
Adaptive Resource Arbitrator for Storage Systems”. In: USENIX Annual
Technical Conference, General Track. 2005, pp. 75–88.
[198] A. Valmari. “The state explosion problem”. In: Lectures on Petri Nets I:
Basic Models: Advances in Petri Nets. Springer, 1998, pp. 429–528. ISBN:
978-3-540-49442-3. DOI: 10.1007/3-540-65306-6_21.
[199] N. M. Villegas et al. “A Framework for Evaluating Quality-driven Self-
adaptive Software Systems”. In: 6th International Symposium on Software
Engineering for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems. 2011, pp. 80–89.
[200] T. Vogel and H. Giese. “Model-Driven Engineering of Self-Adaptive Soft-
ware with EUREMA”. In: ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adap-
tive Systems (TAAS) 8.4 (Jan. 2014), 18:1–18:33. ISSN: 1556-4665. DOI:
10.1145/2555612.
[201] W. Walsh et al. “Utility functions in autonomic systems”. In: IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Autonomic Computing. 2004, pp. 70–77.
[202] Y. Wang, M. Martonosi, and L.-S. Peh. “Predicting Link Quality Using
Supervised Learning inWireless Sensor Networks”. In: SIGMOBILEMob.
Comput. Commun. Rev. 11.3 (July 2007), pp. 71–83. ISSN: 1559-1662.
[203] D. Weyns. “Software Engineering of Self-Adaptive Systems:
An Organised Tour and Future Challenges”. In: Chapter in
Handbook of Software Engineering (2017). (forthcoming;
https://people.cs.kuleuven.be/danny.weyns/papers/2017HSE.pdf).
[204] D. Weyns and R. Calinescu. “Tele Assistance: A Self-Adaptive Service-
Based System Exemplar”. In: 2015 IEEE/ACM 10th International Sympo-
sium on Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems.
May 2015, pp. 88–92. DOI: 10.1109/SEAMS.2015.27.
[205] D. Weyns and M. U. Iftikhar. “ActivFORMS: An Efficient Approach
to Engineer Self-Adaptive Systems with Guarantees”. In: Under review
(2017).
[206] D. Weyns, S. S., and S. Pllana. “Providing Assurances for Self-Adaptation
in a Mobile Digital Storytelling Application Using ActivFORMS”. In:
Self-Organising and Self-Adaptive Systems SASO. 2014.
[207] D. Weyns. “Towards an Integrated Approach for Validating Qualities of
Self-adaptive Systems”. In: Proceedings of the Ninth International Work-
shop on Dynamic Analysis. ACM, 2012, pp. 24–29. ISBN: 978-1-4503-
1455-8.
[208] D. Weyns and T. Ahmad. “Claims and Evidence for Architecture-based
Self-adaptation: A Systematic Literature Review”. In: Proceedings of the
7th European Conference on Software Architecture. ECSA’13. Springer,
2013, pp. 249–265. ISBN: 978-3-642-39030-2. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-
642-39031-9_22.
[209] D. Weyns and M. U. Iftikhar. “Model-based Simulation at Runtime for
Self-adaptive Systems, 2017”. In: Models at Runtime, IEEE International
Conference on Autonomic Computing (ICAC). MODELS 2016. c  2016
IEEE. Reprinted, with permission.
[210] D. Weyns, M. U. Iftikhar, and J. So¨derlund. “Do External Feedback Loops
Improve the Design of Self-adaptive Systems? A Controlled Experiment”.
In: Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Software Engineer-
ing for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems. SEAMS ’13. IEEE, 2013,
pp. 3–12. ISBN: 978-1-4673-4401-2.
[211] D. Weyns, S. Malek, and J. Andersson. “FORMS: Unifying reference
model for formal specification of distributed self-adaptive systems”. In:
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems 7.1 (2012), p. 8.
[212] D. Weyns et al. “Claims and Supporting Evidence for Self-adaptive Sys-
tems: A Literature Study”. In: Proceedings of the 7th International Sym-
posium on Software Engineering for Adaptive and Self-Managing Systems.
SEAMS ’12. IEEE, 2012, pp. 89–98. ISBN: 978-1-4673-1787-0.
[213] D. Weyns et al. “Perpetual Assurances in Self-Adaptive Systems”. In: Soft-
ware Engineering for Self-Adaptive Systems III. Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, Springer, 2016.
[214] D. Weyns et al. “A Survey of Formal Methods in Self-adaptive Systems”.
In: Proceedings of the Fifth International C* Conference on Computer
Science and Software Engineering. C3S2E ’12. ACM, 2012, pp. 67–79.
ISBN: 978-1-4503-1084-0. DOI: 10.1145/2347583.2347592.
[215] S. R. White et al. “An architectural approach to autonomic computing”. In:
International Conference on Autonomic Computing. IEEE. 2004, pp. 2–9.
[216] J. Whittle et al. “RELAX: a language to address uncertainty in
self-adaptive systems requirement”. In: Requirements Engineering 15.2
(2010). ISSN: 0947-3602. DOI: 10.1007/s00766-010-0101-0.
[217] J. Whittle et al. “RELAX: Incorporating Uncertainty into the Specifica-
tion of Self-Adaptive Systems”. In: 17th IEEE International Requirements
Engineering Conference. Aug. 2009, pp. 79–88. DOI: 10.1109/RE.
2009.36.
[218] L. D. Xu, W. He, and S. Li. “Internet of Things in Industries: A Sur-
vey”. In: IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics 10.4 (Nov. 2014),
pp. 2233–2243. ISSN: 1551-3203. DOI: 10 . 1109 / TII . 2014 .
2300753.
[219] H. L. S. Younes. “Verification and Planning for Stochastic Processes with
Asynchronous Events”. AAI3159989. PhD thesis. 2004. ISBN: 0-496-
93475-9.
[220] M. Zamani, N. van de Wouw, and R. Majumdar. “Backstepping con-
troller synthesis and characterizations of incremental stability”. In: Sys-
tems & Control Letters 62.10 (2013), pp. 949–962. DOI: 10.1016/j.
sysconle.2013.07.002.
[221] J. Zhang and B. H. Cheng. “Using temporal logic to specify adaptive
program semantics”. In: Journal of Systems and Software 79.10 (2006),
pp. 1361–1369. ISSN: 0164-1212. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.
1016/j.jss.2006.02.062.
[222] J. Zhang, H. J. Goldsby, and B. H. Cheng. “Modular Verification of Dy-
namically Adaptive Systems”. In: AOSD. 2009.
[223] G. Zhou et al. “Impact of Radio Irregularity on Wireless Sensor Net-
works”. In: Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Mobile
Systems, Applications, and Services. MobiSys ’04. ACM, 2004. ISBN: 1-
58113-793-1.
[224] P. Zoghi et al. “Designing Adaptive Applications Deployed on Cloud En-
vironments”. In: ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems
10.4 (Jan. 2016), 25:1–25:26.
 A Model-Based Approach to  
Engineer Self-Adaptive Systems 
with Guarantees
A
 M
odel-B
ased A
pproach to E
ngineer S
elf-A
daptive S
ystem
s w
ith G
uarantees
M
uham
m
ad  
U
sm
an Iftikhar
Muhammad Usman Iftikhar
   
   
   
                                                 
   
     
     
 
    
   
     
    
   
   
   
     
    
   
  
   
      
     
    
  
 
      
   
      
     
    
  
   
      
      
    
  
  
     
      
    
  
   
      
      
    
  
 December 18, 2017
        ISBN: 978-91-88761-04-0 (print), 978-91-88761-05-7 (pdf)
Prof. Danny Weyns 
Dr. Jesper Andersson
Supervisor(s):
Dissertation presented in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the 
dual degree of Doctor of Computer 
Science from Linnaeus University and
Doctor of Engineering Science (PhD): 
Computer Science from KU Leuven.
